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was himself the last eminent Federalist. His great colleagues and rivals, Calhoun and Clay, were not disciples of Adams. Clay was a compromiser, Calhoun out-Jeffersoned Jefferson. In 1850, that critical date in American history, when Webster and Clay and Calhoun were the second Triumvirate as Jefferson, Madison and Monroe were the first, so greatly had the American mind changed that had John Adams been mentioned, he had been spoken of merely as one of our early Presidents.

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A critical examination of the evidence shows that despite Adams's political principles, he was forsaken by his party and its leaders on personal grounds, as a tactless, obstinate man, facing the blast but never bowing before the wind. Firm in his convictions, he would not pay the price of popularity, even at the cost of reëlection to the Presidency. Jefferson's description of the office as "a splendid misery" would never have been made by Adams. Indeed there is much evidence that Jefferson rated the Presidential office far below political leadership and the founding and organizing of a powerful political party. There is inferential evidence that Adams made precisely a contrary rating. Since the French Revolution, during the early days of which Jefferson was American Minister in Paris, his political ideas have moved forward steadily and triumphantly in Europe. His famous letter on the incapacity of kings and royal families generally was an early epitaph on monarchy. Within recent years his ideas have made yet greater strides. It was Cavour who said, nearly three generations ago, "Society is marching with long strides toward democracy. Is it a good? Is it an evil? I know little enough; but it is, in my opinion, the inevitable future of humanity". Whether or not we like the Jeffersonian trend in government, the Jeffersonian trend is on. No sane man, with the evidence before him, can justly accuse John Adams of lack of statesmanship, or that he failed to follow in the footsteps of Washington, as far as he could follow them. It was the man, Adams, not the statesmanship, that lost. In Jefferson it is the man and the statesmanship which have won.

FRANCIS N. THORPE,

THE FIRST PAN-AMERICAN CONGRESS

BY CARLOS E. CASTAÑEDA

ON June 22, 1926, the Republic of Panama and the PanAmerican Union, representing the twenty-one republics of North and South America, will celebrate the one hundredth anniversary of the First Pan-American Congress held in Panama. Though only four countries, Colombia, Central America, Mexico and Peru, were represented at this meeting and nothing was accomplished, the treaties, conventions, and agreements adopted not having been ratified by any of the nations represented except Colombia, nevertheless this was the first attempt to bring together all the countries of America to establish a basis for a better understanding between them and to strengthen their common ties of interest and friendship. As an eminent historian has said: "It showed the desire to avoid the evils which might arise out of the intercourse of these new States with the Great Powers, the desire to extinguish the germs of civil discord, to kill the spirit of revolt, to establish peaceful methods for the settlements of all disputes, and to make the new States, as far as possible, powerful, capable of all progress and aggrandizement, and equal, not formally and on paper, but actually and practically, to the great nations of the world." This was, undoubtedly, the idea of the man who issued the call for the meeting, Simón Bolívar. With that keen perception that characterized his famous prophesies regarding political strife and social problems, he saw and felt deeply the need for an organization of the new republics; and, in his vivid imagination, the idea immediately took form and shape. Today, after one hundred years of varying success and slow but certain progress, his dream has at last become a reality, and the union of the American republics is the greatest guarantee of peace and good will in the New World.

In 1826, Spanish America, that vast empire of Spain that stretched from the western boundary of the Louisiana Purchase

to the Strait of Magellan, had just shaken the yoke of tyranny and become practically independent of the mother country. The new States, carved out of this immense territory, were struggling to readjust themselves to new conditions, and the liberty which they had at last attained was like a dangerous plaything to which they had not yet become accustomed. The tyranny of Spain was being replaced by the petty and more galling tyranny of local leaders and demigods who sprang up everywhere. With no other political experience than that gained in the local government of the town councils, the leaders found themselves like sailors suddenly placed in charge of a ship upon a stormy sea of internal strife, personal ambitions, and political inexperience. The political ideas of the French Revolution had created a ferment among the members of the creole class who were the educated few, while the success of the United States stood before their eyes as a shining example of what a free democracy could accomplish. But the great masses of the people were ignorant, indifferent, and incapable of governing themselves. The moment was a critical one. It was then that Bolívar, the great Liberator of South America, the impulsive leader and dreamer whom "defeat made more terrible" in the dark days of the revolt against Spain, foresaw the advantages of a union of all the infant States in the new world. Thus collectively they could all the better withstand foreign aggression and individually they could all the better help each other, preventing disagreements and disputes that would necessarily prove disastrous in the first years of their independence.

