between the moderate and the ultra-Reformers turns. The three cardinal aims of the Radical party at this day may be resolved into a recognition of the principle of geographical representation, or the division of constituencies according to square miles; the principle of numerical representation, or their division according to population; and the principle of a self-acting system for the prospective rectification of constituencies, or one which shall provide against the contingent disproportion of numbers (in consequence of the casual reduction of the census in any electoral district through emigration or any other cause), by a proportionate geographical extension of the constituency, without the necessity of a special appeal to Parliament. We here except the question of the Ballot from discussion; inasmuch as a majority in the new House of Commons has already pronounced against its adoption, and has therefore excluded it from the class of practical questions during at least the next session of Parliament.

It is clear that no one of these three demands of the Radical party has met with any extensive sympathy in the country; but, opposed directly as they are to the principle of the representation of classes on which the constitution of the House of Commons is based, it is well to show that these doctrines presuppose principles contradicted by our universal practice, involve immoral deductions, and carry the Radical party into admissions from which they would be the first to shrink.

Now, if a certain number of men had the right to send members to Parliament simply because they were a certain number of men, it would follow that their right was positive and absolute, and that it attached to their condition, as such a section of the community, as inalienably as their civil rights. The principle, on the other hand, of a representation of classes is based on the assumption that each elector holds his suffrage as a trust for the aggregate good of the community; otherwise there could be no aim in a distinctive representation of classes, which is presumptively coincident with a representation of interests. But the theory that the suffrage of an elector is thus absolute and positive, and is inherent in his right of citizenship, necessarily excludes the theory of his right being dependent on the hypothesis of its exercise for the aggregate good. A recognition, then, of such a principle would cut away the whole logical basis of our legislation against electioneering bribery. That legislation has proceeded upon a right of securing the exercise of the franchise in conformity with the presumptive interests of the community. But when the exercise of the franchise is once recognised as a positive right, incidental to the fact of citizenship, it becomes at once impossible to limit or control its application-to determine

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what a man shall, or shall not, do with his own-or to interfere with the exercise of his intangible any more than with that of his tangible rights..

The extreme Radical party, to whom these observations apply, have been loudest in condemnation of what they term ' undue influences' at elections. By that expression they denote, of course, the exercise of the landholding power over the electoral rights of the tenantry and small freeholders. We believe that the exercise of those undue influences is now very exceptional. But whatever it may be-and whatever it may have been during the last quarter of a century-it has, in nine cases out of ten, been the immediate result of their own legislation. It was the proposal of Lord Grey's Government, in 1831, to confer the county franchise upon the holders of leases for a period of twentyone years to the extent of 50l. a-year. To that motion the Duke of Buckingham-then Lord Chandos-moved as an amendment the extension of the franchise to fifty-pound tenantry-at-will. The issue of that proposition depended upon Mr. Hume and his friends; for the amendment was opposed on the part of the Government. The Radicals, however, sided with the Tories; and in a spirit of commendable liberality, though in a mistaken and short-sighted policy, adopted a measure which has of course been the chief means of maintaining the undue influence' of which they have since complained.

Now, it should not be overlooked, that the advocates of the principle of numerical representation, from which it is impossible to dissociate the logical, though indirect, sequence of the right of bribery, would introduce at least a theoretic sanction to a far more undue influence' than any that they have been combating as the result of their own legislation in 1832. Nor let the notion of bribery becoming not illegal in this country, as a consequence of the introduction of the principle of numerical representation, be discarded as preposterous. If the principle of numerical representation be ever established, we shall have gone more than half-way towards a concession of the laws now in operation against bribery. When Conservative Land Societies are already found actively pursuing a more democratic subdivision of the soil than any that exists under the territorial laws of France and Spain, for a furtherance of the merely temporary interests of a political party, it is by no means inconceivable that societies of political capitalists may be found to agitate a repeal of the bribery laws, as a logical deduction from the principle of numerical representation; and which, if realized, would probably invest them with the dominion of the country..

The representation of classes, then, being the principle which

this country will continue to recognise, we propose here to consider in what manner a fairer representation can be given to those | classes, viewed both in a social and in an industrial light.

II. The question of the fifty-pound franchise for the counties appears to depend, in the first instance, upon two leading considerations. If the principle of the representation be that of classes, as presumptively coinciding with an aggregate representation of general interests, do the classes in town and country so widely differ as to justify a restriction of the franchise greater by fivefold in the country than in the towns? If they do not, does a sense of general interests, which is acknowledged to be the supreme arbiter of the question, involve an exceptional deviation, in this instance, from the equal representation of classes, on the ground that the argument of special classes here exceptionally differs from the argument of general interests?

The fifty-pound rental qualification is said to rest on two distinct grounds-the one a theoretic and historic distinction; the other, an additional guarantee, in the maintenance of a separate franchise, for the continued separation of the borough from the county constituencies.

