book; certainly nothing could show the claims of Charles to the sovereignty of the sea in a worse light than this description of his offering to peddle for a sum of money that protection which, after all his swagger, he was unable to give.

'Charles was very naturally highly incensed at this open flouting of his authority. It was an ugly blot on the lustre of his ancient prerogative and a painful proof of the contempt in which his muchvaunted naval power was held by the Dutch Republic, and, what perhaps he felt quite as much at the time, it robbed him of all chance of blackmailing Spain.'

What Mr. Fulton does not dwell on is the confirmation of the distrust of Charles in all seaport towns and of the disgust which was felt in the navy. Mr. Oppenheim* has suggested that the neglect of the interests of the seamen by the first two Stuarts, the non-payment of their wages, the villainous quality of the provisions, the general subjection of them to usurers, was the cause of the navy going solid for the Parliament in the Civil War, thus preventing the interference of foreigners in a domestic quarrel, and helping largely in determining the issue of the struggle. † But the reason suggested refers mainly to the seamen. Officers and seamen alike could not but bitterly resent the ignominy and disgrace which were put upon them by the King's tortuous policy.

It is unnecessary to speak in any detail of the Dutch wars. which followed, and as to which, apart from the fishery question, Mr. Fulton is not an altogether safe guide. The Navigation Act of 1651-the re-enactment, with modifications, of a statute as old as the days of Richard II, but which during the neglect and misgovernment of James and Charles I had been permitted to lapse-was not, primarily, a blow aimed at the Dutch, and any demand of theirs for its repeal would not have been discussed. In saying that the English refused to cancel or modify it, Mr. Fulton implies that they made such a demand, but adduces no evidence.

The outbreak of hostilities was, in appearance, on the question of the salute, but in reality on the right of search, claimed and enforced by the English with all the greater stringency as it was paying off much ill-will accumulated in the East Indies. Mr. Fulton seems to think the fishery question was mainly the cause of this ill-will. To some extent it no doubt was; but the grievance on that score lay mostly with the

* Administration of the Royal Navy, 240-1.

† See, for instance, Gardiner, Great Civil War,' i. 94, 195, 239,

Dutch, and it does not appear that, however determined they might be, they were much embittered by it. The eastern trade on the one hand, the rigid exercise of the right of search on the other, was sufficient cause of quarrel, to which the refusal of the salute put the match. It is fairly well known that Cromwell was from the beginning opposed to the war policy, and when he obtained the supreme power he welcomed the overtures of peace. De Witt on the side of the Dutch was as pacific in his wishes; he rightly judged that even a victory could do them little good, that a defeat must do them infinite harm. The course of the war had been on the whole unfavourable to them; the virtual blockade which the English instituted was ruinous, and it was absolutely necessary to the United Provinces that peace should be made. An English politician, wishing to crush the Dutch, might have enforced severe terms; the statesman then at the head of affairs recognised that a friendly alliance was the true policy; and to that, rather than to the ingenuity or firmness of the Dutch, was due the more equitable treaty, which might have been lasting had it not been for the counter-revolution in the English government.

Between the two peoples there was little love, and the outbreak of the second war was natural enough, though it was doubtless largely-Mr. Fulton would say mainly due to the ill-will of Charles II and to the intrigues of Louis XIV; but words almost fail us when we attempt to characterise the pretences in which the third war began, only to be brought to an end by an indignant people as soon as they were understood. The part in these pretences taken by the 'Merlin' yacht was enough to throw discredit on the claim to the Sovereignty of the Sea; that it survived shows how real it was to the English people, a reality which even William III could not veil, so that he found himself, as King of England, obliged to insist on Dutch ships paying the demanded salute. It was in fact under William that the instruction to our naval officers took its final form. This instruction, issued in 1691 and continued in identical terms for upwards of 100 years, was:

Upon your meeting with any ship or ships within his Majesty's seas (which for your better guidance herein you are to take notice that they extend to Cape Finisterre), belonging to any foreign Prince or State, you are to expect them in their passage by you to strike their topsail and take in their flag, in acknowledgement of his Majesty's sovereignty in these seas; and if any shall refuse, or offer to resist, you are to use your utmost endeavour to compel them thereto, and in nowise to suffer any dishonour to be done to his Majesty.... You are further to take notice that in his Majesty's

THC

seas his Majesty's ships are in nowise to strike to any; and that in other parts no ship of his Majesty's is to strike her flag or topsail to any foreigner unless such foreign ship shall have first struck, or at the same time strike, her flag or topsail to his Majesty's ship.'

With the very plain text of this instruction before us, and the knowledge that English naval officers have a habit of obeying their orders when they can understand them, it is difficult to extract Mr. Fulton's meaning from the statement that the extensive claims which were formerly made to the 'dominion of the English or British seas were practically aban'doned in the eighteenth century,' unless we are to suppose that by the dominion of the seas' he means the fishing rights claimed during the first half of the seventeenth century. Of these the discussion went into other channels, but it is perfectly certain that the claim to the honour of the flag, or as it was commonly called the salute of flag and topsail, was maintained inviolate during the eighteenth century.

