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XIII.

Ineffectu

vours

to form an alli

ance with

From Bufalora the king proceeded to Bia- CHA P. grassa, whilst the Swiss assembled in great numbers at Galera. In this situation the duke of Savoy renewed his pacific negotiations, and having given audience to twenty deputies sent to him with proposals on the part of the Swiss, ally endeahe so far coincided in their representations as to lay the foundation for a further treaty, for the completion of which he afterwards went the Swiss. to Galera, where the terms of the proposed reconciliation were explained and assented to. It was there agreed, that an uninterrupted peace should be established between the king and the Helvetic states, which should continue during his life and ten years after his death; that the territories which the Swiss had usurped in the vallies of the Milanese should be restored, and the pension of forty thousand ducats paid to them from the state of Milan abolished; that the duke of Milan should have an establishment in France under the title of duke of Nemours, should ally himself by marriage to the reigning family, enjoy a pension of twelve thousand francs and have an escort of fifty lances. For these concessions on the part of the Swiss, they were to receive six hundred thousand crowns claimed by them under the treaty of Dijon, and three hundred thousand for the restoration of the vallies, retaining

A. D. 1515.

A. Et. 40.

A. Pont. III.

CHAP taining four thousand men in arms for the serIn this treaty the pope,

XIII.

vice of the king. In this

in

A. D. 1515.
A. t. 40.

case he relinquished Parma and Piacenza, the A. Pont. III. emperor, the duke of Savoy, and the Marquis of Monferrato, were included as parties and allies, but no mention was made either of his catholic majesty or the Venetians, or of any other of the Italian states.(a) The treaty was, however, no sooner concluded than it was broken in consequence of the arrival of fresh bodies of Swiss, who holding the French in contempt, refused to adhere to the conditions agreed upon; whereby such a diversity of opinion arose among them, that although the chief part of the army agreed to remain for the defence of Milan, great numbers quitted the field and retired towards Como, on their return to their native country.

Rapid march

D'Alviano.

of

This defection of a part of the Swiss army was not, however, so important as to damp the ardour of the rest. A body of thirty-five thousand men, accustomed to victory and inflamed with the expectations of an immense booty, presented a formidable barrier to the

progress

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(a) Guicciard. lib. xii. ii. 92. Ligue de Cambr. liv. v. ii. 435.

progress of the king. In retiring from Verona to Piacenza, Cardona had eluded the vigilance of the Venetian general d'Alviano, who having the command of an army of upwards of ten thousand men, had assured the king that he would find sufficient employment for the Spanish troops. No sooner therefore was he informed of the movements of Cardona than he quitted his station in the Polesine, and passing the Adige proceeded along the banks of the Po towards Cremona, with a celerity wholly unexampled in the commanders of those times, and which he was himself accustomed to compare to the rapid march of Claudius Nero when he hastened to oppose the progress of 'Asdrubal.(a) On the approach of D'Alviano, Francis proceeded to Marignano, for the purpose not only of affording the Venetian general an opportunity of joining the French army, but also of preventing the union of the Swiss with the Spanish and papal troops.

(a) Guicciard. lib. xii. ii. 95,

CHAP.
XIII.

AD. 1515.

A. t 40.

A. Pout. III.

Inactivity of the Spa

It may be admitted as a general maxim in the history of military transactions, that the efforts made by separate powers in alliance with nish and each other are inferior to those made with Papal equal forces by a single power. On such occasions the post of danger is willingly conceded

troops.

to

CHAP.
XIII.

A. D. 1515.

A. Et. 40.

to those who choose to take the lead, and the proportionate aid to be given by each party becomes at length so nicely balanced, that the A. Pont. III. common cause is often sacrificed to vain distinctions and distrustful timidity. Such was the situation of the Spanish general Cardona and of Lorenzo de' Medici at Piacenza; where, whilst each of them stimulated the other to pass the Po to the aid of the Swiss, neither of them could be prevailed upon to take the first step for that purpose. In exculpation, however, of the Spaniards, it is alleged that Cinthio da Tivoli the envoy of the of the pope to Francis I. having been seized upon by the Spanish troops, was compelled to disclose the purpose of his mission, in consequence of which Cardona lost all further confidence in the aid of the papal troops; and to this it is added that Lorenzo had himself secretly dispatched a messenger to the king, to assure him that in opposing his arms he had no other motive than that of obedience to the commands of the papal see, and that he should avail himself of every opportunity, consistently with his own honour, of shewing him how sincerely he was attached to his interests.(a) The

(a) Muratori, Annali d' Italia, x. 114. Ligue de Cambr. liv. v. ii. 483. Guicciard. lib. xii. ii. 96.

XIII.

The concurring testimony of the historians of CHAP. these times may be admitted as evidence of facts, which the temporizing course of conduct adopted by the pope on this occasion renders highly probable. But it is equally probable, that Cardona availed himself of these circumstances, as his justification for not doing that which he would equally have declined doing, had they never occurred. Ferdinand of Aragon was at least as indecisive as the pontiff, and Cardona well knew the disposition of his sovereign. Day after day was appointed for the passage of the Po, and a part of the Spanish army had at one time made a movement for that purpose, but a pretext was easily found for their retreat; and the Swiss, deserted by those allies who had called for their aid, were left, almost alone, to support a contest which was to decide the fate of Milan and perhaps the independence of Italy.

At the conclusion of one of those inflammatory exhortations with which the cardinal of Sion was accustomed to harangue his countrymen, the resolution was adopted instantly to attack the French, although only about two hours of day-light remained. By a rapid and unexpected march the whole body

of

VOL. III.

E

A. D. 1515. A. Æt.40. A. Pont. III.

Battle of Marignano,

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