mind, but distinct from it, or, in other words, things either seen, or felt, or smelled, or heard, or touched. Now, it is evident that ideas of thought, memory, and imagination, can only exist in a mind, or, which is the same thing, cannot be conceived as existing in its absence. But that which is termed matter, by which really is meant the external world, would also seem to exist only in a mind, or, in other words, cannot be thought of as having a being without a mind. For every particle, or every conglomerate of particles, that makes up the outer world, necessarily must be a thing, or congeries of things, either seen, or felt, or smelled, or touched, or heard—that is, a thing, or series of things, perceived immediately through the senses; and consequently the sum of these things, or the universe itself, must be the collect of percepts, or total of things perceived immediately through the senses. But all things immediately perceived through the senses are ideas of sense, or sensations; and as these evidently can only exist in a mind as to speak of ideas and sensations without supposing a mind would be as absurd as to speak of flowers and trees without implying vegetable life-it follows that the outer world can only exist in a mind, or, which is the same thing, cannot be conceived as having an existence without it. The conclusion therefore, is, not that the outer world-from the finest atom that scarcely peoples the sunbeam' to the mightiest sphere that revolves in some circle unknown-does not exist; it clearly has an existence to be seen, felt, touched, heard, and smelled; but that existence is in a mind, evidenced and realized in the sensations; and therefore its Eeing is to be Perceived.

But as this may seem paradoxical, or, at best, removed from common apprehension, we may examine the theory more minutely. Let it then be clearly understood that the question is, not whether matter, or the outer world, does, or does not, exist, but whether its existence is in a mind, or can be conceived without a mind. To test this, let us suppose the absolute existence of this entity, matter or the outer world, apart from and independent of intelligence. Now matter is composed of masses of inertness--according to this hypothesis, infinite, and capable of perpetual subdivision. These masses, however, when severally analysed, resolve themselves into individual bodies, which again, when scrutinized, become composites of extension, weight, and figure, or, as they are termed, the primary qualities, with a certain amount of colour, taste, smell, and heat, or, as they are called, the secondary qualities, either annexed to them, or conceivably annexable. These qualities, however, whether primary or secondary, are merely ideas of sense or sensations. For, in the first place, ideas of sense or sensations are all that they suggest, or conceivably

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can suggest. Thus the dividing a tree into parts, examining it with a microscope, burning it in a fire, moulding it into new forms for architecture or shipbuilding, is simply varying, diminishing, or multiplying sensations or ideas of sense suggested to us. In the second place, the qualities into which every particle or conglomerate of particles of matter resolves itself must be either archetypes existing in the subjects themselves, of which our ideas of sense or sensations are the types, copies, or representations, or they must be ideas of sense or sensations themselves, since otherwise their existence is inconceivable. Now it must be obvious that the secondary qualities of any subject of matter whatever are not archetypes inhering in it but present themselves in changeable sensations. The colour of a tree varies to every possible shade of hue, as we look at it through glasses of different power, or at different distances; the smells of it would be quite various to nostrils of unequal keenness; and the same observation applies to its taste, or its degree of heat. It follows, then, that the secondary qualities of any subject of matter do not inhere in it; and if so, what is to be said of its primary qualities? Now, first, it is impossible in any subject of matter whatsoever to dissociate altogether its primary from its secondary qualities, or to conceive the one as existing alone, independent of the other. No thought can body forth into form anything merely extended, organized into shape, and of a certain weight, without, at the same time, annexing to it some colour, some possible taste, some smell, and some degree of heat, or cold, the privative of heat. If, therefore, the primary qualities of any subject of matter are inseparably connected with its secondary qualities, so that one cannot be imagined apart from the other, and if the secondary qualities do not inhere in the subject, it follows that neither do the primary, and therefore that both present themselves in sensations. Secondly, upon close examination, it will appear that conceivably the primary qualities might present themselves in changeable sensations, and therefore that they do not inhere in any subject. Man by experience assigns to things a certain extension, which he accurately proportions as he approaches or recedes from them, so that the different objects of sight preserve a ratio of size, when viewed repeatedly at equal intervals of remoteness; but were his faculties suddenly reduced extremely, would not that extension instantly be altered? So, too, we measure subjects of matter by definite weights; but if our capacity for raising or lowering them were augmented or diminished in an extraordinary degree, would not their weight be different from that which it had been? The reason, therefore, that the primary qualities of any subject of

matter seem to be necessarily inherent in it, is, that they present themselves always to us in unchanging sensations; but, in truth, the one are really no more existent in it than the other. But if no subject of matter contains in itself archetypal qualities, it follows that all its qualities must be ideas of sense or sensations; and as these clearly can only exist in a mind, or, which is the same thing, cannot be conceived existing without it, it follows that every subject of matter exists in a mind, and that its Esse is Percipi.

If this be true of the apparent qualities of any subject of matter, taken alone, so it is equally true of those apparent qualities of sound and motion suggested in sensations upon certain relations of different subjects of matter. And if it be true that every subject of matter realizes itself in ideas of sense or sensations which can only exist in a mind, this is true of the sum of these subjects, or the universe, which of course exists, but exists only in a mind. Hence we revert to our conclusion, that the universe has a being, but that this being is in a mind.

