such Christian ever does keep, or entertain so much as a thought of keeping? or, except in and by this formulary, addressed to young children only, is ever called upon to keep?

To engage in any such task as that of writing a commentary on this Jewish code, forms not any part of the design of the present tract. That part of this Catechism, which is composed of the remaining eight of these commandments, has therefore been omitted.

Question 8.-What dost thou chiefly learn by these commandments?

Answer.—I learn two things: my duty towards God, and my duty towards my neighbour.

OBSERVATIONS.

Of a commentary, be the subject what it may, a proper, and (it should seem) where, as here, censure is out of the question, the only proper, use is in so far as the text is, either with reference to all persons in general, or with reference to a particular description of persons, for whose use the commentary is intended, less perspicuous than might have been wished, to clear away the ambiguity or obscurity;-to wit, by bringing to view what, upon the consideration of the whole, presents itself as the true meaning-the meaning intended by the person of whose discourse the text is composed.

On a subject such as the present, if,-besides exhibiting the meaning which it was in the mind and intention of the author of the original work to convey, the author of the accessory work in question takes upon himself to draw inferences of his own, in so far it is rather a sermon than a

commentary. Be that as it may, in this case what he ought to do is carefully to avoid confounding with the consecrated ground-work his own unconsecrated inference: and, in particular, in giving expression to his own inference, he ought to employ for that purpose other words of his own, chosen by himself for that same purpose; and not any such words of the original text, as will have the effect of causing this inference of his to be regarded not as his inference, but as so much matter already and actually included in the text; i. e. as constituting a part of that meaning, which, by means of that text, it had been the intention of the author to convey to his expected readers.

Taken on the footing of an independent proposition, that in the main, at this time of day, it would be for the benefit of a professor of the religion of Jesus, to regard the above described duties as so many duties incumbent on himself, is not here less meant to be represented as a matter open to dispute. But that, in the character of an inference-an inference drawn from the tenor of the code here in question, any such proposition is correct, can not be admitted. The Jews-they and they alone-were the people to whom this code was addressed. In addressing himself, whether to his hearers or his readers, those, and those alone, were the people, which, on this occasion, could have been present to the mind of Moses, in such sort as to be considered as the people, with reference to whom the word neighbour was to be understood. But in those days, and on that occasion, who was the neighbour of a Jew? In general, every other Jew:

but most assuredly no person other than a Jew. On that occasion, had the benefit of these commandments been meant to be extended to men in general, the word correspondent to the word man, and not the word correspondent to the word neighbour, would have been the word employed. If by Moses, of all men, men in general-all men without distinction-had been meant, what should have been his inducement to discard this most obvious of all words, and substitute to it a different word, the effect of which, in so far as any effect is given to it, is-to designate, to the exclusion of the whole remainder of the species, a comparatively minute portion of it.

Neighbour being a relative term-a word of reference-no sooner is the object of reference changed, than, in this new case, it comes to be designative of a set of persons altogether different from those which in the first instance it was employed to designate. The sort of person, who, during the penning of the text, was in contemplation under the word neighbour, could be no other than a Jew. But, at this time of day, in so far as the word neighbour is used in its only proper sense, no Jew is the neighbour, much less the only sort of neighbour, of any child into whose mouth this formulary is forced. True it is that, when Jesus comes, he is represented as making an amendment to this code: declaring, on that occasion, that, by every one of his followers, not Jews alone, but every other man without exception, should, to the purpose of receiving the benefits proffered by him, be considered in the character of a neighbour. With this explanation, true it is that, to the particular purpose in ques

tion, in the vocabulary of a follower of Jesus, the word neighbour becomes synonymous to the word man:-understand with this explanation, given as it was by Jesus. But, to the explanation and extension, thus, at so vast a distance of time after the issuing of this code, given to it by Jesus, no reference is, in this formulary, to be found. In it the neighbour of the Christian is represented as being at all times the same sort of person as was the neighbour of the Jew in Moses' time; and the one as well as the other, as being the same sort of person as is designated by the word man at all times. Accordingly, presently after, viz. in the answer to the next question but one, the expression all men is slipt in,-and, without notice, is employed in the place of neighbour: as if the two words had all along the same meaning: and thus, instead of the clear light in which the whole matter might so easily have been placed, it is wrapt up in confusion and darkness.

Question 9.-What is thy duty towards God?

Answer. My duty towards God is to believe in him, to fear him, and to love him with all my heart, with all my mind, with all my soul, and with all my strength; to worship him, to give him thanks, to put my whole trust in him, to call upon him, to honour his holy name and his word, and to serve him truly all the days of my life.

OBSERVATIONS.

On the subject of this answer, not a few are the questions that present themselves:-the questions, pregnant, all of them, with doubts, if not with objections,-some of them chargeable, as it should seem, with impertinence. But as the suggestions conveyed by them have not for their result any imputation on the morality of the dis

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course;―as, supposing them well grounded, nothing beyond its character for wisdom is affected by them, to frame the answers is a task that will be left altogether to the reader: nor, upon any of the subjects thus touched upon, will any more words be employed than what have been found absolutely necessary for giving expression to the questions themselves.

1. Belief in God? what is it that is here meant by it? belief that God exists, or any thing, and what else?

2. Belief-an act of the understanding-ought it to be, or can it be made subject to the determination of the will?

3. If, in the mind in question, the existence of God is already the subject matter of belief, what need can there be to take it for a subject of obligation ? to rank it among duties?

4. If it be not, where can be the effective ground-the cause of fulfilment-in. the case of the obligation thus supposed? Of what sort of matter can any such ground be composed?

5. In regard to love, on the supposition that, to the person in question, the object in question is not only an object of fear, but of a fear which is altogether boundless, in this case, of any such affection as is expressed by the word love, is the real existence, or any thing but the name and profession, compatible with such fear?

6. In particular, any such sentiment or affection as love, is it, in such a place as the human breast, producible by, or so much as compatible with, all this straining.

7. Wherein, except in words, consists on this