Spain; the raising of the siege of Cadiz, and the occupation of Madrid by our troops. But did it secure those advantages? Did they remain permanent? Was lord Wellington able to pursue Marmont? No. He was not able to do that, which so obviously he ought to have done, because Joseph's army, reinforced by the corps from Suchet, was hanging on his flank, and afterwards on his rear. It was necessary to disperse that army. He did so, and entered Madrid. Could he then march southward to pursue the career of his conquests? No. He found that the corps which he had so lately defeated, the army over which he had so recently triumphed, was strong again, and he was compelled to direct his course to the north once more, to meet them. Then followed the siege of Burgos, and all he should say upon that subject was, that so far from considering as a disappointment the failure of lord Wellington in his attempt to reduce that fortress-it was madness to suppose that a fortress of such a description could be reduced by a few guns. He could not conceive, indeed, how any calculations founded upon success could be entertained, when lord Wellington's means were confessedly inadequate according to all the established rules of war. Again, when it was understood, so far back as the month of June last, that lord Wellington was advancing into Spain, was it possible not to see that France, being engaged in a war with Russia, must necessarily detach a great part of her force to that quarter of Europe, and that then was the moment, not only in reference to that event, but also to the temper of the Spanish nation, to send out sufficient reinforcements to enable lord Wellington to proceed upon a large and effective scale of operations? Without such reinforcements it was manifestly imprudent to advance into Spain. He (marquis Wellesley) at that period holding the seals of office, had repeatedly urged in his dispatches that it would be highly dangerous to advance into Spain without such a commanding force, and such co-operation as would almost secure success; under any other circumstances it was not only disadvantageous to the cause, but it was perilous to the parties. Now, how was lord Wellington reinforced? On the 21st of October he thought it necessary to retire from Burgos on the 25th he saw the French army, and we knew from his dispatches that they were greatly superior to his own force, especially in cavalry, the most dreadful of all species of superiority in that country. He (marquis Wellesley) had a right therefore to assume, that on the 25th of October, that army which lord Wellington had conquered on the plains of Salamanca, that army which he had driven before him on that memorable day, with a grandeur of military achievement which the language of history or poetry could never equal, which ima gination herself could not decorate with a splendor beyond the colouring of truth, and which ranked him among the most renowned generals of this or any other age, he had a right to infer that that army had received strong and efficient reinforcements since the battle of Salamanca. Now, where was lord Wellington's reinforcements during the same period? Scattered every where some in port at home, some on the ocean, and some landed at too great a distance to be of any use. Fifteen hundred men reached him on the 24th, four days after he had begun his retreat. Where were the others? One regiment advanced as far as Benevento, and were forced to retreat again to the frontiers. Two regiments were landed at Corunna, and were re-embarked for Lisbon, where they arrived just in time, probably, to reach lord Wellington at the commencement of the next campaign, certainly not much sooner. He bad Such was the state of the war in the peninsula-such the manuer in which it had been conducted-and he would ask their lordships whether, if the same exertions had been used by the ministers in this country as were employed by the enemy, might not lord Wellington have been able to prosecute to their full extent his operations against Burgos? He would now, however, call their attention for a few moments to the Sicilian expedition, as it had been denominated. stated that the plan of that expedition had been concerted with lord Wellington when he was before Badajoz. In consequence of the improved fortune of our affairs in Italy, it was thought that a part of our force might be spared to co-operate with our armies in Spain: and, if it had arrived at the proper season on the southeast coast of that country, at the time when lord Wellington fully expected it, Suchet would have been utterly unable to detach a corps to reinforce Joseph's army: Joseph must rather have hastened to assist Suchet. Such a timely arrival would have been a real service: but like all the rest of the system, it was imperfect exactly at that moment when it was most required to be perfect; something was done, but not all; and what was done was of no use. The first division arrived in the course of June, but it was so small that it could effect nothing. Suchet, meanwhile, wrote to Joseph that he could not proceed with his whole corps, but that he sent him a reinforcement, and which reinforcement, it afterwards proved, had the effect of subverting every great object of the campaign. Suchet had nothing to apprehend from the Sicilian expedition in the force to which it at that period amounted. Some time afterwards, however-about the end of July-arrived the remainder. They appeared on the coast of Catalonia, and he was very much afraid, though he was far from intending to impute blame to any of the commanders concerned in that expedition, that all they did was to excite the Catalonians to a demonstration of attachment to the British and Spanish cause, which led, in the result, to dreadful executions among them. It had left also, on the minds of the Catalonians, sentiments of suspicion, alienation, and hatred, which it would be difficult, he apprehended, to eradicate. It was thought advisable, that this