It is evident, however, that matter, the outer world, or the universe, does not exist in the mind of each individual. For its existence is quite conceivable before intelligence was sphered in any mortal being; it might, therefore, exist independent of any human mind; and it would be absurd to suppose that it exists in each individual mind. But as it cannot exist without a mind, it follows that there must be some mind, in which it can have its being. Now, since in our contact with the outer world we experience ideas of sense or sensations without or against our own volition; since we see, and hear, and smell, and taste, and touch, the instant we interact with matter, independently of, and contrary to, our own wills, it follows that the mind, in which matter or the outer world exists, is immeasurably more powerful than any human intelligence. And since, as we examine the universe, we gaze with awe and wonder at that marvellous scheme, which reveals itself to us in a series of sensations-appearing in certain fixed successions, combined in an harmonious arrangement, and filling our minds with a sense of power, wisdom, and goodness, we are forced to concede that the mind, in which all these things have their being, is all-powerful, all-wise, and allbountiful; and thus we have in nature a proof of God-the omnipotent, omniscient, and ever beneficent intelligence.

From these principles follow several very important conclusions. First, matter is merely an attribute of the Divine intelligence, not a self-existent substance. Secondly, the laws of matter, or the outer world, are for us arranged successions of sensational phenomena, not causes operating without a present

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mind. Thirdly, space, which has been assumed to be infinite, eternal, self-created, and omnipresent, is merely the sum of the universe, existing in the mind of God. And a consideration of the truth, thus explained, shows the folly of Atheism, Paganism, and Scepticism. For to deny the existence of God is impossible, when every particle of this outer world which we see or touch, and which reveals itself to us in our sensations, is a necessary demonstration of that existence. And again, if men firmly grasped the truth, that all external objects have their being in God, they would scarcely deify mere evidences of Him, but would ascend to the worship of the Divine Mind, in which alone they really exist. Lastly, if men were convinced that the ideas of sense or sensations, which they perceive, are not images, more or less perfect, of archetypes without, but are the very things themselves, existing for us in our sensations, and existing really in the mind of God, they would not wander in doubt as to the truth of their own perceptions, they would not be as Prometheus is said to have found them, commingling in vain all things like the shapes of dreams."

Such is Berkeley's famous theory. We think that, two thousand years ago, the same kind of paradox was confuted by Plato. It rests upon the assumption, that our subjective apprehensions of the outer world or matter in perception-i. e., the things, ideas of sense, or sensations, which we have, and which undoubtedly can have no being without our minds, give the perfect Idea of its objective existence-that is, as it is in itself, in all its possible relations. Assuming this, it is easy to show that in his contact with matter, the things which man perceives are his sensations, and therefore that the existence of matter cannot be conceived in the absence of a mind. But the fallacy lies in postulating that, because we can only comprehend the outer world or matter in our sensations, that is, cannot conceive its existence without a mind, therefore the absolute existence of an outer world, independent of any mind whatever, must be impossible. Berkeley's proof demonstrates that this is the invariable and necessary relation of the external universe to our minds, that it is presented to us conditionally; that is, that for us it has its being in our sensations; or, in other words, that we are only conscious of it (i. e., can only conceive it) as it is comprehended by our minds (i. e., as it exists in the sphere of intelligence); but it does not exclude the possibility that the outer world exists in other relations, which transcend man altogether. It tries, indeed, to explain away this possibility, by placing the existence of the outer world in the mind of God; but as this is obviously mere hypothesis, it leaves the case as it stood before. Hence he

has to fall back upon the assumption, that this possibility is impossible; that is, that in perception we comprehend things in all their relations; that the collect of our percepts is the intuition of external being, or simply that man's knowledge is omni

science.

It is quite true that we cannot demonstrate this possibility, because that interaction of our minds with matter, or the outer world, which we term perception, evidences itself in sensations only. But it is not got rid of by merely showing that the laws of our being do not inform us of it-that we are not made to know it fully. On the other hand, by pushing Berkeley's principles to their full consequences, by negativing it as impossible, that is, by assuming that the outer world can only exist relatively to us in our sensations, and cannot exist absolutely in other relations, we can negative the existence of ourselves as distinct from ideas or sensations in our proper essence. For if we limit the existence of the outer world to the proofs of it in our sensations, we are bound to apply the same test to ourselves, and only affirm our existence in the proofs of it. Now, what are these proofs ? In our actual relations with ourselves, and with other men, all that we can apprehend is, that we think and feel; that is, that we have ideas and sensations. But if this is the complete notion of our existence in all its possible phases, it follows that our existence is the having, or being conscious of ideas and sensations; and therefore, that consciousness of ideas is the definition of existence. But what is consciousness of ideas but an idea; and what therefore is man's existence but an idea? To these conclusions proceeds the assumption that our subjective apprehensions are the necessary criterion of objective existence; that things in the sphere of our consciousness must be perceived in their essential being and complete relations; that the manifestations to the subject are the nature of the object. The assumption ends by analysing both mind and matter into mere phenomena; and with this reduction of it to absurdity, perishes the theory based upon it. The deduction from the premises may be unassailable, but the premises rest on a basis that drives thought to folly, and therefore, that cannot be the foundation of philosophy.

The ethical and religious works of Berkeley are mainly comprised in Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher. This beautiful product of his mature manhood seeks to defend moral science and Christianity against the cavils of contemporaneous infidels. It is cast in the Platonic mould, and is, therefore, rather discursive than systematic, and rather presents truths in units than combines them in a whole. Though not altogether free from a