even do that which must at all times be painful to a commander, I will retreat before the enemy. I will even retreat to vantage to the enemy; but if, in the course of my retreat, I can take any opportunity of attacking him with a prospect of success;-if his weakness, or my address, should enable me to take any advantage of him, without committing my own army, without committing my country, and above all without commiiting that great interest entrusted to my care, then will I revenge the crimes by which France has disgraced herself; and attacking the enemy with that spirit and firmness which belongs to my nature, make him feel what my countrymen are capable of effecting in such a cause."Such had been the object, and such was the language of our illustrious commander; and the proud and ever-memorable victory of Salamanca grew out of this resolution. He asked the House, whether he had not faithfully performed the promised object, by a battle, than which there was never one fought more nobly, or with more advantage to the common cause? Twenty thousand men had been put hors de combat; and the advantage would have been still greater, had not night, and the force of nature, interfered to prevent all those results which were aspired after. The loss of the French army in the fight, and through the consequences which naturally resulted from it, could not be estimated at less than the above number. He contended, that the plan of campaign, as originally conceived by lord Wellington, (which did not aspire to effect the total expulsion of the enemy, whose expulsion, on military principles, was not to be expected, even from a victory glorious as stood, till he found them in such a situation as would enable him to turn it to their discomfiture and defeat. Upon these principles he acted up to the battle of Sa-Ciudad Rodrigo, rather than give any adlamanca, and when the French crossed the Douro, (an opportunity of which lord Wellington could not deprive them from being in possession of the fords and bridges, so that it was impossible for him, with an inferior army, to make the Douro a military position,) he then retreated; but his retreat was made on this principle. "If you give me an advantage, I will at tack you, but otherwise I will not put to the risk of a single battle the cause of the peninsula, which may ultimately triumph without such a sacrifice." And what was the result of this determination? It led to that great action; which not only filled the nation with gratitude, but inspirited other countries to oppose the aggressions of France-an action, of which it was justly said, on a former evening, that, in the history of all the battles which the campaign in Spain, or in any other country, presented, there was none which could be less imputed to chance than the battle of Salamanca. It was not one, the armies engaged in which met but the hour before they engaged, and decided the struggle by force of arms unaided by policy; but it was a battle fought between two great armies (for they both were great) nearly equal in numbers, though a superiority was certainly on the side of the enemy, after looking at each other, and not only looking at each other, but watching, manœuvring in each others presence for an advantageous opportunity of attack, from the 16th of July to the 22d of that month, the day on which the glorious and evermemorable battle of Salamanca was fought. -Without going into the detail, which he thought unnecessary, as every English-that of Salamanca) had been perfectly reaman must be familiar with it, from having read the Gazette with the highest interest and delight over and over again; he would repeat that this was a victory achieved after manœuvres the most complicated, where two armies were long in sight of each other, each observing what the other did, and trying, by every effort of military skill, to take advantage of any errors that might occur. The greatness of his mind was the admiration of all Europe. In him was seen a general not tenacious of what might be said by his enemies, not putting to risk his army to maintain a particular position, but saying "to himself and to his government, "I will lized. The object of lord Wellington's operations in the north was to force the enemy to quit his hold of the country in the south, and to do that which the French officers were instructed by their government never to do, if it could by possibility be avoided, namely, to raise the siege of Cadiz. The French government was afraid of the moral effects of their raising the siege of Cadiz, and hence these orders; as they believed that while they appeared in strength before Cadiz, the world would give them credit for being strong in Spain. He put it to the House, then, if the operations of lord Wellington had not compelled the enemy to abandon the siege of Cadiz, the whole of Andalusia, and left them with- pulse and turned their backs on the exerout any force to the westward of Alicant. tions of Spain) did they think that that What was the situation of Spain at present? spirit had nothing to do with that which Lord Wellington had said, that but for had recently manifested itself in another one unfortunate circumstance the success part of the world? Even the retreat of of the campaign would have been certain. lord Wellington to Torres Vedras had Success would have been certain, had not been of service to that power which now, the French collected the whole of their awakened