latter mostly external to, the sphere of unaided Reason. Reason indeed can exercise most important service within the domain of Revelation; nevertheless, even after Revelation has been given, Reason can never in this life demonstrate the truth of revealed verities. Yet Faith and Reason can of course never be at variance with each other. Whenever such variance appears on the surface, the cause must either be, that dogma is apprehended falsely, i. e. in some sense different from the Church's; or else, that private fancies have been mistaken for the dictates of Reason. Whenever therefore any proposition, which contradicts the Faith, is presented to Catholics as a conclusion of science, they are strictly bound to reject it, as being, even in the order of secular science, erroneous or at least unfounded.

Reason and Faith, we have said, can never be at real variance with each other; but more than this is true, for they are of great mutual assistance. On the one hand, Reason has been the one effective instrument of all theological science; while, on the other hand, Faith preserves Reason from many errors and imparts to it multiform knowledge.

Lastly. The Deposit of Faith is no philosophical discovery, to be perfected by subsequent human speculation; but has been given the Church once for all, to be faithfully guarded and infallibly declared. Yet undoubtedly the Faith, once for all given by the Apostles, admits (as time proceeds) of being more profoundly apprehended, and more thoroughly mastered in its mutual relations. This is the doctrine of "Development": to which Father Newman drew such prominent attention even before he was a Catholic, and which the Vatican Council now has so distinctly sanctioned and enforced.

11. After thus setting forth Catholic_truth-positively in the Chapters and negatively in the Canons-Pius IX. founds, on what has preceded, a practical exhortation. He addresses himself to "all Christ's faithful, but especially those who govern or perform the office of teaching." He "entreats them by the mercy of Jesus Christ,-nay, commands them by the authority of their God and Saviour," that they will use their utmost efforts to extirpate such errors. It is not unworthy of observation, that all Christ's faithful are exhorted by the Council to labour actively, as opportunity may serve, towards the overthrow of theological error: though this duty is of course more especially incumbent on those, who are invested with the office of teaching.

In conclusion comes that most important sentence, to which we have already referred. The present Constitution, as we have more than once pointed out, condemns no other errors, except those which actually contradict revealed dogmata: but "it is not enough,' adds the Holy Father with full approbation of the Council, "it is

not enough to avoid heretical pravity, unless those errors also are diligently shunned which more or less nearly approach thereto." The words are spoken generally; but in this case they have of course special reference to errors connected with those particular doctrines which the Constitution has laid down. In regard to such non-heretical errors, the faithful are earnestly referred by Pope and Council to the various condemnatory Acts which have issued from the Holy Sec. To this class should be referred such tenets, as many of those denounced in the Munich Brief, and again in the censure of Günther. The modified Traditionalism, recently advocated at Louvain, will also come in the same category; and such ontologistic errors also, as were condemned in the Letters addressed from Rome to the four Louvain Professors. It must never be forgotten that these Professors were expressly required, not to obey these Letters as disciplinary enactments, but to subject their intellect to them "fully, perfectly, and absolutely," as to doctrinal instructions.

Such then is this first Dogmatic Constitution of the Vatican Council commencing, as we earnestly trust, a long series of doctrinal definitions, which shall bring loyally-intentioned Catholics into far greater intellectual union than now unhappily exists; and which shall thus increase a hundred fold their power of combining in resistance against the moral and intellectual evils of the time.

II.

An apparent variety has at last been introduced into the discussion of Papal infallibility. Mgr. Maret, "from the bosom of the old Sorbonne," had given a new edition of the famous "Defensio." He brought to the support of an untenable cause, learning, controversial acumen, and a lucid style. Janus - from "liberalCatholic" Munich-had poured out the vials of his wrath upon the devoted heads of the Romanizers. He brought to his work of destruction a crude mass of chips and cuttings, unbounded hardihood, and a not-misplaced reliance on ignorance and bigotry. Döllinger and Gratry had condensed into pamphlets the virus of Gallicanism and Liberalism for the behoof of those who have not patience to read octavos, or even to skim lightly over the pages of a duodecimo. In a host of pamphlets, articles, letters, in Italy, Germany, France, and at home, the old song had been repeated with variations. At length, it became plain that the orbis Catholicus would be moved from its resolve, neither by the time-honoured traditions of Paris, nor the insolent swagger of young Germany. Then the tactics were changed. The plan of direct attack on the doctrine, or the opportuneness of defining it, was abandoned, and it was sought to shelve the question by a side-wind. An ingenious

