A Supplement to the Second Edition of the Methods of EthicsMacmillan, 1884 - 184 sayfa |
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action actually admit adoption æsthetic affirm agent appears applied attainment aversion Benevolence Book causes chap chapter Common Sense commonly conceive consciousness consequences consider definite degree deliberate desire determining discussion distinct distinguished doctrine doubt duty effects Egoistic Hedonism emotions existence experience Freedom fundamental Grant Allen happiness Hastings Rashdall hedonistic HENRY SIDGWICK human ideal imply important impulses individual intensity internal sanction Intuitional Intuitionism involved J. S. Mill judge Justice Kant latter less Libertarians means merely moral judgments moral rules moralists motives nature notion object observed obvious onus probandi ordinary organism particular Perfection persons pleasure and pain possible practical present principle proposition psychical psychological psychological Hedonism question rational rational egoism realization reason recognized regard relation result right conduct seems sentiments shew social Social Statics society Spencer stimulates strictly tendency tends term thought tion treatise true ultimate end uncon Utilitarian virtue virtuous volition voluntary
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Sayfa 69 - Pleasure the equivalent phrase — a feeling which we seek to bring into consciousness and retain there, and if we substitute for the word Pain the equivalent phrase — a feeling which we seek to get out of consciousness and to keep out ; we see at once that, if the states of consciousness which a creature endeavours to maintain are the correlatives of injurious actions, and if the states of consciousness which it endeavours to expel are the correlatives of beneficial actions, it must quickly disappear...
Sayfa 83 - Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
Sayfa 14 - But when we speak of a man doing something at his own "pleasure," or as he "pleases," we signify the mere fact of choice or preference ; the mere determination of the will in a certain direction. Now, if by "pleasant...
Sayfa 29 - This is what we owe to Locke. A sort of action is a right one, when the tendency of it is to augment the mass of happiness in the community.
Sayfa 128 - But this proposition is not established by Mill's reasoning, even if we grant that what is actually desired may be legitimately inferred to be in this sense desirable. For an aggregate of actual desires, each directed towards a different part of the general happiness, does not constitute an actual desire for the general happiness, existing in any individual; and Mill would certainly not contend that a desire which does not exist in any individual can possibly exist in an aggregate of individuals.
Sayfa 8 - I have given in the text. tion than to Rational Intuition (as commonly understood) : and hence the term Moral Sense might seem more appropriate. But the term sense suggests a capacity for feelings which may vary from A to B without either being in error...
Sayfa 138 - Why should I sacrifice my own happiness for the greater happiness of another?' it must surely be admissible to ask the egoist, 'Why should I sacrifice a present pleasure for a greater one in the future? Why should I concern myself about my own future feelings any more than about the feelings of other persons?
Sayfa 60 - I conceive it to be the business of Moral Science to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct; and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery.
Sayfa 123 - Such a principle manifestly does not give complete guidance — indeed its effect, strictly speaking, is merely to throw a definite onus probandi on the man who applies to another a treatment of which he would complain if applied to himself; but Common Sense has amply recognized the practical importance of the maxim: and its truth, so .far as it goes, appears to me self-evident.
Sayfa 151 - For even supposing that this ideal society is ultimately to be realised, it must at any rate be separated from us by a considerable interval of evolution ; hence it is not unlikely that the best way of progressing towards it is some other than the apparently directest way, and that we shall reach it more easily if we begin by moving away from it.