Rational Extremism: The Political Economy of Radicalism
Cambridge University Press, 14 Ağu 2006
Extremists are people whose ideas or tactics are viewed as outside the mainstream. Looked at this way, extremists are not necessarily twisted or evil. But they can be, especially when they are intolerant and violent. What makes extremists turn violent? This 2006 book assumes that extremists are rational: given their ends, they choose the best means to achieve them. The analysis explains why extremist leaders use the tactics they do, and why they are often insensitive to punishment and to loss of life. It also explains how rational people can be motivated to die for the cause. The book covers different aspects of extremism such as revolution, suicide terrorism, and global jihad. The arguments are illustrated with important episodes of extremism, including the French Revolution, the rise of nationalism in Yugoslavia under Milosevic, and the emergence of suicide terror and Al Qaeda today.
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actions Al Qaeda argued bandwagon effects Becker behavior beliefs beneﬁts chapter Communist conﬂict corner solution corruption crime curve deﬁned democracy dictator dictator’s dictatorship difﬁcult discussed economic equation equilibrium ethnic capital ethnic group example extreme extremist groups extremist methods fear Figure ﬁnd ﬁrm ﬁrst free-rider free-rider problem French Revolution gangs globalization goals idea implies important income increase indifference curve individual individual’s indivisibility investment Islamic jihad leader leadership level of repression loyalty McWorld Milosevic Milosevic’s movements nationalism network externalities networks obvious ofﬁce organization participation party point of view political possible pressure problem production punishment Qaeda rational choice reason regime religious rent seeking result revolutionary risk sacriﬁce security dilemma Serbia Serbs shareholder system social capital social cohesion social interactions society solidarity speciﬁc stakeholder substitution effect sufﬁcient suggested suicide martyrdom suicide martyrs tend terrorism terrorist tion totalitarian transparency trust typically utility function wealth effect