expedient was devised for this purpose. The theory was started, and pressed forward into sudden prominence, that a majority of the Council would not be competent to decide points of faith, but only a morally unanimous consent of the Fathers. The opposition outside the Council must be congratulated upon the cleverness of this move. In the first place, it is a diversion, and anything that may put off the catastrophe is a matter of triumph. Besides, it has the merit of seeming to bring new matter into the controversy. There is a scientific, abstract, general air about the proposition, making it look as if it had no immediate reference to a controversy of the hour.

The "Civiltà Cattolica" has devoted two articles to the subject. The first is a general discussion of the question, and critique of the various arguments alleged by the liberal journals in support of their view. The second is a rejoinder to a pamphlet published at Paris in reply to the first article. We shall not enter into the particular controversy of the Roman periodical. It is well able to take care of itself, and to give a good account of its antagonists. But, in the few observations we intend to make, we shall take the liberty of drawing on its pages as occasion may serve.

We will begin by stating our conviction that from the point of view of reason, the controversy between the defenders and the impugners of Papal infallibility could not have taken a form better calculated than the present to put the true doctrine in its full force and light. From the discussion of the mutual relations of majorities and minorities in councils, the guiding and all-controlling power of the Supreme Pontiff will be made evident; while the doubts and fears which have arisen in many minds, as if the relations of the Pope to the Episcopate were about to be fundamentally changed by the proposed definition, will be calmed at least, if not entirely set at rest. For ourselves, we have no doubt that a fair considera

* L'Unanimité dans les Conciles Ecuméniques. Paris: E. Dentu. 1870.

+ We have no desire to enter into a small verbal controversy which excited some notice two or three months ago. But we think that many excellent persons are needlessly scared by the use of the terms-personal, independent, separate, as applied to Pontifical Infallibility. The use of each

of these words is right in one sense and wrong in another. The word personal is rightly used to set aside the distinction of scdes and sedens; a wrong use is to take it as signifying that the soul of an individual, on election to the Popedom, receives a new supernatural quality different from that of ordinary mortals. It rightly insinuates also that the prerogative of infallibility is incommunicable. The term independent rightly excludes the subordination of the Pope to the rest of the Episcopate, and expresses the true order in which the divine charisma of infallibility is derived to the Church; it is wrongly understood to mean that the Pope has no obligations to the loci theologici, as if, of his own good pleasure, without taking any means of ascertaining what had been revealed by Almighty VOL. XV.-NO. XXIX. [New Series.]

tion of this question of unanimity will result in these two conclusions.

First, that the novelty of this question, in the present controversy, is only apparent; since to ask for unanimity, as a condition of a legitimate definition of faith is no more nor less than to assert, under another form of words, that the infallibility of the Church resides in the consent of the Churches, in the sense of the fourth Proposition of the Gallican Declaration, and by consequence to deny infallibility to the Church of Rome. The author of the Defensio draws out the whole theory in strictly logical accord with his first principles. Starting from the denial of Papal inerrancy, he places the sole and unfailing test of ecclesiastical infallibility in the consent of the Churches, whether assembled in Council or dispersed throughout the orbis terrarum. And, since all the Churches, taken singly, are liable to error, their testimony, to

God, he could propose new articles of faith or rules of moral conduct. So the word separate (which we should not think of using ourselves, nor are we sure that it has been used on the Ultramontane side of the controversy, though it has been ascribed to them by their adversaries): the word separate is capable of a right and a wrong sense. If it be understood to mean that the Holy Father, in defining this or that dogma, is not bound to consult formally the rest of the Episcopate, either antecedently, concomitantly, or subsequently, it is most true; but if by separate is meant that the Pope, considered as cut off from, or in opposition to the rest of the Episcopate, is an infallible guide of faith, such a sense is inadmissible, because the case is impossible. Should any of our readers think these and such like explanations superfluous or too late, we would ask them if it is not true that a good deal of heat in the present controversy arises from the fact that the parties to the dispute have not always rightly apprehended their opponents' meaning,-a thing by no means to be wondered at when one considers the fragmentary character of newspaper controversy.

