call, not the righteous, but "sinners," "children of wrath," "condemned already." If the atonement did not regard sinners as antecedently bound over by sin to suffer the penalty of the law, Christ would not have died to redeem them from under the condemnation of the law. This public testimony to the dueness of the punishment, honors the divine government in maintaining and enforcing its claims on the sinner, and marks sin as an inexcusable wrong, and of unextenuated guilt.

II. The provision of an atonement shews the great concern of the moral Governor for the ends of justice to be secured in his administrations.

God is rich in mercy, plenteous in redemption, and ready to forgive; nevertheless he is concerned for the honor of his justice. He loves right, and he hates wrong. He loves order in his government, and is concerned to prevent disorder. His hatred of disorder and wrong, is commensurate with his love of himself, and with his concern for the public good of the universe. In defending his own rights, the whole of his public character and revealed glory is concerned. He needs no motive to feel compassion and mercy towards sinners, but a safe medium is necessary for the honorable expression of that mercy towards them.

Sin is a public injury to God and to the universe. It is not in the nature of mercy, nor does it become its character, to forgive such a public wrong without an expression of its abhorrence of the crime. Such a mercy would be weak indulgence, a fond and a blind passion. Every one sees that a family governed on such a principle would soon become the pest of a commonwealth. And so would a company of servants or an army of soldiers. Even family discipline requires that when you forgive a child, there ought always to be some expression of displeasure at the offence.

The most powerful expression of mercy's abhorrence of sin, and of its concern for the ends of public justice, has been given in the substitution of the Son of God.

A father, for instance, will not be afraid of relaxing the bonds of good discipline in forgiving a child, when a mother in tears and anguish is the expression of an abhorrence of the child's offence. God has consulted the ends of public justice in the exercise of his mercy, and has set forth the death of his Son as the honorable ground on which he is just in justifying him that believes. God spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, as a clear demonstration of his great concern for his justice, and as a public expression at what a dear rate he forgives the sin which his righteous soul abominates.

Such a provision for securing the ends of justice, honors the divine government. It shews that the reins of just authority are not at all relaxed. All the subjects will feel that the moral Governor thinks highly of justice. No friend of the Mediator can slight the law and the government, and no one who slights and disregards the law will ever be deerned a friend of the Mediator.

III. In the atonement the suffering of death by Jesus Christ was substituted, by the blessed God, instead of the suffering of the punishment that was due to the sinner.

Jesus Christ suffered for us, the just for the unjust. He was made a curse for us-and a sin-offering for us. When it is said that Christ suffered for us, it is not meant that he suffered the sufferings due to us in law, but that his sufferings were endured as substituted instead of our sufferings. An atonement goes on the supposition that the identical sufferings threatened against man are suspended, and other sufferings substituted instead of them.

This exchange, or commutation of sufferings, in the expedient for redemption, was intimated in the first promise made to Adam. Man by transgression had become liable to the literal sufferings threatened in the penalty of the law. From these sufferings he was to be delivered by the Seed of the woman. This deliverance was to be effected, not by power, but by a price of sub

stituted sufferings, designated the "bruising of the heel," a very different kind of suffering from that which was threatened to Adam.

This view of the vicarious and substitutionary character of the sufferings of Christ will give some definiteness and force to the phrase, "Christ has paid our debts." Though this phrase is not scriptural it is not to be treated contemptuously, as it is constantly used with much sweetness and unction by many Christians, and has been sanctified by long usage in our sermons, and in our spiritual songs.

"What are the debts which Jesus Christ has paid for us?" Some answer the question by saying that Jesus Christ obeyed the law for us; gave, in our stead, and in our name, that obedience which we owed to the law, so that the law cannot now demand perfect obedience of us, because this was given to it in our stead by Jesus Christ.

Let it be duly considered-Did Jesus Christ pay our debts in this sense? Did he obey the law that we might not obey it? Did he do what the law required, that we might be discharged from our duty? Did he love God and love his neighbor, in our stead, so that we are delivered from the obligation to do so? I am sure, I wrong my reader by supposing for a moment that he does not perceive, at once, that in this sense, Christ has paid no debts for us. Paying for us the duty which we owed to the law, would be redeeming us from God, and not to God, and would be an axe at the root of all moral government. No class of rebels would ever be restored to their allegiance by a high officer so obeying the law in their stead, as to discharge them from all fealty and homage.

It is, therefore, evident, that by Jesus Christ's paying our debts, must be meant, not the debt of duty, but the debt of penalty. The handwriting, or chirograph which he cancelled was not the bond of obligation to duty and service, but the bond of liableness to punishment and sufferings.

It will be inquired, "How did Jesus Christ pay our debt of penalty?" This question is frequently answered, by saying, that Jesus Christ suffered the identical punishment to which we were exposed in law. This sentiment is embodied in a phrase not at all uncommon, that "Jesus Christ suffered the hell of his people."

I shall refer a fuller discussion of the commutation of sufferings to the chapter on the atonement in its connection with sin. I shall, now, only remark farther, that the atonement of Christ cancelled the obligation to punishment, not by paying the idem in the duty, nor by suffering the idem in the penalty, but by substituting his own sufferings instead of the sufferings due to the sinner. IV. The sufferings of the Lord Jesus Christ answer the same ends as the punishment of the sinner.

An offender is publicly punished by a wise government, not for the sake of putting him personally to pain and torture, but for the sake of deterring others from committing crimes and offences. An English judge once remarked to a criminal before him, "You are condemned to be transported, not because you have stolen these goods, but that goods may not be stolen."

The ends of government in the punishment of offenders are to shew the goodness and benevolence of the law-to demonstrate the impartial justice of the governor-to exhibit the evil consequences of breaking the law, and to impress offenders with the hopelessness of escaping the punishment due to crime.

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You may be doubting the benevolence of a law that takes away man's life. But suppose your house robbed, or your child murdered, you would account that law really benevolent that would kindly throw around you the shield of her sympathy, and would rid the country of such robbers and murderers. It is true, the murderers themselves would not regard such a law as good and benevolent, but every honest man would admire and welcome it. Sinners generally judge of the laws of God, as criminals judge of the laws of their country. Public punishments tend to shew that the law

is good and that it watches kindly over the interests of the poorest subject.

By public punishment the magistrate shews that his justice is impartial and fair. He is above private motives; his concern is for the public good. The insulted rights of the lowest subject shall be vindicated by him: and the rank or power of an illustrious offender shall not thwart the measures of righteousness. The effect will be, that all will stand in awe of the majesty of unsullied justice.

The spectators of a public punishment are likely to be impressed with the evil of the crime. They perceive that they who know the interest of the nation best, regard the deed of the culprit as injurious and wrong. They feel that if every one did as the culprit did, there would be no living in any community. They will know that by the conduct of the culprit some families have suffered severely, and that, if he had been spared, many more would have suffered. They would see that such a mode of life, however easy and pleasant for the moment, is sure, eventually, to end in sorrow, infamy, and ruin; and that such an ignominious end of such a character, will be approved and praised by all honest men every where.

The other end of government, in executing punishment, is to convince all offenders, of the hopelessness of escaping the law. The criminal may long hide himself, but eventually he will be apprehended, and caught in the firm grasp of the law. Neither his obscurity nor his rank, neither his entreaties nor his bribes, can shelter him from the execration of the law and the constitution. The impressions of this, every spectator, and every hearer of the execution, will carry with him to his home, and to his retirement.

If a man transgress a law, he must, in a just and firm government be punished. Why? Lest others have a bad opinion of the law, and transgress it too. But suppose that this end of the law can be secured without punishing the transgressor; suppose that a measure shall