principles shall be impeded, the responsibility for that result as well as every other will rest on her head.

Having submitted these considerations, it belongs to Congress to decide whether after what has taken place it will still await the further action of the French Chambers or now adopt such provisional measures as it may deem necessary and best adapted to protect the rights and maintain the honor of the country. Whatever that decision may be, it will be faithfully enforced by the Executive as far as he is authorized so to do.

The House of Representatives adopted a resolution declaring that the execution of the treaty ought to be insisted upon but defeated a bill appropriating three million dollars for "extraordinary military expenses," and the Senate merely pronounced it "inexpedient at present to adopt any legislative measures" on the subject; both Houses obviously thought best to note first the effect of the message in France.

They had not long to wait. France was surprised beyond measure. The temperateness of the President's previous communications had been misinterpreted as a sign of weakness or of fright. This message was different. It was not a timid Executive writing perfunctorily; it was Old Hickory himself speaking up and clearly meaning business. Even as of the present day, in trying situations, the French people had been "deluded by the politicians" and the only thing left for the Ministry to do was to detect and resent an "insult to the nation"-the dernier ressort of French diplomacy-and suspend official relations by recalling their Minister to Washington and sending passports to the American Minister in Paris.

"Having in this manner," Jackson reported to Congress with quite delightful irony, "vindicated the dignity of France, they next proceeded to illustrate her justice" by proposing an appropriation bill which should become operative as soon as, but not before, the President had virtually apologized for what he himself smoothly depicted as his "conditional recommendation of reprisals." To this peremptory demand he replied in the plain language which he had now substituted for the conciliatory phrases which he had been using vainly for years:

The honor of my country shall never be stained by an apology from me for the statement of truth and the performance of duty; nor can I give any explana

tion of my official acts except such as is due to integrity and justice and consistent with the principles on which our institutions have been framed.

So that was that. But to leave no doubt in anybody's mind that he was not only closing but bolting the door, instead of "explaining" his proposals of reprisals,-"peaceful remedies" he called them, he renewed them, with the added mild suggestion that it might be sufficient at first to prohibit the introduction of French products and the entry of French vessels into American ports, as "a proper preliminary step to stronger measures should their adoption be rendered necessary by subsequent events."

He then directed the attention of the Congress to "public notices of naval preparations on the part of France destined for our seas," and continued:

Of the cause and intent of these armaments I have no authentic information, nor any other means of judging except such as are common to yourselves and to the public; but whatever may be their object, we are not at liberty to regard them as unconnected with the measures which hostile movements on the part of France may compel us to pursue. They at least deserve to be met by adequate preparation on our part, and I therefore strongly urge large and speedy appropriations for the increase of the Navy and the completion of our coast defenses.

"Come what may," he concluded, "the explanation which France demands can never be accorded, and no armament, however powerful and imposing, at a distance or on our coast, will, I trust, deter us from discharging the high duties which we owe to our constituents, our national character, and to the world."

This message was delivered to Congress on January 7, 1836. On January 27 the British Government kindly offered its services as mediator, and on February 3 Secretary Forsyth frankly and confidingly agreed on behalf of the President to "abide by the opinion" of His Britannic Majesty, with a simple reservation to the effect that such opinion should involve no concession upon any point claimed by the United States.

But there were no hearings. All this, of course, was only the customary fol-de-rol to help Mlle. Marianne to save her pretty face and, no later than February 15, the British Government notified Mr. Forsyth that the French Government were so enchanted with "the frank and honorable manner" in which the

President had expressed himself, with respect to the points of difference, that all difficulties, "upon the score of national honor,' were removed and the money was ready whenever Uncle Shylock, or whatever they called him in those days, should call for it.

On May 10, Andrew the First notified Congress that the Treasury had received the four accumulated instalments, and rejoiced at "the restoration of the ancient cordial relations between the two countries," which happily have maintained for the ninety years that have intervened from 1836 to 1926.