It is obvious that, so far as the historic distinction is concerned, that distinction would be fully sustained, not only by the halving of the present rental qualification for the counties, but by any reduction which should preserve an appreciable distinction between the two rental franchises. The historic distinction, therefore, is no argument against the abolition of the 501. clause, although it is no doubt an argument (be it worth what it may) for a limit in the reduction of the qualification, intervening between what it now is, and what the borough franchise will become under the new constitution of the House of Commons.

The same answer may of course be returned to the second, or more practical, of these grounds. A county franchise fixed at 251., or 20l., or perhaps a lower rental qualification, would be as effective a guarantee for a bearing in mind of the practical distinction between the borough and the county franchise as the present qualification of 50l. This object, indeed, can hardly be regarded as of great value. It is absolutely necessary that the county constituencies shall be kept separate from the great boroughs, because, although they may not have antagonistic interests, they must, nevertheless, have distinct interests to maintain. But it may be questioned whether the preservation of distinct franchises is any necessary condition of the preservation of distinct borough and county constituencies.

A comparatively new argument against a measure which should go so far as to identify the two franchises,-or should at least

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reduce the county qualification to 10l., is suggested by Lord Brougham in his speech of the 3rd of August in the House of Lords:

'He viewed not only with jealousy, but with the greatest possible aversion, any measure such as that which had more than once been introduced into the other House of Parliament for letting in upon the counties the votes of the 107. householders, and thereby reducing to a nullity the franchise of the freeholders and other proprietors. The inevitable consequence of swamping the counties with 10%. householders would ultimately be to throw the whole of the representation into the hands of the borough members.'-Times, August 4.

The justice of this apprehension may however, we venture to think, be gravely doubted. By making use of the distinctive term borough members,' and not the more generic one of town members,' we understand Lord Brougham's apprehension to be, either that the inhabitants of boroughs would form a large proportion of the holders of a 101. county franchise; or that they would avail themselves of the reduction of the county franchise to 10l., to become tenants beyond the borough limits to that value, in order to exert a voice over the county elections.

The former apprehension appears entirely groundless. By the 2nd Will. IV., c. 45, § 24, 25, it is already provided that no person shall vote for a county in respect of any freehold occupied by himselfnor in respect of any copyholds or leaseholds-which may confer a vote for a borough, whether he shall have qualified himself by residence, &c., or not. The only borough voters for counties, therefore, even now, are the freeholders of tenements which they do not occupy. Occupying tenants are also excluded by the fact of occupation. The result, therefore, to the boroughs, of a reduction of the county rental franchise, will be simply nil.

The latter apprehension appears to us to be already answered in the negative by the experience of twenty-five years. Are the boroughs more likely to govern the counties by means of a 101. rental, than of a 40s. freehold qualification? Have not the Conservative Land Societies created a by far greater number of such freehold qualifications than any corresponding Liberal Associations? Have not the towns now a moral dominance in the country which would render them less than ever likely to resort to such a method of securing their policy in the House of Commons? It appears clear that this apprehension, if it be well founded, must apply with equal force to the 40s. freeholders. If we restrict the reduction of the rental qualification for the counties in deference to such an apprehension, we ought surely to raise in some degree the freehold qualification. It is, no doubt, a monstrous anomaly that a moderately-educated person in an easy

condition of life, renting a house at 451. a year, should have no vote, and that the dweller in a cabin, who has received a little freehold of just 40s. a year from some Conservative Land Society, should have one. It is an anomaly opposed, not only to individual justice, but to general policy. It will be for Parliament to resolve whether any alteration in respect of freeholds be practicable or not. But it is certain that the raising of the freehold qualification from 40s. to 5l., and the reduction of the rental qualification to the square of the freehold-viz., 251. in place of 501.-would greatly amend the existing law. It would also consult whatever justice may exist in the apprehension expressed by Lord Brougham.

It must be remembered also that the mapping-out of the counties into small freeholds has been the work, so far as it has gone, of Societies, and not of individuals. This is, in our view, a species of constructive bribery, as detrimental to the morality as it is injurious to the agricultural interests of the State; for, whatever the possessors of these little freeholds, under the action of Land Societies, may have paid for their possession, it is certain at least that they have received them on terms dictated by the consideration of their votes. Now, although it would be difficult, if not impossible, to defeat the creation of such freeholds on the part of individuals, it would be by no means difficult to defeat their creation on the part of Societies. A single stipulation, rendering null and void either sales, or leases, or other grants of land, on the part of Societies constituted for political objects, would probably cut at the root of this great and increasing evil.

Whatever force, therefore, may exist in the apprehension expressed by Lord Brougham, it will be conceded, we venture to think, that it is one which may be easily dissipated by precautionary legislation.

That it may be seen more clearly from whence the evil of undue democratic influence in the counties is to be apprehended, we subjoin the following analysis of the principal electors for each county, or division of county, which we have made from the voluminous Tables in the Return presented to the House of Commons. It will be seen from the relation of the freeholders to the aggregate, that other classes are too insignificant to enter singly into the question. The latest registrations uniformly given in this Return are for 1850:—