 To have the sense of virtue is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no farther; nor do we enquire into the cause of the satisfaction.  Mind - Sayfa 42editör: - 1892Tam görünüm - Bu kitap hakkında
 | David Hume - 1817
...constitutes- our praise or admiration. We go no farther; nor do we inquire into the cause of the satisfaction. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because...particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of ,beauty, and tastes, and sensations.... | |
 | David Hume - 1826
...our praise or admi-> ration. We go no farther; nor do we inquire into the cause of the satisfaction. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because...particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in Our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations.... | |
 | Jeremy Bentham - 1834
...from ' the contemplation of a character. The very 'feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. ' We do not infer a character to be virtuous ' because...particular manner, we in effect 'feel that it is virtuous. The same is implied in ' our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, ' and tastes, and sensations... | |
 | Jeremy Bentham - 1834 - 359 sayfa
...from ' the contemplation of a character. The very ' feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. ' We do not infer a character to be virtuous ' because it pleases ; but m feeling that it pleases ' after such a particular manner, we in effect 'feel that it is virtuous.... | |
 | David Hume - 1854
...our praise or admiration. We go no further ; nor do we inquire into the cause of the satisfaction. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because...particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, VOL. n. 30 and tastes, and... | |
 | Robert Woodward Barnwell - 1859 - 92 sayfa
...our praise or admiration. We go no farther ; nor do we inquire into the cause of the satisfaction. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because...particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations.... | |
 | David Hume - 1874
...our praise or admiration. We go no farther ; nor do we enquire into the cause of the satisfaction. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because...a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous.i The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and... | |
 | Edmund Pfleiderer - 1874
...dasselbe; nicht etwa bildet das Gefühl nur den Anlass oder die Basis für einen moralischen Schluss (we do not infer a character to be virtuous because it pleases, sondern das Gefühl seines Gefallens ist, wieder völlig wie in der Aesthetik, identisch mit dem Gefiihl... | |
 | Edmund Pfleiderer - 1874 - 540 sayfa
...dasselbe; nicht etwa bildet das Gefühl nur den Anlass oder die Basis für einen moralischen Schluss (we do not infer a character to be virtuous because it pleases, sondern das Gefühl seines Gefallens ist, wieder völlig wie in der Dienende Stellung der Vernunft.... | |
 | David Hume - 1882
...our praise or admiration. We go no farther ; nor do we enquire into the cause of the satisfaction. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because...a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous.1 The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and... | |
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