to a sense of its own strength, disposable force, amounting to not less than had resisted and chastised the power of 70 or 80,000 men, upon the Tormes, and France, and from which so much might be compelled lord Wellington prudentially to augured for Europe. But with Russia, the make a retreat, a retreat which was more hopes excited by the Spanish resistance like the prelude to a victory than a proof did not end: beginning at the extremity, of disaster. The enemy had only been it was to be hoped its influence would exenabled to compel him to retreat by an tend further into Europe-to those powers abdication of every military principle which now, indeed, appeared to form a which had regulated their conduct before. part of the strength of France, but which, If Madrid had been a position of military in fact, were only unnaturally connected importance, which it was not, the case with her, he meant the whole power of would have been materially different from Germany. Such were the effects resultwhat it at present appeared. Lord Wel- ing from this battle; and which the House lington had not taken possession of it as a might justly trace to itself, as well as to military position, nor had he advanced its brave army, and its distinguished geupon it for the vain glory of taking the neral. Did the House know that the chaenemy's capital, he did nothing for mere racter of the great battle of Borodino, for parade-he went there on this principle; it was a great battle, was partly caused by he knew that unless by advancing he lord Wellington; a battle greater than threw a large force on the flank of Soult, that of Eylau, greater than that of Aspern, he could not make that general do what and that in which the power of France was really the object of his operations had received one of the severest checks it raise the siege of Cadiz, while Andalusia had ever received. In that great battle, in and the southern provinces of Spain were which 70 or 80,000 men laid down their delivered from the enemy. What, too, lives, it was consoling to know that prince was the result of these operations? The Kutusoff had it in his power, on the mornFrench, in consequence, did abandon ing of that day, to animate his troops by Cadiz; they had since abandoned Madrid, telling them of the glory gained by the and thus had lost the moral conquest of English on the plains of Salamanca.-Did Spain. They were obliged to evacuate not the House feel that it must be most the capital in their turns as well as us, and animating to the Russian army to know that were now only in possession of the ground the marquis of Wellington had at Salaon which they stood, and as far as ever manca completely routed the French from effecting the military or moral sub-army? To be told, that if they stood to jugation of the country. And, he should be glad to know a position in which a French army could be placed, less useful to themselves or less prejudicial to the interests of Europe? But if they were to measure the influence of the victory of Salamanca only by what it had produced in Spain, he would say, their estimate of its value would be most unfair, most unwise, most untrue, in the circumstances in which Europe was at present placed. Did the House imagine that that spirit of resistance which grew out of that House, or rather out of that people they represented in that House, (for be should like to know what ministers could have retained their situations in this country, who at such a period had not obeyed the universal im the enemy like Englishmen, they would achieve as great a triumph, and as great a triumph they did achieve? For, though from various circumstances it was found impossible to follow up that victory, still it was a victory, than which a prouder triumph never was obtained by the forces of any country.-In that action, that distinguished general prince Bagration, whose loss we had since to deplore, with 30,000 men, repelled the whole military power of France directed to one point. But it was not at Borodino only that lord Wellington had served the cause of Russia by the influence of his actions, and where the moral effects of his victory were foundthey pervaded the whole Russian empire. Russia had been assisted by his military councils. The principle on which Russia | so far from finding any support in the pohad acted on the opening of the campaign was that which was recommended by the marquis of Wellington. He had said, if Russia adopted that system she was safe. It was on that principle that he had formerly defended Portugal; so that Russia might be supposed to have derived equal benefit from his councils and example. At the moment the French had taken Moscow, it was some consolation to our allies to know that lord Wellington, by pursuing a plan similar to that on which they were acting, had taken Madrid; and what was more, that he had forced the enemy to give up that which, for more than two years, they had anxiously carried on the siege of Cadiz. It was immediately subsequent to their receiving intelligence of this, that Murat met with that defeat which sealed the necessity of Buonaparte's retreat from Moscow. The effects, then, of the battle of Salamanca were to be traced not only in Spain, but in Russia; and not only in Russia, but through all the world; its ramifications were felt to excite those who suffered under the tyrant of France to rise to resistance. There was yet one other extra/ ordinary and