thians were to put away from themselves this wicked person, it cannot be inferred that every member was to do so, either virtually or nominally, as an ecclesiastical judge, but, as has been already evinced, only the elders; while at the same time it was his duty, by every proper testimony of respectful acquiescence in the sentence of the latter, and by abstaining even from all unnecessary intercourse with the offender in common life *, in his private capacity, to confirm their deed. And though it should be admitted moreover, that the "sentence," as we are told, 2 Cor. ii. 6, "was "inflicted by many," it will not follow that it was passed by many, or all of them, for there is an essential distinction, in every government, between the making and the infliction of a sentence. The former might be performed only by a few who were rulers, while the latter might be executed by all the members of the church, who were bound to concur with the elders, by inflicting the sentence; and who were all, as we have said, under an obligation to refuse to have Presbyterian rulers are better known than those of Independents, does it not arise from the superior candour and publicity of their system? and were the deliberations and debates of Independent churches as open to our inspection, might we not witness in them also no less imperfection and impropriety? And upon the whole, while such is the openness and publicity of this plan, and while even its most private business, with the decision which has been formed upon it, must at least be announced in a public meeting, can we fail to be astonished at the assertion of Mr. Haldane, (p. 72 of his Address), that "less danger is to be apprehended in a political light, admitting there were cause for any, from unconnected congregational churches than from those called Episcopalian or Presbyterian. In the one of these" says he, "a few individuals exer"cise the whole authority" (so that it seems there is authority even among Independents); "in the other, it is vested in Sessions, which generally are small secret meetings, Synods, and Presbyteries, greater and lesser affiliated, and corresponding societies, under one parent society, called a General Assembly." Is a body, the greater part of the meetings of whose rulers are free to the hearing and examination of all, and whose deliberations are only private, as in the best regulated civil authoritative courts, when the business requires it is this body, I say, though governed by a gradual subordination of courts, a more striking image of those revolutionary clubs which once threatened the subversion and destruction of our kingdom, than a body, almost all whose proceedings are conducted in secret, and where nothing in the deliberations of almost any of their courts is transacted in the presence and hearing of the world?. * 66 66 See, and consult particularly, 1 Cor. v, 9, 11.. 2 fellowship with him, that he might be ashamed, and that others might fear. Is it said, in short, that as all the Corinthians are commanded to forgive their offending brother, (2 Cor. ii. 7—10), they must all have been rulers? It is replied, that this consequence appears by no means to follow-but that all that can be deduced from it is this, that as they had all been offended by him in their various stations, so they were all to forgive him upon tokens of his repentance, and express their forgivenesss in a manner which was suited to their situation in the church. Those who were rulers, and were offended by him in that capacity, were commanded as such to forgive him, and restore him again to the privileges of their society; and those who were members, and had been offended by him as such, on account of the dishonour which he had done to God, were called as such to express their forgivenness, and restore him once more to the comforts and advantages of private fellowship. Thus it would appear, that neither from this in particular, nor from any other expression contained in this passage, we are warranted to conclude that the members at large, in common with the rulers, are entitled to govern the church of Christ. * SIR, LETTER VIII. In proof of your opinion you farther affirm, (p. 38), that the people must be admitted to judge and vote, because, in the reference to the apostles and elders at Jerusalem from the church of Antioch," they are represented as all uniting in "the decision that was formed on the question appealed." Thus we are told, that "it pleased the apostles and elders, "with the whole church, to send chosen men of their com " pany to Antioch, with Paul and Barnabas," &c.; and "that they wrote letters by them after this manner: The "apostles, and elders, and brethren, send greeting unto the "brethren which are of the Gentiles in Antioch, and Syria, "and Cilicia." Let it be supposed for a moment, that the brethren, here mentioned, were not the other ministers who were then at Jerusalem besides the apostles and elders: if it be asserted that these members, in any form, voted and judged in the case referred to, while it seems to establish in one view, it completely subverts in another, the scheme for which it is urged. You argue against Presbyterians when they attempt to demonstrate from this passage, that one congregation, with its rulers, may be subject to the rulers of a number of congregations met as a Presbytery, and tell them that this case was extraordinary. Mr. Ewing observes, in his Lecture, p. 77, that "the miraculous gifts of "the Spirit were very generally enjoyed in the church at "Jerusalem;" and seems to insinuate from this, the propriety of their being admitted, in a particular view, as