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LIST OF NECESSARY TRUTHS.

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many intricate side-paths, but that into these we need not enter; the only essential point being that we should be persuaded that he could guide us safely through them. In such a case, I think we should feel that we had been swindled out of our fee on false pretences, and that, instead of our absolutely wanting a guide, the truth was that it was the guide who absolutely wanted us. And our faith in the guide would be a little tried if, when we came to a place where two paths diverged, and asked him which we were to follow, he replied, that if he had not been there to direct us, we might have safely taken either way, as many had already got safe to their journey's end by both roads; but that now we had heard him direct us to take one path, we should certainly come to grief if we took the other.

You may naturally inquire what is the actual practice of the Church of Rome, with regard to insisting on an actual knowledge of certain truths, in addition to the general knowledge that the Church is able to teach rightly concerning them. It is clear that lay people are not to be sent off to explore the huge folios which contain the decrees of councils. What is it that for their soul's health they are obliged to know? A popular little manual circulated by thousands, and called, What every Christian must know, enables us to answer this question. It tells us that every Christian must know the four great truths of faith, namely:— 'I. There is one God. II. In that God there are Three Persons. III. Jesus became man and died for us. IV. God will reward the good in heaven, and punish the wicked in hell.' This list of necessary truths is not long, but some Roman Catholics have contended that it might be shortened; pointing out that since men were undoubtedly saved before Christ's coming without any explicit faith in the Incarnation or in the doctrine of the Trinity, an explicit faith in these doctrines cannot be held to be necessary to salvation.* Nor does such faith seem to be demanded in a certain papal attempt to define the minimum of necessary knowledge. Pope Innocent

This view is taken by Gury, Compendium of Moral Theology, i. 124, quoted by Littledale, Plain Reasons, p. 75.

IV., in his Commentary on the Decretals, lays down that it is enough for the laity to attend to good works; and, for the rest, to believe implicitly what the Church believes. Those who have the cure of souls must distinctly know the articles of the Creeds. Bishops ought to know more, being bound to give a reason to everyone who asks it. For the lower clergy, who have neither leisure for study nor money to bear its expense, it will be enough if they learn as much as the laity and a little more. For instance, as being constantly employed in attendance on the altar, they ought to know that the Body of Christ is made in the Sacrament of the Altar. And if they have the means of paying teachers, it would be a sin if they did not acquire more explicit knowledge than the laity.*

Although, in the first editions of Father Furniss's little manual, which I have already mentioned, only the four great truths of faith are declared to be necessary to be known; the later editions add the doctrine of the Sacraments, namely— 'Baptism takes away original sin; Confession takes away actual sin; and the Blessed Sacrament is the body and blood of Christ.' But take this list of necessary truths at the longest, and it certainly has the merit of brevity. And we may think it strange that a modern writer has succeeded in doing what the writers of the New Testament tried to do, and are said to have failed in. It was certainly the object of the New Testament writers to declare the truths necessary to salvation. St. John (xx. 31) tells us his object in writingThese are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the son of God; and that believing ye might have life through His name.' Yet we are required to believe that these apostles and evangelists, who wrote under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, performed their task so badly, that one who should have recourse to their pages for guidance is more likely than not to go astray, and is likely to find nothing but perplexity and error. Strange, indeed, that inspired writers should fail in their task: stranger still, that writers

Innocent IV., Comm. in Librum Primum Decretalium, lib. I., cap. i., sects. 2, 3, 6.

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NO NEED OF INFALLIBLE GUIDANCE.

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who claim no miraculous assistance should be able to accomplish it in half-a-dozen lines. But the main point is, that if the list of necessary truths is so short, the necessity for an infallible guide disappears. The four great truths of faith, just enumerated, are held as strongly by Protestants, who dispense with the guidance of the Church of Rome, as by those who follow it.

The great argument by which men are persuaded to believe that there is at least somewhere or another an infallible guide is, that it is incredible that God should leave us without sure guidance when our eternal salvation is at stake. It is thought that, if it is once conceded that an infallible guide exists somewhere, the case of Rome will be established by the absence of competition from anyone making a similar claim. Now, we saw that Milner's axiom was altogether extravagant. He demanded that God should miraculously secure men from error of any kind. Surely, it cannot be required that we should be given certain knowledge on all possible subjects. All that with any plausibility can be demanded is, that we should be guarded against error destructive of salvation. But now it is evident that infallible guidance cannot be asserted to be necessary, except in cases where explicit knowledge is necessary. If our readiness to believe all that God has revealed, without knowing it, is enough for our salvation, there is an end to the pretence that it was necessary to the salvation of the world that God should provide means to make men infallibly know the truth. Here is a specimen of what Roman Catholics call an act of faith: 'O my God, because Thou art true, and hast revealed it, I believe that Thou art One God; I believe that in Thy Godhead there are Three Persons; I believe that Thy Son Jesus became man, and died for us; I believe that Thou wilt reward the good in heaven, and punish the wicked in hell; I believe all that the Catholic Church teaches; and in this belief I will live and die.' In other words, this act of faith is a profession of explicit belief in the four great truths of faith, and of implicit belief in all the teaching of the Church. Now, substitute the word 'Bible' for the word 'Church,' and a Protestant is ready to make the same profession. He will declare his belief in

H

the four truths already enumerated, and in all that the Bible teaches. If a Roman Catholic may be saved who actually contradicts the teaching of his Church, because he did not in intention oppose himself to her, why may not a Protestant be saved, in like manner, who is sincerely and earnestly desirous to believe all that God has revealed in the Scripture, and who has learned from the Scripture those four great truths of faith, and many other truths which make wise unto salvation, even if there be some points on which he has wrongly interpreted the teaching of Scripture? Have we not as good a right in this case as in the other to say that his mistaken belief will not be fatal to one who, notwithstanding his error, is of an humble, teachable disposition, and who does not wilfully reject anything that he knows God to have revealed? In fact, if it were even true that a belief in Roman Infallibility is necessary to salvation, a Protestant would be safe. For, since he believes implicitly everything that God has revealed, if God has revealed Roman Infallibility, he believes that too. Thus the argument for the necessity of an infallible guide has no plausibility, unless, with regard to the absolute necessity to salvation of an explicit belief, we hold a theory far more rigid than even the Church of Rome has ventured to propound.

There is, however, something more to be said before we can part with the discussion of Milner's axioms.

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MILNER'S AXIOMS.-PART II.

N the last lecture I tried to show that, if Milner's axiom were limited to an assertion about saving truth—that is to say, truth an explicit knowledge of which is necessary to salvation—it would be perfectly useless to one desirous to establish the necessity of an infallible guide. I wish now to show that, if Milner's axiom be asserted not only with regard to truths necessary to salvation, but also to truths highly important and useful, then the axiom is not true. There is an immense amount of knowledge, both secular and religious, highly important for man to possess, but for which God has not seen fit to provide certain never-failing means whereby men may attain to it, and consequently which, as a matter of fact, many men do fail of obtaining. I am the more particular in stating this, because I should be sorry if the previous discussion had led you to think that I represented the great bulk of God's Revelation as useless, and that I thought that, provided a man be made acquainted with that minimum of knowledge which is absolutely necessary to salvation, it is a matter of small importance whether any further knowledge be communicated to him. I hold the gaining of such knowledge to be of the very highest use and importance; but I say that all we know of God's dealings forbids us to take for granted that, because knowledge of any kind is of great value to man, God will make it impossible for him to fail to acquire it.

There is one piece of vitally important knowledge which Roman Catholics must own God has not given men neverfailing means for attaining: I mean the knowledge what is