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action admitted allow appears Athenian Athens attempt become believe Bentham better called cause character civilized claim common concerned condition conduct consequences consider consideration Constitution cultivation depend desire doctrine duty effect England equally ethical evil exist fact feeling force foreign France freedom give given greater ground happiness human idea important improvement individual influence institutions interest justice kind labor less liberty live mankind matter means ment merely mind moral nature necessary never object obligation once opinion origin pain party person philosophy pleasure political popular position possible practical present principle produce question reason regard respect rule sense sentiment side slave slavery social society standard sufficient supposed theory thing thought tion true truth universal utilitarian utility virtue Whewell whole women wrong
Sayfa 312 - It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.
Sayfa 323 - As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as you would be done by, and to love your neighbour as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.
Sayfa 315 - According to the greatest happiness principle, as above explained, the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable — whether we are considering our own good or that of other people — is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality...
Sayfa 311 - Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures ; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.
Sayfa 165 - What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer...
Sayfa 310 - But there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation.
Sayfa 374 - To recapitulate: the idea of justice supposes two things— a rule of conduct and a sentiment which sanctions the rule. The first must be supposed common to all mankind and intended for their good. The other (the sentiment) is a desire that punishment may be suffered by those who infringe the rule.
Sayfa 325 - He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his trouble; he who betrays the friend that trusts him is guilty of a crime, even if his object be to serve another friend to whom he is under greater obligations.