We are glad to be able to confirm our observations in this note by the authority of the Archbishop of Cambrai. The thought and language are so like our own, that we must say that the passage had not come under our notice until after the note was written. In a recent letter to the clergy of his diocese, Mgr. Regnier writes :-"Dites que ce Pape isolé, absolu, séparé de l'Église sur laquelle il exercerait un empire déspotique; ce Pape multipliant à son gré les dogmes nouveaux, décidant, définissant tout ce qu'il veut sur toutes choses, sans autre règle et sans autre mesure que son bon plaisir, est une création chimérique de l'esprit de parti. Le vrai Pape, celui dout nous acceptons avec amour et sans restriction l'enseignement irréformable et l'autorité suprême, ne peut jamais être séparé de l'Eglise universelle."-Lettre de Mgr. l'Archevêque de Cambrai sur le Concile Ecuménique du Vatican. Bien Public, 31 Mai, 1870. This letter has since been published in the form of a pamphlet by M. Palme.

* "In fidei quoque quæstionibus præcipuas Summi Pontificis esse partes, ejusque decreta ad omnes et singulas Ecclesias pertinere, nec tamen irreformabile esse judicium, nisi Ecclesiæ consensus accesserit."Denzinger, Enchir., n. 1191., ed. 4. It is immaterial whether we say the consent of the "Church' or the "Churches," since the author of the Defensio uses the expressions indiscriminately.-Vide passim.

have dogmatic effect, must be unanimous. A fortiori, therefore, those Bishops who happen to be present at a given Ecumenical Council, must be unanimous. And, always in complete harmony with himself, the doctor of Gallicanism refuses to allow infallibility to the unanimous definition of a General Council, until the decision has been accepted, expressly or tacitly, by the unrepresented Churches. But, as it would not have suited the tactics of the neo-Gallicans to have taken their stand upon the fourth Proposition, because in that case they well knew the verdict of public opinion would have condemned them without further hearing, they have treated the question of unanimity by itself and on its own merits, as if it were not a mere corollary of an erroneous theory of Church authority.

Secondly, it will appear that the prime source and seat of the infallibility of the Catholic Church is the Pope of Rome for the time being, and none other. For it will not only be seen that complete agreement among the Bishops is not a necessary condition of an infallible decision, but, which is much more important, it will be clear as the sun at noon-day, that the definitive power of an Ecumenical Council is derived in the last resort from its union with the Roman Pontiff and the conformity of its judgment with his. It will be seen that majorities and minorities per se are of small account. No majority, as such, has power to bind the consciences of men. Any minority, in communion with the Pope, is sufficient to command assent.

The first thing to be done, in order to place the truth of these assertions in a proper position to be seen, is to remove the ambiguity which surrounds the inquiry. At first sight it would seem as if few questions could be simpler in their terms than this. In Ecumenical Councils is a majority of votes sufficient to carry a question; or is unanimity, at least moral, necessary? And yet almost every term must be distinguished and limited before we can properly understand its bearing. As we are not writing a treatise on Councils, but only offering a small contribution to a question of the day, we have no intention of opening out and examining all the ramifications of the above question. We shall indicate so much as may be necessary to enable us to answer with special reference to the discussion on the subject of Infallibility.

Let us then analyze the question. Ecumenical Councils, speaking from our present point of view, are of two sorts. In some the Pontiff sits in person; in others he is represented by legates. When present he sits in a double capacity of President and of Prince. He has this double character, because although the church is a monarchy, the Bishops in Council are not simply consultors and

* Bellar., De Conc. et Eccles., lib. i. cap. 18, n. 16.