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his soil an average yield of 0.72 of an American bale per acre. This implies that he, or his child or his grandson, should be able to increase the Egyptian cotton production by 410,400 bales, if all goes well. In other words the spot market of the future must count upon an Egyptian supply of approximately 1,800,000 bales.

Of course, I know that boll weevils and other pests may make my calculations appear like the dream of a theorist. But I do not think these agricultural hazards weaken the salient point of my argument, for, whether the Nile water goes to Egypt or to the Sudan, the same element of risk exists. I know for instance that Egyptian cotton is attacked by what is popularly called the "pink worm". I am advised that the Sudan is menaced by the aphis which deposits honey dew on a relatively large scale and thus suffocates the plant. It therefore follows that as a practical proposition the insect peril exists both in Egypt and the Sudan. All of these statistics lead up to one fact. Egypt as an eventual cotton entity represents a territory of approximately 2,570,000 acres capable of raising about 1,800,000 American bales of cotton. What can the Sudan produce?

If the independence of Egypt means what the words imply, the English cannot linger long in this country. A corollary to this will be that the irrigation system of Egypt will pass into native hands. Will this purely local administration, if it come about, make it possible for the Egypt of the future to produce 1,800,000 American bales of cotton? To answer this question would be to indulge in prophecy. I do know, however, that if the Sudan gets, as The London Times inferred that she will obtain, an adequate allocation of Nile water, English engineers will drive the last pound of efficiency out of every cubic yard of water meted out to the "Black Country". There is, accordingly, a possible element of personal equation which may enter into any computations which may be made.

In returning to my narrative I deem it necessary to speak of quality before I touch upon quantity. I thought for a time that good cotton could not be grown south of the thirtieth degree of north latitude. New Orleans is just south of this parallel. The country tributary to my native city is farmed in sugar and rice. Very little cotton is grown south of Baton Rouge. I had under

stood, in a vague way, that this was because cotton was not at its best quite so far south. When I reached Egypt I soon learned that an admirable staple was grown several hundred miles south of this dividing line. But certain preconceived ideas are most tenacious.

When, therefore, I determined to look into the Sudan question I requested the experts consulted by me to be most careful as I had an idea that the Sudan could not produce a high grade article. I have received unequivocal written assurances from an agronomist who has produced the actual stuff on the spot, that in the Gezira district of the Sudan the "ordinary American variety" and all Egyptian grades are successfully grown.

I shall not speak of the American plant. Of the Egyptian I feel that I may well say a word. It produces four varieties: (1) the Sakellaridis; (2) the Assili; (3) the Affifi, and (4) the Ashmouni.

With the exception of American sea island cotton, which is in a class all by itself, the Sakellaridis is, I am assured by competent authority, the longest, finest, strongest and whitest grade in the world. The Ashmouni, which is the most inferior of the Egyptian supply, in ordinary years brings in the Liverpool market 20 per cent. more than the average American output.

I am assured that the Sudan Sakellaridis and Assili are not equal to the best of the similar Egyptian variety, but that the best Sudan Sakellaridis and Assili are equivalent to the medium Egyptian stock of this same grade. On the other hand the Affifi and Ashmouni run to the same standard as in Egypt. This means that the Lower Nile Valley can put upon the market a better staple than anything we can produce outside of the Sea Islands—always assuming my information to be accurate.

When one considers the marvellous fertility of the Nile Valley, this should not be considered surprising. Man tickles the earth and it laughs into a golden harvest. A group of influential British capitalists commonly known as a Syndicate has for several years been fully aware of this fact. It helped to put through the British Parliament a bill whereby England guaranteed a Sudan bond issue of £3,000,000, which has been applied to building the Sennaar Dam which is now ready for business. These financiers bought up what is known as the Gezira Province of the Sudan.

They have converted it into a closed corporation, or, to be more accurate, they have made it impossible for any one to buy any land in the Gezira. These men have been calling out for water for years, but until their Sennaar Dam neared completion their cries were premonitory symptoms rather than an urgent appeal for help. Luckily for them, the stupid killing of the chivalrous Stack happened just when the construction work near their property was practically finished.

It is therefore clear that the Sudan has both the grade of cotton which counts and a capitalistic group to make the most of these natural advantages. It remains only to inquire as to how many bales this ideal combination can produce.

VII

I do not know the area of all the cultivable land in the Sudan. It is estimated at not less than 35,000,000 acres of good arable soil. I shall concentrate my attention on the Gezira. That is where the heavy investments have been made. There is where the driving force of the Sudan cotton industry is settled. Here I have something concrete with which to deal. I am not in the domain of fanciful conceptions but face to face with a reality which is determined that Manchester shall get its cotton within the British Empire.

