CHAP. A. D. 1515. A. Et. 40. A. Pont. III. "The king of England] is resolved that "his sister shall on no account remain in "France. "The emperor and the catholic king are " using all their efforts to have her married to "the archduke. This is what we hear from ❝our nuncios in Germany and in Spain.(a) "I recollect nothing further that can be new "to you. I leave the festivities of this car"nival to be narrated by others. I shall only "mention that on Monday the magnificent "Lorenzo will have the Panulus(b) repre"sented in your theatre, and will give a sup66 per in your salon to the Marchesana. And 66 on Sunday, in Testaccio, he and the most "reverend cardinal Cibò will exhibit a mag"nificent gala with twenty persons, dressed " in brocade and velvet, at the expense of his "holiness. It will be a fine sight. ❝ You (a) It is not improbable that the attachment of the widow of Louis XII. to the duke of Suffolk, and the sudden celebration of their marriage, terminated a negotiation which might have had such important consequences to these kingdoms and to Europe. (b) of Plautus. 66 XIII. "You have never yet informed us whether CHAP. you have excused yourself to the duke of Milan; whether you have sent to the Swiss ❝ and the cardinal of Sion, as was spoken of and "advised; or whether you have had any com"munication with his most Christian majesty. 66 Respecting all these matters it is requisite "that his holiness should be fully informed. 66 "Remember that next to his holiness, every one regards you as the person in whom all "the thoughts, the expectations, and the designs, of the pope are concentred. I must "also remind you, that all your actions are "not less noted and considered than those of "his holiness; and I therefore entreat you, by the great affection which I bear you, that you will daily if possible manifest such a "course of conduct as may be worthy of your " character. 66 "THE CARDINAL DA BIBBIENA." From Rome, the 16th Feb. 1515. Could the French monarch have remained satisfied with the neutrality of the pontiff, the motives which had led to its adoption were sufficient to have induced Leo to persevere in it; A. Et. 40. A. D. 1515. but 1 XIII. A. D. 1515. A. Æt. 40. A. Pont. III Leo X. compelled decisive part, ac cedes to against France. CHAP. but as the contest approached, Francis became more desirous of engaging the pope to take a decided part in his favour. Such, however, was the aversion which Leo entertained to the establishment of the French in Italy, that even the solicitations of his brother to favour their cause to take a were of no avail. As far as expressions of respect and paternal admonitions could appease the king, Leo spared nothing that might be the league likely to conciliate his favour; but the more Francis pressed him to a decision, the more apparent became his inclination to the cause of the allies. In order, however, to ascertain his intentions, Francis dispatched as his ambassador to Rome, the celebrated Budæus, who is deservedly considered by Guicciardini, as "perhaps one of the most learned men of the 66 age both in Greek and Roman literature."(a) He was shortly afterwards succeeded by Anton-Maria Pallavicini, a Milanese nobleman, who was supposed to possess great influence with the pope ;(b) but the endeavours of the king to obtain a positive sanction to his enterprise were still ineffectual. Sometimes Leo appeared (a) Guicciard. Storia d' Ital. lib. xii. ii. 86. (b) Ligue de Cambr. liv. iv. ii. 410. XIII. appeared to have serious intentions of enter- CHAP. ing into a treaty, and required as a preliminary that the states of Parma and Piacenza should be guaranteed to the church, the refusal of which he conceived would afford him a sufficient apology for joining the cause of the allies. At other times he is said to have made propositions couched in such ambiguous terms, as, when assented to, always required further explanations, and which left the negotiations in the same state of suspense as when the treaty begun. The French and Italian writers are agreed in considering the conduct of the pontiff on this occasion as the result of artifice and disingenuousness;(a) but they appear not sufficiently to have attended to the difficulties of his situation or at least not to have made sufficient allowance for them. As head of the church, and, both by his disposition and office, the acknowledged arbiter and mediator of Europe, he ought not perhaps to have been solicited to take a decided part in the threatened hostilities; and as a prince whose temporal authority was supported rather by public opinion and the favour of surrounding states than by his A. A. D. 1515. A. Æt. 40. Pont. III. (a) Guicciard. Storia d' Ital. lib. xii. ii. 87. Muratori, Annali d' Ital. x. 107. Ligue de Cambray, lir. iv. ii. 411. XIII. A. D. 1515. A. At. 40. A. Pont. III. CHAP. his own forces, it was evident that he could not, without endangering his own safety, ac-. cede to the propositions of the king. If therefore the reiterated efforts of the French monarch to engage the pope in his interests were not followed by the consequences which he wished, they were followed by such as he might reasonably have expected, and instead of inducing the pope to unite the power of the Roman and Florentine states with the arms of France, compelled him, in conformity with his former maxims, to embrace the cause of the allies. In the month of June he issued a monitory, subjecting, in general terms, all those who should again disturb the states of the church, and in particular Parma and Piacenza, to the penalties of excommunication;(a) and in July, he openly acceded to the general league expressly formed for the defence of Milan. Nor, if a decision could no longer be delayed, can it be denied that in making this election he chose the part that did the most credit to his character, or that an opposite conduct would have rendered him deservedly liable to the suspicion of having sacrificed his principles (a) This document is preserved in Lünig, Cod. Diplemat. Itat. v. ii. p. 802. |