on Value and Interchange. While liberal measures are made a condition of liberal support; while, in other words, this reciprocity endures, those measures will, no doubt, be pursued, or at least paraded. But from the moment that the vigilance of the country slackens, or political liberality ceases to be remunerative, from that moment this political liberality will be doomed. Mr. Bright and his friends will, we have no doubt, find themselves treated, in the long run, not much better than by an Ethiopian slave-dealer. Mr. Disraeli has in his own person already illustrated his character (applied by him originally to Sir Robert Peel) of the political pedlar, who bought his party in the cheapest market, ' and sold them in the dearest.' And we have no doubt that certain Liberals will find to their cost that this principle is, with Mr. Disraeli, inexhaustible in its application.

The drift of these observations is to impress upon our readers that, if the present Government shall remain in power, the vigilance of the Whig party, backed by the support of the country, will alone realize a reconstruction of the Indian Government. So great is our falsely-termed Conservative prejudice against destroying even the most vicious institutions, when supported by usage and tradition, that it is often only in a moment of public activity that the most useful reforms can be carried into effect. We have already said that such piecemeal legislation for India as is now before the public, can by no means be decisive in favour of a Bill founded upon the fourteen resolutions. These resolutions will bear to the Bill itself only that relation which Preliminaries of Peace bear to the Treaty of Peace. The Bill, when it comes, will be liable to all the misadventure of a Treaty after the Preliminaries are signed. Brief discussion, such as Lord John Russell designed, might have rendered the policy of proceeding by resolutions serviceable. Prolonged discussion, such as the Government have managed to carry out, renders this whole policy a farce. There is therefore, in our opinion, no alternative between the immediate re-adoption of the Bill No. 1, and the postponement of the Indian question either indefinitely, or at the least until 1859.

The present division in the Liberal ranks is one of the most unfortunate of the recent phases of the House of Commons. This division obviously is the result of Liberal jealousy of Whig superiority. The Whig party have offended the independent Liberals, it would appear from Mr. Bright, by a want of courtesy. Civility,' said Mr. Bright, under the late Government, was a thing altogether unknown.' We might say something about such a complaint coming from such a quarter.

6

Historical Relations between Great Britain and Oude. 209

If men of natural capacity, of aptitude for public business, were introduced into the ranks of the independent Liberals, there is no doubt that members of their party would gain admission into a Whig cabinet. But the fact is, that there is not a single such member in those ranks who does not differ in opinion so vitally even from his own party, as to render direct concert all but impossible.

We turn, then, to the condition and politics of India itself. The general question of Indian reform is one of too large a scope to be dealt with effectually on this occasion; and it is one which has not at present been raised in the legislature. We shall, however, glance at it before we conclude. But in the first place it is necessary to deal with Lord Canning's celebrated Proclamation, and we shall hope to throw some additional light on the controverted terms of the re-establishment of our authority in Oude.

Much of the difference of opinion that has been professed on the latter of these points has arisen, we suspect, from entire misapprehension of matters of fact, which are now matters of history. Both Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli have represented Oude as a country in possession, until a year or two ago, of all its rights of independence, and as a State suddenly seized by our authority under Lord Dalhousie's administration. They have questioned at once the policy and the morality of the annexation of Oude. They have intimated that they regard it as an act of sudden and unprovoked violence. They therefore sympathize with the nobles of Oude, as a body rising against the oppression of the British power. These views-unless indeed they were fomented by an unworthy jealousy of Lord Canning-appear to have formed the basis of their Indian policy.

Now it happens that all this is so much sheer misconception of matters of fact, on which there can be no dispute. We cannot, therefore, do better than explain at the outset, the historical relations between Oude and British India, and the circumstances in which the annexation of the former took place. It will then be seen what are the moral claims of Oude as a recently defunct state, in what light the conduct of the Talookdars is to be regarded, and how the policy of Lord Canning is consequently to be adjudged.

The cardinal circumstances to be here noted, are three in number. 1st. It is a fact that throughout the present century the British Government, under nearly every representative in India, has made gradual but sure encroachments. 2ndly. It is a fact that, among these encroachments, we had assumed, even under Lord Ellenborough's rule, nearly the whole power of the State in

military matters, which, in such a State as Oude, was nearly equivalent to the assumption of all power. 3rdly. It is a fact that, through successive Governors-General, we have repeatedly threatened to assume the whole government of Oude, and that the Court of Lucknow has repeatedly acquiesced in the justice of this alternative. It must be remembered too, that this interference was directed, not simply against the State, but in favour of the people of Oude.

1. The first of these encroachments on the sovereignty of Oude was made by Lord Wellesley in 1801. In consideration of certain territories ceded to us, we undertook to defend the sovereign of Oude, and to defray the cost of the military forces requisite under this liability, both as against foreign and domestic enemies.' (Sleeman, Vol. ii., p. 186.) These domestic enemies were obviously the Talookdars. Thus, the very first diplomatic relations of this century between Oude and British India, accept the fact of the common hostility of the Talookdars to both Governments. Yet they are described by Lord Derby, Mr. Disraeli, Mr. Bright, Sir James Graham, and others, as rising, in 1857, in behalf of their natural sovereign against an European Power with which they were but just thrown into collision!