ecclesiastical arbiters, to adopt and transmit the judgment of the apostles and elders as their judgment. You yourself also affirm, that all who passed this decision were under this influence, though in different degrees: for while you represent the apostles, and elders, and brethren," as united in "making it," you declare it to be extraordinary; adding, (p. 44), "if it was not extraordinary, let us see to "what it will lead." But if the argument which is advanced by Presbyterians from this passage for a court of review, above the ministers or elders of a particular congregation, composed of the ministers of a number of congregations, seems to you inconclusive, because this assembly was inspired, and delivered an extraordinary inspired decision, must it not be equally inconclusive when urged by Independents for the right of the people to judge and vote in their religi ous assemblies? If the ministers and elders of different congregations now, who correspond to the elders associated with the apostles, are not to judge as a Presbytery in matters which relate to another congregation, because, though they determined along with them in the appeal from Antioch, the whole of them were guided by a miraculous energy, on what principle can it be proved that the people now are to judge and vote, because the people at Jerusalem judged and voted under the guidance of this extraordinary infallible energy? Is it alleged with Mr. Ewing, (p. 78), that though the apostles and elders were inspired, Presbyterians allow their ministers, whom they call their successors, though not inspired, to judge and rule, and why not allow the mem bers now to judge and vote, since they are the successors of those ancient members who sat and judged in this inspired assembly? We allow, that if it could be proved that this assembly was inspired, no argument would be urged by Presbyterians for the ministers and elders of a number of congregations deliberating, as an authoritative court of review, in any appeal which is made, as in the case here recorded, by a single church. It follows, therefore, upon his own principles as well as those of Presbyterians, that since he and his brethren consider this assembly as composed of persons supernaturally qualified for the decision which they delivered, in no point of view are they entitled to conclude, from what they apprehend to be said of the brethren judging in this extraordinary meeting, and under this miraculous influence, that members now, and upon common occasions, are warranted to judge in the church of God. The argument, besides, adduced by you and Mr. Ewing, in common with Mr. Glass, for the right of the members to judge at present in the affairs of the church, from what is here said of the brethren at Jerusalem, if it prove any thing, proves undoubtedly too much. It demonstrates not merely their right to judge and vote in matters which relate to their own, but in those which concern even another congregation. But does not this contradict a first principle of Independency, that neither the members nor the rulers of one congregation have a right to interfere, even according to your own acknowledgement, (p. 30), and according to the favourite position of Glass which he so keenly de fends *, with any other congregation under heaven? Besides, would not the subordination to which this argument leads, a subordination of a particular congregation, not merely, as Presbyterians maintain, to the ministers and layelders, the wisest and most enlightened of a number of congregations, but to the members indiscriminately of a sister congregation, be much more intolerable, even upon your own principles, than that for which the former contend? On the whole, whether this assembly was inspired or not inspired, if it be asserted that the brethren must judge now because they judged then, it will necessarily follow, not only that the brethren of one congregation may judge in matters which are to bind the brethren of another congregation, but that they may judge of them finally while the latter are not present, nor give their consent. But does not this contradict also another Independent principle, as stated by you, p. 30, That whatever is done by those who are appointed "to rule, is carried on in the presence of the general body, " and with their consent?" And will it not completely oppose another favourite position of Glass, and Lockier, and other Independents, "That nothing can be binding upon any society where their acquiescence and votes have not "previously been asked and obtained ?” 66 Or is it said, that the assembly at Jerusalem was not inspired, and that the reference made to them was simply for opinion and advice? On this supposition, no judicial power at all was exercised, no act of government was performed by any of them; and consequently, though it were admitted that the brethren at Jerusalem were allowed, along with the apostles and elders, to state their opinion upon the controverted points, no argument can be adduced from it for the right of the brethren at present to govern and vote in the church. Governing the church and exercising discipline are certainly very different from a mere statement of opinion upon a controverted point, which either might be received or rejected. And if the apostles, and elders, and members in the case before us, merely gave an advice, and stated an opinion, (as is done by the occasional associations of your ministers, while, as you declare, p. 31, 32, &c. it is not binding upon any of your congregation), it will never follow that because the brethren were permitted to do this, they are * See his Works, vol. i. p. 155-202. I |