As early as 1822, Bolívar addressed the Governments of Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Buenos Aires, and invited them to send delegates to a congress of plenipotentiaries "that should act as a council in great conflicts, to be appealed to in case of common danger, and be a faithful interpreter, in short, of all differences." His proposal was answered only by Mexico and Peru. Undaunted, he persisted with his idea, and in 1824 he again addressed all the Governments of the newly created States in Spanish America, urging them to delay no longer, for the "movement of the world hurries everything on, and may accelerate to our harm." He felt keenly, painfully, the fundamental impor

tance of such a Congress in promoting peace and good will in America. "The day our plenipotentiaries make the exchange of their powers will stamp in the diplomatic history of the world an immortal epoch."

The response to the appeal for a Congress of plenipotentiaries, representing the States of the New World, was slow. The various countries of Spanish America were busily engaged at this time in regulating the more pressing questions of internal affairs, and the result was that two years elapsed before the Congress actually met. Only four countries were represented, although seven had replied favorably, among them the United States.

Unfortunately the delegates of the United States, Mr. Richard G. Anderson and Mr. John Sergeant, arrived too late in Panama to participate in the Congress. The bitter opposition of the House and the Senate to the appointment of delegates had delayed action and aroused suspicion as to the private ambitions of Bolívar, who was openly accused of trying to form a confederacy of all the States that had been created from the former Spanish colonies and of making himself its supreme ruler.

Were any of these charges true? Nothing was further from the dreams of the Liberator who repeatedly had asserted that a confederacy of all the new States was impossible and unwise, that the different Spanish colonies, though having many points in common, were fundamentally distinct entities in themselves, and that each should form an independent government suited to its particular needs. As a matter of fact, at this time he already foresaw the inevitable falling away of the union of Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru, all three of which constituted Greater Colombia. This State was the cherished child of the ardent imagination of the Liberator, but it was formally dissolved in 1830. In his private letters, in his invitation to the Congress, in his public addresses, and in his instructions to the delegates of Peru, there is absolutely no evidence that he had any ulterior motives in calling the first Pan-American Congress, or that he desired to make himself the supreme ruler of Spanish America.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that Bolívar's idea was not to form a Pan-American Union in our modern sense, but rather a Spanish American Union that should include only the

States created out of the former Spanish colonies. In his invitation he did not include the United States. It was the Ministers of Mexico and Colombia that extended an invitation to this country.

Why did Bolívar exclude the United States from the great PanAmerican Congress of the Isthmus? Did he have any animosity against them? The chief reason is found plainly stated in the second clause of his two expressed purposes of the Congress: "The establishment of certain fixed principles for securing the preservation of peace between the nations of America, and the concurrence of all those nations to defend their common cause, each one contributing thereto upon the basis of its population." Naturally, he felt that the Spanish colonies had a common enemy, Spain, and that it was vital for them to band themselves together for collective action should danger threaten them from that quarter. At this time Spain had not given up all hopes of reconquering her lost territory. She still held absolute sway in Cuba and Porto Rico, and from these strategic positions she could strike at any point along the coast from Mexico to Venezuela. It is not strange, therefore, that Bolívar should have realized fully this danger, nor that in his private instructions to the delegates of Peru he should have specifically urged them to seek concerted action at the Congress to oust Spain from her menacing position. He likewise realized that the United States did not have, nor could she feel, the same interest in this enterprise which particularly affected the Spanish American countries.

Furthermore, in 1823, Monroe had, in his message to Congress, expressed the Doctrine which today bears his name, and which has exercised such a transcendent influence on the policy of the United States toward her southern neighbors. That Doctrine, so often misquoted and so generally misunderstood even in our day, did not make the new States of Spanish America a party to it. This country has steadily maintained that it is a domestic policy. Ever since its announcement, therefore, it has been looked upon with distrust by the small nations to the south of us. It was but natural that Bolívar should have thought of a similar policy to be announced collectively by all the nations of Spanish America. That such was his intention is plainly evidenced in his instruc

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