In addition to this liability for defence, the Anglo-Indian Government, in virtue of the same treaty, and of that of 1816, held the power of direct military occupation throughout Oude, in peace as well as in war, while nearly the whole of the native army of Oude was disbanded.

'The British Government (writes Sir W. H. Sleeman) retained the power to station the British troops in such parts of the Oude territories as might appear to it most expedient; and the Oude sovereign bound himself to dismiss all his troops, save four battalions of infantry, one battalion of Nujeebs and Mewaties, two thousand horsemen and three hundred Golundages, or artillerymen, with such numbers of armed peons as might be deemed necessary for the purpose of collecting the revenue, and a few horsemen and nujeebs to attend the persons of the amils.'-Vol. ii., p. 188.

More than half a century, therefore, ago, the right of military occupation in Oude, by the British forces, and the hostility of the Talookdars, both to their natural sovereign' and to the British Government, were fully recognised. Previously to the treaty of 1801, the forces of Oude consisted of not less than 80,000 men. Thus much on the first of the three points to which we adverted a moment ago.

2. Turn next to the second point-the repeated complaints and repeated threats of successive Governors-General towards the Court of Oude. These complaints are nearly innumerable, even

Long threatened Annexation of Oude.

211

under the administrations of Lord Amherst and Lord Hastings; and the direct threats of annexation appear to have originated so early as the governorship of Lord William Bentinck. The following extract will evince the policy of our Indian Government so long as a quarter of a century ago:

'On the 20th of January, 1831, the Governor-General, Lord William Bentinck, held a conference with the King of Oude, and told his Majesty, in presence of his Minister, that the state of things in Oude, and maladministration in all departments, were such as to war rant and require the authoritative interference of the British Govern ment for their correction, &c.'

The narrative of this interview thus concludes:

'That his Lordship hoped that a better system would be established by his [the King's] minister's agency; but if he failed, and the same abuses and misrule continued, the King must be prepared to abide the consequences; that the Governor-General intended to make strong representations to the authorities in England on the state of misrule prevailing, and to solicit their sanction to the adoption of specific measures, even to the length of assuming the direct administration of the country, if the evils were not corrected in the interim.'-Vol. ii. pp. 194, 5.0

In the following year, Lord W. Bentinck writes to the King of Oude, as follows:

'I do not use this strong language of remonstrance without manifest necessity. On former occasions the language of expostulation has been frequently used towards you, with reference to the abuses of your Government, and as yet nothing serious has befallen you! I beseech you, however, not to suffer yourself to be deceived into a false security,' &c.-p. 196.

i

Turn next to the correspondence of Lord Hardinge with the King of Oude, in 1847. In a voluminous memorandum drawn up by that Governor-General we find the following passage:→→

That by wisely taking timely measures for the reformation of abuses as one of the first measures of his reign, his Majesty will, with honour to his own character, rescue his people from their present miserable condition; but if he procrastinates, he will incur the risk of forcing the British Government to interfere, by assuming the Government of Oude.'—p. 204.

These quotations suffice to destroy the exclusive association of Lord Dalhousie with the policy of annexing Oude the exclu sive association of Lord Canning with that of severe measures against the Talookdars.. It will be seen, therefore, that the arguments of the Government, and of their new allies in the House of Commons, are founded on enormous assumptions directly at variance with fact.

3. The third point, that the Indian Government had always

made the interests of the inferior classes paramount to every other in its interference in Oude, is abundantly borne out in successive despatches. Thus writes Lord Hardinge again to the King of Oude in 1847

That in the more recent Treaty of 1837, it is stated, that the solemn and paramount obligation provided by Treaty, for the prosperity of his Majesty's subjects, and the security of the lives and property of the inhabitants, has been notoriously neglected by successive rulers in Oude, thereby exposing the British Government to the reproach of having imperfectly fulfilled its obligations towards the Oude people,' &c.—p. 202.

It is clear, therefore, that whatever support may formerly have been accorded to the Court of Lucknow was simply dependent on its coinciding with the interests of the people of Oude. Meanwhile, the hostility to the Talookdars was unvarying and unconditional. The final annexation of Oude by Lord Dalhousiefar from revolutionizing the traditionary policy of the Indian Government, as the Ministers and the odd sort of Liberals who sustain them insist-was, therefore, no more than the practical recognition of a principle settled by a long line of predecessors, in the event of reform by the Native Government proving illusory, as was since unquestionably the case.

Such appear to have been the chief relations of our own Government with Oude, from the rule of Lord Wellesley to the period of the annexation. On what principles, then, were we now to deal with the rebellious nobles, distinguishing the mere allies of the Durbar from the murderers of Europeans?

Since the arrival of Lord Canning's Proclamation in this country, two successive modifications of the policy which that proclamation announced have been made known to us. The first is to be found in the correspondence between Lord Canning and Sir James Outram, published by the daily journals in London on the 22nd of May. This consists, however of a single qualifying provision, rather explanatory, than introductive of any fresh principle of importance. The second rests in the carte blanche which appears to have been subsequently given by the Governor-General to the British Commissioner in Oude, with reference to the treatment of the refractory Talookdars. By the most recent accounts, it appears that the Commissioner has given a very liberal interpretation to the discretionary powers which have been vested in him. The result is, of course, a different policy from that which Lord Canning originally had in contemplation. But it does not, therefore, follow that the course last adopted is the course most expedient. Without presuming to