The area of the Gezira between Khartoum and the railroad line which crosses the province is 5,000,000 acres. Of this 3,000,000 can be irrigated by the Sennaar Dam; that is to say, a portion of these 3,000,000 acres can be put under cotton beginning in 1926, should all the "water of the Blue Nile be earmarked for the Sudan". There is no reason why every square yard of this immense tract should not be devoted to cotton. If, as some say, there is enough water in the Nile in ordinary years to supply the present requirements of Egypt and at the same time to irrigate the Gezira, it follows that the Southern States of America will be called upon within a few years to face an additional cotton supply of 2,160,000 American bales.

In fixing this figure I use the Egyptian production per acre as my basis. It does not, however, allow for an increased Egyp

tian output nor does it take into consideration that the Sudan will never agree to limit its cultivation to so small an acreage, once it is started on the high road to wealth. If this eventuality of increased cotton acreage comes about, it will spell ruin for the American cotton planter, not tomorrow perhaps but before the young men of today shall have passed away.

If, as I firmly believe, there is not enough water in the Nile in low years to deviate a drop from Egypt without jeopardizing her existence, and if the policy foreshadowed in The London Times be adopted, it will mean (1) famine in Egypt and (2) reduced prices for American cotton. I shall not attempt to prove why I think that there is not enough water for Egypt to spare a mouthful in low years. Suffice it to say that if the entire Egyptian acreage now under cotton cultivation, which consisted in 1924 of 1,787,843 feddans, were wiped out, the Southern planter would still be penalized for the Stack murder. This absolute elimination of Egyptian cotton production to make way for a syndicate of British capitalists is not going to occur. Such things do not happen. The British are too just to consent to make an arid desert of the Delta of the Nile in order to cause the upper stretches of that river to blossom like a rose and incidentally to enrich a syndicate of capitalists.

But, I repeat, should the entire Egyptian cotton crop disappear (and it will not), the increased African cotton acreage would still be 1,212,157 feddans. To get this result I subtract from the 3,000,000 acres Gezira tract now ready for the plow and lying opposite the Dam "earmarked for the Sudan" the 1,787,843 feddans (or acres) which Egypt had under cotton in 1924. This difference, upon the basis of the results obtained during the last five years, represents a Sword of Damocles in round figures of 970,000 American bales, enough to turn any Bull market into a Bear feast.

But it is the possibility of unlimited expansion which sharpens this sword and makes of it a guillotine. Nor must this salient point be forgotten. It is the essence of my argument: Egypt needs foodstuffs. Seventy per cent. of her soil is applied to filling her stomach and but thirty per cent. is devoted to clothing her body. The money back of the Sudan development will be applied

entirely to cotton. No seventy per cent. and thirty per cent. will be tolerated there. The Sudan and Egypt both lie in Africa. So does the Nile. It is immaterial to the American cotton planter whether a bale reach the spinner marked "Egypt" or labelled "Sudan". But it does make a difference to him to know that cotton producing Nile-Africa will, in all probability, cease to be a seventy per cent.-thirty per cent. country and become for immense stretches a one hundred per cent. cotton land. Admitting, therefore, that every other deduction drawn by me be fallacious; that the Nile beginning in 1926 will irrigate the same number of acres as in the past; the very fact that the seventy per cent. food production can no longer be counted upon accentuates the gravity of the problem.

VIII

But it is an ill wind that blows nobody good. The Sudan is face to face with a great scarcity of labor. The Syndicate will have a hard time getting hands to sow its fields and to pick its cotton. Besides, the temperature runs so high in the Nile basin that competent English engineers will not relish the idea of working down there unless they are paid fancy salaries. Moreover experience in Egypt has taught that it is extremely difficult to get big concerns started. It is therefore probable that years may elapse before the Sudan can get under headway. But it behooves the South to think of tomorrow and not solely of today.

This silver lining that I have just pointed out is, of course, most important. The main issue, however, centers around one point. It is not whether we may have a breathing space before we face bankruptcy, but are we called upon to hoist our danger signals? In answering this question it is well to bear in mind that Sudan cotton can be transported to the markets of the world without serious economic difficulty, and that the capitalists who have put up the money to emancipate the Manchester cotton spinner from industrial vassalage to the South are determined that the labor problem shall be solved. There are no Australians, no Canadians, no Afrikanders, to prevent the importation of Coolies and of Indians. Who will risk the assertion that the

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