expedition should operate either at Barcelona or Tarragona, or some part intermediate: but at last they arrived where no human being could have anticipated their presence, and then became utterly extinct as to any efficient purpose to the prosecution ofthe war. He had been told there were various ways of accounting for this indecision at one time it was thought this place would be the best at which to disembark; and then another, till at last the very worst place of all was adopted. He had often heard that it was the greatest trial of a powerful mind, to decide between two conflicting difficulties: he was sure it was the test of a weak mind, to be placed between two advantages, and not know which to choose. The feature of the present case, however, was, that both the advantages were lost, and only this disadvantage gained, that a warlike and lofty province of Spain had been, as far as it was possible such true Spanish patriots could be, alienated from the Spanish cause by the vacillation and indecision of their allies. And what had been the ultimate result of all those proceedings? They had been told in the Speech, indeed, that the result was nothing more than the consequence of the concentration of the French armies, as if lord Wellington's retreat was merely a military manoeuvre and then followed the monstrous proposition, that it was favourable to the interests and resources of the Spanish nation. He hoped some explanation would be given of that assertion; for it was most injurious both to this country and to Spain. Before he could subscribe to it he must learn to think in direct contradiction to every sentiment he had ever felt, and to every principle he had ever known, either from reading or experience. Had the south of Spain been deli vered? Did the minister mean to say that, in point of fact, the south of Spain was not now under the dominion of France? was perfectly satisfied that his noble friend, than whom he knew no man more sincerely honest, had never seen a Spanish army, as it had been his (the marquis's) misfortune to do. If he had, he would have known that the army of Ballasteros was utterly incapable of making any stand against two such armies as those of Soult and Suchet; and that Ballasteros, instead of resigning his command, would have found the materials of it vanished in an instant, when opposed to the troops of the two French generals already mentioned. He In moving from Burgos, lord Welling ton found himself pursued by a force much superior to that under his command, and without meaning to make any desponding statements, he would ask, this being the end of the campaign, what real progress had been made towards the great object of the contest? With regard to what was to be the object of the war in Spain, three schemes had been successively devised; two were only talked of, and the third was practised. The first was grounded on an idea that it would be imprudent to embark as a principal in the contest, unless some other power, by its co-operation, diverted the forces of France from being all concentrated towards that one point, the subjugation of Spain. From that policy he had always differed upon principle-but this fact was at least deducible from it, that our resources were considered by those who maintained the opinion to be insufficient to carry on the war as principals upon an adequate scale, and that we must therefore await a more favourable opportunity. His view of it had been, that we should engage as principals, and that in order to afford a chance of diver tion, he must be informed where the benefits arising out of these exertions were to be found. sion in other parts of Europe, it was necessary to urge the Spanish war with our utmost vigour and with the greatest effect. The second plan was, that it would be prudent and highly expedient to make exertions upon a large scale, adequate to the destruction of the French power in Spain. Both these plans were different in their principles, and yet both were consistent upon their own principles. If our resources were really inadequate, then the first plan was very just and proper: but if, as he held, they were adequate to extensive operations, then the second plan was obviously the fittest to adopt. But the plan of all others, which all mankind must reprobate and reject, was that plan of employing the resources, of exposing the sinews of our strength, to hourly danger; bearing hard upon our finances, yet accomplishing neither object, but falling dead, as it were, between both. Such a plan as this every one must concur in condemning. It was essentially hostile to the principle of economy; it was expence without fruit; and yet that was the system which had been pursued during the last and during the preceding campaign. A vast expence of blood and treasure had been lavished, and our resources enfeebled, without accomplishing any one definite or precise object. When it was to end he knew not; but it would be invidious to call upon him or any one, to say how closely calamity might tread upon the footsteps of error. When France was meditating fresh wars in the north of Europe, and when we saw Russia prepared to re-important effect of the inactivity of Swesist her ambitious designs to the last extremity, what more vigorous or effectual assistance could we have given to Russia than by prosecuting the war in Spain? The best succour we could give to that country, the most essential aid that we could bestow, was by carrying on the war in the peninsula upon a broad and extensive scale of operations; but it was not so carried on, and he charged upon that system, therefore, in the first instance a defection from the cause of Russia. He did not, indeed, mean to dispute that the events of the last campaign had not been beneficial to Spain, but his objection was that those benefits were imperfectly secured, and that they could not be expected to be permanent. On all these grounds considering ministers as culpable in with holding needful supplies, before