most important result seen proceeding from the battle of Salamanca, in the conquest it gave lord Wellington over Spain herself; for he would put it to the House, with their knowledge of the pride of the Spaniards, their distinguished pride, their honourable pride, and, in many instances, their useful pride, for he did not know but that their pride opposed a more effectual bar to foreign conquest than almost any other nation could oppose to it he put it, then, to the House, what must be the effect of lord Wellington's exploits on the Spanish mind, what the ascendancy of character which he had gained, when the united voice of the whole nation gave him the command of their whole military means. If a proof were wanting of the universality of this feeling in the Spanish people; if a proof were wanting that that honour was not conferred on him merely by the majority of the Spanish councils, the Cortes or the Regency, they could bring it to no better test, than was furnished by the conduct of that unfortunate officer general Ballasteros, to whose neglect and disobedience of the orders he received was in no small degree attributable the speedy advance of the enemy. What, however, was the result of this test? It appeared in his case, that pulation of the country, or in the army been engaged, he hoped the House would look at her difficulties as well as her de falcations. If she had not been able to equal our wishes, she had more than equalled our hopes. If she had not been able to bring large regular armies into the field, her irregular forces had risen in such strength, that at one time they actually so completely divided the French armies from each other, that each was ignorant of the way in which the other was occupied. Spain had laboured under greater difficulties than any other country, and had done more. With respect to the assistance given her by England, though he would hereafter challenge any man to show that ministers had withheld from her any assistance they had it in their power to give; he did not wish to bring this point into discussion. We had assisted her as promptly as we could, with all we could spare from ourselves, and when it was considered that this for a time was all the means of resistance she had to work upon; when, too, it was recollected, that all her resources from South America, which had always supported her, were cut off for a considerable period, the wonder was that she had done so much, rather than that she had done no more. All the claim that he meant to prefer this night was this, that the services of lord Wellington, and the battle of Salamanca, were not to be considered merely as important in themselves, but as productive of great military consequences in Spain, and great moral consequences throughout Europe. With respect to the original plan of the campaign, on the principles of which he acted, and still more with the aid of the original documents in the possession of government, he (lord Castlereagh) begged to say that lord Wellington had not only accomplished all he expected, but more than all he had hoped to perform, and retired to the frontier having raised the siege of Cadiz, freed Andalusia, triumphed over danger, and gained immortal glory. If they watched his advance and retreat, it would be found that no disasters had occurred to damp our satisfaction. Only observe the skilfulness with which our great commander executed that retreat. We heard of no rearguards surprised; no guns or stores taken by the enemy, except two or three in one place, which did not belong to his equipment, and which he could have carried off with little trouble, had they come with in the scope of his main object so as to (VOL. XXIV.) induce him to encumber himself with them. He sustained no loss but what might be expected in the ordinary course of service. After having accomplished every military object which he had in view, he had retired with glory. His character never appeared more glorious. Our credit and our hopes were never higher in Spain than at the present time; and if we could not now drive the enemy over the Pyrenees, it was evident the enemy could not conquer Spain, and might be said to have little more hold of the country than they would have, if, having been forced to recross the Pyrenees, they were accumulating strength, and waiting an opportunity to return.-He would now conclude, hoping, that though he had gone at greater length into the subject than he thought of doing, that he had not wearied the patience of the House, that he had not introduced any question of military policy that would awaken a controversial feeling, and above all, that he had not appeared desirous of screening ministers from censure under the great and illustrious name of the marquis of Wellington. Any charges as to the means they bad afforded, or ought to have afforded lord Wellington, they were anxious to meet on a future day. They had no wish to hang the conduct of government on the neck of lord Wellington, but were content to stand or fall on their own merits. He then moved, "That the thanks of this House be given to general the marquis of Wellington, for the many and great services which he has rendered to this kingdom, and to his Majesty's allies, during the late campaign; and more particularly for the glorious and decisive victory obtained near Salamanca, by the allied army under his lordship's command, upon the 22d of July last, whereby the French power in Spain