luntary beings, unless accordant with the pleasure of God, can in no wise sustain the character of proper parts of a perfect system. Just so far, as they vary from this pleasure, they vary from the character specified. It will not be denied, that God is both able, and disposed, to plan a perfect system of good. It follows, therefore, that he certainly has planned such a system. Whatever accords not with his pleasure, upon the whole, accords not with this system; this being the thing, which is agreeable to his pleasure; but must be defective, or superfluous; out of place, or out of time; aside from, or contrary to, the perfection of the system. Consequently, if the actions of voluntary beings be not, upon the whole, accordant with the pleasure of God; he was not only unassured of the accomplishment of the end, which he proposed in creating and governing the universe; but he entered upon this great work without knowing, that it would be accomplished; and was originally certain, that the perfect good, which he proposed, would never exist.

Those, who deny this doctrine, are therefore, unless I am deceived, forced by their denial to acknowledge, that God is a limited, mutable, and dependent being; and that he originally was, and ever must be, uncertain of the accomplishment of the great end, proposed in his works; or rather, that he ever was, and will be, certain, that it can never be accomplished. The magnitude of these difficulties I need not explain.

SERMON XV.

THE DECREES OF GOD.

JOB Xxiii. 13.

But he is in one mind; and who can turn him? and what his soul desireth, even that he doeth.

IN

my last discourse I asserted, from these words, the following Doctrine;

That all things, both beings and events, exist in exact accordance with the purpose, pleasure, or, what is commonly called the Decrees, of God.

In discussing this doctrine, I mentioned, that I should attempt, I. To Explain it ;

II. To Prove it; and

III. To answer the Objections, commonly made against it. Under the first head, after having mentioned several erroneous opinions, and forms of phraseology, frequently adopted concerning this subject, I expressed my own views of it in this manner: What is commonly intended by the Decrees of God, is that choice, or pleasure, of the Divine Mind, eternally and unchangeably inherent in it, by which all things are brought into being.

Under the second head, I alleged several direct arguments in support of the doctrine; and then suggested several difficulties, which result from denying it. These, by proving the converse of the doctrine to be false, indirectly proved the doctrine to be true: VOL. I.

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according to the general axiom, that every proposition, or its converse, is true.

I shall now, as I proposed, attempt,

III. To answer the Objections, commonly made against this doc

trine.

These, I think, may be reduced to the following;

1st. That it is equivalent to the Stoical doctrine of Fate, or Destiny:

2dly. That it exhibits God as the Author of sin:

3dly. That it destroys the Free Agency of rational creatures : and,

4thly. That it discourages all the Efforts of mankind towards Reformation.

I will not say, that no other objections are brought against this doctrine; but I think of no others, which appear to be regarded, as material, by those who allege them; or which, if these be fairly obviated, would be supposed sensibly to affect the question in debate. These, therefore, I shall now proceed to consider in the order proposed.

1st. It is objected, that the general doctrine of this discourse, is equivalent to the Stoical doctrine of Fate, or Destiny.

The Fate of the Stoics, as explained by Cicero, was of this nature. These Philosophers supposed a series, and it would seem an eternal one, in which each link of the vast chain was the effect of the preceding, and the cause of the succeeding, one: every link being alternately a cause and effect. These causes, so far as I understand the subject, (for it is not very clear, that we understand precisely what was the Stoical doctrine, nor that the Stoics understood, or united in, it themselves,) were not considered by them as either intelligent, or voluntary; but as merely coerced by those which preceded, and as coercing those which followed. In other words, the doctrine was substantially the same with that of Atheists concerning an eternal series, which was exploded in a former Discourse*. To the irresistible efficacy of this series of causes, the Gods, acknowledged by the Stoics, were absolutely subjected; and Jupiter himself, their

* See Sermon II.

supreme Ruler, was utterly unable to resist, divert, or at all change, the order of things, brought to pass by the compulsion of this Fate, or Destiny.

He, who can find any resemblance between this doctrine, and that on which the present discourse is founded, must find it by the aid of an ingenuity, to which I can make no claim. I freely own, that I cannot perceive any similarity between an unintelligent and involuntary series of causes, compelling by natural necessity, or coercion, the existence of their consequent effects, and controlling by inevitable necessity the actions of both Gods and Men; and the free, wise, and voluntary, agency of the infinitely intelligent and benevolent Mind, originally planning, and steadily executing, a system of infinite good, according to the dictates of his boundless wisdom, and perfect pleasure. I cannot perceive a similarity, sufficient to enable me to discern in what the professed difficulty lies; or what the real objection is, which I am required to answer. I shall take the liberty, therefore, of waiting until I shall find the objection so stated, as either to induce me to acknowledge its force, or enable me to attempt a refutation.

2dly. It is objected, that this doctrine exhibits God as the Author of sin.

To the phrase, Author of sin, very different meanings are annexed by different persons. In order to meet this objection, therefore, with any hope of success, it will be necessary, in the first place, to determine the true meaning of the phraseology. Some persons understand by it the immediate and efficient Cause of sinful volitions: others, not only mean the efficient, but the guilty, Cause of such volitions: others, still, such a Cause, as in any manner, however remote, lays a foundation for the existence of sin and others, a Cause, supposed to be intelligent, which, when possessed of sufficient power to prevent the existence of sin, did not interfere to prevent it. When it is said, that this doctrine exhibits God as the Author of sin; I shall, for the present, consider the phrase, as used in one, or both, of the two first of these senses; and regard the objector as intending, that, according to this doctrine, God is either the guilty, or guiltless, immediate, and efficient, cause of sinful volitions in his creatures: In