How long they will continue agreeable is a question which France alone can answer. Uncle Shylock, strange to say, is not deeply concerned by the debt itself. He can wait. That he will be paid eventually he has no serious doubt. True, if the experience of Uncle Sam recounted above be observed as a precedent, an expert accountant figures that, upon the basis of actual payment upon a schedule of twenty odd years for five millions, the time required for liquidation of three and one-half billions, fixed by the Mellon-Berenger arrangement, will be 17,128 years. Eternity, in our opinion, would be much nearer the finish line but for a single fact, namely, that the finances of France cannot be reëstablished without the same kind of help from the same source that John Bull received from Uncle Shylock when he decided to put the £ to par. But for that simple circumstance we would never get a franc from France.

But Mlle. Marianne is beginning to realize that neither manifestations of "ill will" nor abuse nor scorn nor spit-balls nor any of the precisely similar tricks attempted on Andrew Jackson will prevail now with President Coolidge, who would not if he could and could not if he would regard the settlement tentatively fixed as other than an irreducible minimum.

Nevertheless, France need not even agree to pay; Andrew the Second will not even hint at the rude proposals which Andrew the First made to Congress. Mlle. Marianne can "sit pretty" as long as she likes; but meanwhile, she may as well be notified positively, Uncle Shylock will sit tight.

We anticipate favorable action by the French Parliament before the end of the calendar year.

THE INDUSTRIAL SITUATION IN BRITAIN

BY LIEUT.-COMMANDER THE HON. J. M. KENWORTHY, R.N., M.P.

NINETEEN-TWENTY-SIX has been a sorry year for British commerce and industry. But I shall presently give reasons to show why no irreparable damage has been done. The year started well with a gradual decrease in unemployment and an increase in orders, especially for the shipbuilding and engineering industries, both of which had suffered several years of severe depression.

The long-expected struggle between the coal mine owners and the miners, avoided by the grant of a subsidy in the previous autumn, broke out in May. The nine days of the so-called General Strike followed. The plan of the Trades Union Congress, and of certain members of the British Government, was to get the mine workers back to work simultaneously or soon afterwards. If this plan had not miscarried all would have been well, except for the loss of wages by the British workpeople during the strike, amounting to between seventy and eighty million dollars. In fact, from the business viewpoint, the laying of a troublesome ghost in the shape of the sympathetic or General Strike would have been, and, in fact, still is, a great step forward. The gain in British prestige, political and financial, would have been almost worth the effort and loss from the commercial, financial and industrial point of view.

Unfortunately, the plan did miscarry, and the miners still refused to go back to work on the terms offered by the mine owners, or the enforceable terms offered by the Government.

The long drawn out stoppage in the coal mines might, to the superficial observer, indicate an almost mortal blow to British prosperity. And there are some grounds for this supposition. Britain is peculiarly fortunate in having rich deposits of coal placed conveniently near the seaports. It was in Britain that coal

was first mined on a large scale. The proximity of coal, both to the seaboard and to the iron mines, was the basis of Britain's industrial development in the nineteenth century. In 1800 we raised 10,000,000 tons of coal! In 1913, 287,000,000 tons were raised, but 98,000,000 tons were exported. Not only was a great predominance established in the heavy industries and especially in the production of steel, in engineering and in shipbuilding, but the British mercantile marine has been largely built up on the supposition that outward freights of coal would always be available, so that few voyages need be made in ballast. British tramp steamers outward bound with coal returned with grain, timber or other commodities.

But just because Britain was the pioneer in the coal industry, the British mines in many cases are still worked on a system long obsolete elsewhere; and in other cases the best seams have been exhausted and the inferior seams do not now show a good profit. While the question of disposing of slack and waste is still untackled, in many of the older workings the coal face is now far removed from the bottom of the shaft. To these disadvantages, some of them avoidable, some unavoidable, must be added the cumulative mistake of the organizers of the heavy industry in Britain.

Most of the coal mines are owned by different small companies, and there is great loss in the management through a multitude of directorates. Thus, 1,500 separate undertakings and companies exploit about 3,000 coal pits. In addition, in most cases, the coal mines stand by themselves. That means they have to sell their coal in a falling market to nominally or actually independent electricity companies and to gas works and other concerns which reap the benefits of the by-products of coal.

What has been evident for a generation in Britain is the need of reorganizing the coal industry vertically and horizontally. By that I mean that there are far too many separate companies and they should be amalgamated in a few big concerns; and that these few big concerns should themselves reap the benefit from carbonising the coal and disposing of the three hundred different commodities produced from raw coal. A selling cartel and the linking up with electrical undertakings are the next steps. Al