has been essentially diminished, the siege of Cadiz has been raised, and the southern provinces of the peninsula have been rescued from the hands of the enemy." Sir Francis Burdett professed himself to be incompetent to follow the details of military operations, so as to be able to offer an opinion upon them; indeed, he did not much like the agitation of such subjects in that House: but the noble lord had entered into a variety of subjects, and seemed disposed to call upon the House to sanction the whole conduct of the government respecting the conduct of the campaign, and to endeavour to shew that they had not been wanting in afford. (M) noble lord that evening, he had never understood that it was totally out of the contemplation of government to expel the French out of Spain. What the noble lord called success, he called defeat; for he never could have imagined that an expenditure of one million a month had taken place in the military department of this country for the last eleven ing supplies to lord Wellington. (No! | ever. Until he had heard it from the no! from the other side.) As far as he understood the noble lord, what he had said went to shew, that government had supplied every thing that had been essential to the success of the marquis of Wellington. [Lord Castlereagh disavowed having made any such statement, and said, he had particularly guarded himself against such a construction.]-He begged the noble lord's pardon if he had misunder-months, for no other purpose than raising stood him, but he could not upon all occasions comprehend the course of his arguments. It often fell to his lot to be totally incapable of collecting the meaning of the noble lord; and now, amidst his many tropes and figures, and words about circumstances and details, he felt that there was in many instances no distinct idea conveyed to his mind. He yet did imagine that some excuse was indirectly intended for the conduct of his Majesty's ministers. He was not very much dis posed on any occasion, when a vote of Thanks was proposed for services per; formed by the British army, whether those services had been attended with success or defeat, to give such a vote any opposition. Far was he from wishing invidiously to detract from the merits of men who had devoted their exertions to the service of their country, or to withhold from them any recompence which it was in the power of the House to bestow. But when he heard it stated that the victory gained over the French forces in Spain was more important in its consequences than any which had been gained in former times, and that the victory of Salamanca was equal to that of the duke of Marlborough at the battle of Blenheim, in which the enemy lost 20,000 men, had their general, marshal Tallard, taken, and 30 or 40 squadrons driven into the Rhine, and other great battles, which had completely changed the aspect of the whole affairs of Europe-though not desirous of undervaluing the merits of the great general whose achievements were meant to be extolled, and whose character and ability no man could more sincerely admire than he did; yet he could not suffer such delusions to go forth uncontradicted, the more especially, when he considered that they were calculated to plunge the country, under the direction of the same persons, still deeper in a destructive and ruinous war. He contended that, after these boasted and overpraised victories, we were still as far from our object as the siege of Cadiz. As to the Andalusias, they must fall again, as a mattter of course, into the hands of France. Under all the circumstances of the contest, it appeared to him, even upon the ministers' own shewing, that we were unable to find sufficient means to support the campaign; and that after lord Wellington's retreat, he had only the two fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, left to him as the fruits of his campaign in Spain. What! were we to be satisfied after all the splendid victories which had been gained in the course of the present campaign-after the exhausted state to which the French troops had been reduced by their incursion into Russia, and more particularly after the glorious, important, and unparalleled victory of Salamanca, so highly advantageous in its consequences to the general affairs of the peninsula, were we to be satisfied by a retreat? Were we not to take advantage of all those gratifying and cheering circumstances? Were we to suffer the French troops to recover from the effects of their discomfiture and exhaustion, and to wait until the tide of good fortune which had attended us had flowed back upon its source? It seemed to him, that such propositions were totally inconsistent with the obvious rules of common sense and reason. And yet, where now was the marquis of Wellington? In what direction were we to look for the glorious results of the campaign? In what manner was the diminution of the French power in Spain evinced? The noble lord had slightly touched upon the most important feature of the war, the failure of the siege of Burgos. If the word of the noble lord was to be taken, nothing on this occasion was to be imputed to the commander of the forces. Lord Wellington did all that a great commander could do, and all that his means rendered him capable of performing. If this was the case, then either the government had not supplied lord Wellington with the means adequate to accomplish his purpose, or, possessed of |