With France we were generally at war; and when not, the French King's ships avoided coming into English seas. The disputes with France about flag and topsail' were few and did not cause much difficulty, but disputes which proved impossible to settle did arise as to the priority of the flag in the Mediterranean. Notable among these was that in 1731, at what was intended for a friendly réunion of the nations at Leghorn, where the French preserved their dignity by absenting themselves. No French ship was present at what-allowing for the difference of 180 years-may be compared with the naval display at Spithead last June.

With the Dutch we were on friendly terms for the first eighty years of the century, and there is no reason to suppose that the honour was not regularly paid on all occasions of accidental meeting. The case of Dutch men-of-war acting in conjunction with English was specially provided for, and in 1780 England declared war on the United Provinces, not, as Mr. Fulton has put it, because they had joined the armed 'neutrality,'' but because the Republican party having obtained the upper hand had forced the Government into a virtual support of the French and American alliance. The declaration of war was previous to their joining the armed neutrality, and when they tried to bring its strength to act against England their failure to do so brought discredit on the whole alliance and made it what the Empress Catherine had said it was-an Armed Nullity. During this short war and in the few troubled years of peace that followed there was no question of sovereignty; but on several occasions Swedish and Baltic vessels, singly or

in a fleet, refusing to pay the recognised salute, were brought in for adjudication.

In all this there was no question of a mare clausum; and when the northern powers, at the instigation of Russia, if not really of France, claimed the Baltic as such, the claim was at once denied by the British Government, even as it was in a recent year, when the practical reply to the shadowing of such a claim was the Channel fleet taking its summer cruise in the waters named. But in the year after Trafalgar it was necessary to issue a new edition of the 'Admiralty Instruction.' The preparing this for the press was left to Admiral (afterwards Lord) Gambier, and at his suggestion the Article of 1691 quoted above was for the first time omitted. Gambier had the idea that if the claim was simply dropped without any order, it might be repeated if it seemed desirable. This of course was absurd. Once dropped, the resumption of the claim was impossible; but it was recognised as an anachronism, and a dangerous anachronism-one which could do no good and might easily do much harm.

Naturally, when no longer enforced, the salute was no longer paid, even by our own ships, except occasionally, in times of great excitement, and then only imperfectly, by dipping the ensign. Even the memory of this clause may be considered as having been finally wiped out when, on the occasion of the visit of the French fleet to Spithead in August 1865, the Admiralty flag and ensign, in the presence of both fleets, were dipped, and dipped first, to the French Ministre de la Marine. At the present time, a large merchant ship or great liner may or may not dip on passing the King's fleet, purely as a matter of courtesy, to be returned; a smaller vessel takes no notice, except sometimes by getting in the way, so as to secure a collision and a thorough refit at the expense of the country.

ART. VI.-THE CAMORRA IN MODERN ITALY.

1. La Camorra: Studio di Sociologia criminale. Da Signor ALONGI. Torino: Bocca. 1890.

2. La Camorra. Da M. MONNIER.

1862. 2a edizione.

Firenze Barbera.

3. La Camorra. Da FERD. RUSSO E E. SERRAO. 3a ediz. Napoli: Bideri. 1907.

4. Usi e Costumi dei Camorristi. Da Dott. A. DE BLASIO. Con prefazione di CESARE LOMBROSO. 2a edizione. Napoli: L. Pierro, editore. 1897.

5. Il Corriere della Sera. Milano. June to August 1911. 6. L'Uomo Delinquente. 2 vols. 4a ed. Torino: Bocca. 1889.

THE

HE Jubilee year of Italian independence has come and almost gone. Every species of celebration has marked, up and down the peninsula, the occurrence of the auspicious date. Three great exhibitions have drawn foreigners to Turin, Rome and Florence; a colossal statue of the LiberatorKing has been unveiled by his grandson within a mile of the Pope's palace, and the European peoples have sent their representatives to rejoice with the new nation. Meanwhile, in a little hill town, not fifty miles from Rome, something has been going on, during the last four months, which, assuredly not designed in commemoration of the events of 1861, forms, in fact, a striking commentary upon them. Inasmuch, moreover, as the dramatic scenes at Viterbo would have been impossible without the emancipation of Italy, they may be fitly looked upon as a contribution to the national celebrations (if we will strain so far our fancy) from the Demiurge who arranges the procession of human events. For the redoubtable Camorra, the curse of Southern Italy, has been laid by the heels at last, and some thirty-five of its functionaries, including the president and the effective head of the organisation, safe in the grasp of justice, listen daily from their cage* to the disputes of the men of the law over the crime with which they are charged. This crime is one traditionally associated with the Camorra, the execution of a treacherous member. The

* Prisoners in an Italian Court of Justice are placed during the sittings of the Court in a large iron cage similar to those used by lion-tamers.