Mind, 1. cilt

Ön Kapak
George Croom Robertson, George Frederick Stout, George Edward Moore
Oxford University Press, 1892
A journal of philosophy covering epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind.

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Popüler pasajlar

Sayfa 113 - Every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man.
Sayfa 507 - Why, I, in this weak piping time of peace, Have no delight to pass away the time, Unless to spy my shadow in the sun And descant on mine own deformity; And therefore, since I cannot prove a lover, To entertain these fair well-spoken days, I am determined to prove a villain And hate the idle pleasures of these days.
Sayfa 535 - Who smiles for the pleasure of smiling, or frowns for the pleasure of the frown ? Who blushes to escape the discomfort of not blushing ? Or who in anger, grief, or fear is actuated to the movements which he makes by the pleasures which they yield ? In all these cases the movements are discharged fatally by the vis a tergo which the stimulus exerts upon a nervous system framed to respond in just that way.
Sayfa 74 - And if a brief definition of ideal or moral action were required, none could be given which would better fit the appearances than this: It is action in the line of the greatest resistance.
Sayfa 101 - ... philosophers. Nor can a man any more live whose desires are at an end than he whose senses and imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continual progress of the desire...
Sayfa 582 - In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale.
Sayfa 535 - Important as is the influence of pleasures and pains upon our movements, they are far from being our only stimuli. With the manifestations of instinct and emotional expression, for example, they have absolutely nothing to do. Who smiles for the pleasure of the smiling, or frowns for the pleasure of the frown?
Sayfa 327 - It will strive — mine at least will — 'spite of its inaptitude, to thrid the maze; like an unskilled eye painfully poring upon hieroglyphics. I have sat through an Italian Opera, till, for sheer pain, and inexplicable anguish, I have rushed out into the noisiest places of the crowded streets, to solace myself with sounds, which I was not obliged to follow, and get rid of the distracting torment of endless, fruitless, barren attention...
Sayfa 42 - To have the sense of virtue is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no farther; nor do we enquire into the cause of the satisfaction.
Sayfa 541 - The quantity of fire in a flame burning steadily appears to remain the same, the flame seems to be what we call a " thing." And yet the substance of it is continually changing. It is always passing away in smoke, and its place is always being taken by fresh matter from the fuel that feeds it. This is just what we want. If we regard the world as an " ever-living fire

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