he could agree to that part of the Speech which spoke of the exertions of the Spanish na The noble marquis, next, dismissing the topic of the peninsular war, adverted to the hopes held out of a diversion from Sweden, in favour of the operations of Russia. He could not conceive any thing more erroneous in policy or in co-operation than the line of conduct pursued with regard to this power. As it appeared to his mind, a more extraordinary act of diplomacy had never occurred than the Treaty which our ministers had concluded with the government of Sweden. It was a treaty which promised every advantage to Sweden without guaranteeing any to England. It was, in fact, a treaty in which, as it had been once whimsically observed upon a similar contract, the reciprocity was all on one side; for we had engaged to afford Sweden all the assistance in our power, in her operations against the enemy, or for her own protection, while nothing appeared likely to be done for us or for our allies on her part. An expedition was, indeed, projected and expected to sail from Sweden, with a view to co-operate with Russia; but that object was soon abandoned; no expedition ever did sail; and in consequence of that abandonment general Victor, who, with his force, waited in Swedish Pomerania, to meet the apprehended diversion, was enabled to withdraw, and his division actually formed a part of the army with which Buonaparté made his way to Moscow. Such was the den, and for that inactivity, so injurious to the objects of the war, it was for ministers, in their diplomatic management with Sweden, to account. This account, indeed, they were bound, for their own justification, to produce. At a meeting which had taken place at Abo about the end of July, between the emperor Alexander, lord Cathcart, and the crown prince of Sweden, it was understood to have been ar ranged, that the expedition already alluded to, was to have been dispatched from Sweden; and so cordially it seemed did ministers enter into the project-so promptly did they determine to forward its progress, with a view to impede the army of France, that transports for the conveyance of the Swedish expedition were ordered to sail from Sheerness on the 19th of September, and Buonaparté entered Moscow on the 14th of the same month! So fared this grand and much talked of expedition. What sort of explanation ministers had it in their power to give upon this subject, he could not pretend to conjecture; but it appeared most extraordinary, that after the meeting and discussion he had just mentioned, ministers should not have been enabled to judge of the real disposition of the crown prince of Sweden, or that they should not have taken measures to ascertain whether any change had taken place in that disposition before the useless dispatch of the transports. With respect to Russia, while he was fully disposed to concur in the panegyric pronounced upon the magnani mity displayed by that power, he would ask, what assistance had our ministers afforded to encourage the display or to aid the operation of that magnanimity? This he was at a loss to know, except the sending the Russians about 50,000 arms, with lords Cathcart and Walpole, who were no doubt important instruments to aid a great empire in extricating itself from its difficulties and repelling a formidable foe, were to be viewed in this light. Upon the subject of America he thought it necessary to say a few words; and first he had no hesitation in asserting, that a more unjust attack was never made upon the peace of any nation than that of the American government upon this country, nor could any cause be imagined more completely just than that which this country had to oppose to America. But he must confess that he heard with surprise the passage in the Speech from the throne, which sanctioned the opinion that ministers still hoped for pacification with America in consequence of something done previous to their declaration of war; he meant with surprise, in consequence of the grounds upon which this hope was understood to rest. Nothing appeared more preposterous than the calculation that the repeal of the Orders in Council would serve to pacify America; for these orders were never in fact the point at issue. Of the conduct of this government throughout its discussions with that of America, he was pretty accurately informed, and he was fully prepared to defend it, especially that part of the discussion in which he was personally concerned. But he would maintain, as he had uniformly stated, that the dispute with America did not originate or rest upon the Orders in Council, but referred to higher questions, to topics deeply affecting our great maritime rights, to points, indeed, of such importance, that (VOL. XXIV.) according to his fullest conviction, the British government could not concede to the pretensions of America without throwing into her hands the trident of the main. It would not avail ministers to repeat the assertions of those who expressed such sanguine opinions as to the probable result of the repeal of the Orders in Council, for these assertions furnished no answer to his view of the subject. They might indeed be adduced in reference to some noble lords near him, from whom ministers borrowed this measure of repeal. Yes, they abandoned their own opinion upon that question, and adopted that of their adversaries, which no doubt furnished a strong proof of their vigour, firmness, and perseverance. But even with reference to those adversaries, ministers could not now rest upon formerly expressed opinions or predictions as to the consequence to be expected from a repeal of the Orders in Council; because, although they agreed to the measure upon the advice of their adversaries, they acted upon it in an opposite spirit. They were dilatory, and apparently reluctant in the adoption of this measure of repeal, and they ought, up various grounds, to have seen its utter inefficiency to pacify America. They ought, in fact, to have expected and been fully prepared for war with America; they ought, as statesmen, to have known that the American government had been long infected with a deadly hatred towards this country, and (if he might be allowed an unusual application of a word) with a deadly affection towards France. It was absurd to suppose that governments were not as likely as individuals to be influenced by passion-that they were not more apt to act from the impulse of their own vices or corruptions than from a consideration of the interest of those over whom they presided. Therefore no statesman should or would conclude, that because it was contrary to the interest of the American people to engage in war with this country, the American government would shrink from such a measure. Indeed, in this instance no such conclusion could be deemed in the slightest degree excusable, for the disposition of the American government was quite evident, and therefore common policy should have urged ministers to prepare fully for the event, and they should have made adequate exertion either to pacify, to intimidate, or to punish America. No means should have been unprovided effectually (D) to repel the audacious attack which the American government had ventured to make upon us. Nothing of this kind, however, had been done, and America had been suffered to commence, and, for a time, to carry on hostilities, even unthreatened with danger to herself. That attack would yet, he trusted, be completely avenged; that the most extensive exertions would be made to convince the American government of its folly and desperation, and he had no doubt that the best hope of peace with that government would rest upon the manly and vigorous employment of our resources to make it feel sensibly the consequences of war. The only remaining topic in the Speech to which he had to refer, was that with respect to India, in which he felt a peculiar interest. And here he would repeat the wish which he took occasion to express last session, that the affairs of our Indian empire should be fully investigated by their lordships before any system for its future government was finally determined upon. He meant that the whole question should be brought before their lordships, not in the shape of a bill for legislation, as it was proposed last session, but in a distinct and separate form for deliberate inquiry, in order that it might be examined in all its details. He was happy to learn that his noble friend at the head of the Board of Controul, was diligently employed in considering this subject, and he trusted that the result of his intelligent deliberation would be the suggestion of a course of measures, creditable to himself, honourable to this nation, advantageous to the interests of the whole empire, but above all, calculated to promote the interest and happiness of the great mass of population subject to our dominion in India. He again expressed his hope that the concerns of India would be fully discussed before an attempt was made to pass any law upon the subject. Having thus observed at considerable length upon all the topics embraced in the Speech, he would now proceed very briefly to mention an omission of great importance to the country, and which he regretted exceedingly; he meant, the Catholic Question. Before he concluded, he felt particularly called upon to advert to this omission, which he could not help noticing with surprize and sorrow. He was certainly surprised and sorry to perceive, that after all that had passed upon this subject-after all that had occurred in discussion, and been excited in hope, no disposition whatever was expressed to conciliate the Catholics, or to adjust their claims. It was in the recollection of their lordships what had taken place at the close of the last session, both in that and the other House of Parliament. That in the latter, indeed, a distinct pledge had been entered into, fully to consider the Catholic Question, with a view to an ultimate and satisfactory arrangement. Was it now resolved to relinquish this pledge, to set aside all that had been done? There were too many grounds of suspicion upon this subject. Recollecting the expression of the noble earl opposite, and now at the head of his Majesty's government, (Liverpool), at the close of the last session, that he would oppose no barrier to the fair discussion of the Catholic claims, he could not doubt his candour, but yet he had heard of several proceedings, both in this country and in Ireland, where, to use an old phrase of lord Camden, the hand and fingers of government were very visible." Indeed, so anxious was government considered in its hostility to the cause of the Catholics, that one cause of the dissolution of parliament was said to be in order to get rid of the pledge of the other House upon the subject; and if the rumours afloat were founded, that statement would appear not improbable. For according to this rumour it was the intention of ministers, after the Houses had sat for a few days, to adjust some matters immediately necessary to their own objects, to propose an adjournment for two months. If so, the practical effect of such an adjournment would be to evade the pledge for taking the Catholic Question into early consideration, which, combined with the omission in the Speech, was a bad omen for the Catholics. did not mean at present to discuss the proposed conduct of ministers, or to cast any blame upon them, but merely to ask, and he should be glad to know precisely their intention, what was the state of the question, namely, whether all that had passed was to be regarded as gone et nil, and that the question was to be returned to again as a res integer?-There were some words, he observed, at the conclusion of the Speech not, he presumed as a matter of course, in praise of the constitution. Indeed there was a report that ministers had it in contemplation to propose an extension of the duration of parliament upon the demise of the crown; but this praise He |