peror; and the prophet Jeremyk brings in the people complaining in a time of famine, "Our sons and our daughters are too many, let us take corn for their price, that we may eat and live." But this being only in the case of extreme necessity is not to be drawn to any thing else, for this power is only just when it is unavoidable: and therefore it is permitted in laws, which do therefore so comply with the necessity, and endeavour to find a remedy, or to make it tolerable, that in such cases the judges, if there be a contest in the particular, are tied to proceed summarily: and if a son should pretend causes of excuse from giving aliment to his father during the whole contestation, and till the proof be made, the son is tied to maintain his father in the interval; so careful are the laws to secure the performance of this duty, for the omission of which all the world hath observed great marks of the divine displeasure, expressed in judgments, and particularly of immature deaths; so Homer1 observes of Semoisius,

οὐδὲ τοκεῦσι

θρεπτρὰ φίλοις ἀπέδωκε, μινυνθάδιος δὲ οἱ αἰὼν,

❝he refused to nourish his loving parents, and therefore he lived but a short life.'

§ 5. One particular more is to be added, and that is, if an indigent father have a rich father living, and a rich son, although both are obliged to nourish him, yet it is in the father's power to burden the son and to excuse the grandfather; that is, the power which the father hath over the son can require this duty: the grandfather is equally obliged, but the son hath no power over him, the law hath. For as for the thing itself there is no other difference in it. But if the rich father refuses he is worse than an infidel, if the rich son refuses he is impious; the first is unnatural, and the second is ungodly; the first is a heathen, and the other is no Christian; the grandfather hath no bowels, and the grandchild no gratitude; the first hath no humanity, and the other no religion; so that it is an even lay between them which is the worst: but the necessitous father may put the duty actually upon the son by reason of his paternal power, that is, he may so order it, that if the son refuses he is not only uncharitable, but undutiful also, he commits two great sins; whereas the refusing grandfather commits but one, though that also be enough to bring him an extreme damnation.

[Read, Nehemiah v. 2.]

1 Iliad. iv. [477; cf. lib. xvii. 301. The passage has been similarly misapplied by Andrewes (Pattern of cate

chistical doctrine, part ii. chap. 1. § 2. p. 65. 8vo. Oxf. 1846.), and Saravia (quoted by Hacket, life of Abp. Williams, part ii. § 74. p. 75. fol. Lond. 1693).]

RULE IV.

THE FATHER'S POWER DOES NOT EXTEND TO MATTER OF RELIGION AND
PERSUASIONS OF FAITH.

§ 1. In the law of the twelve tables it was written, Sacra privata perpetua manento, that the private religion of a family should not be altered: which Cicerom expounds to mean that all those to whom the care of the father of the family did appertain were tied to the celebration of the same rites; and the lawyers say, that Filii sunt in sacris parentum dum sunt in eorum potestate", children are within the holy rites of their parents while they are in their power.' And indeed this is very true in the court of conscience so long as their understanding is in their father's power; but that is of all things first emancipated: when a son can choose for himself, when he is capable of malice and perverseness, when he is judicable by external and public laws, then he is emancipated and set free, so as he can choose his religion, and for that the father hath no other power over him but persuasion and instruction. For it is very observable that as it was said of the law of Moses, it was a 'schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ,' so it is true of the imperium domesticum, 'the father's government,' it is a pedagogy to bring us to the obedience of the laws both of God and man: the father's commands are exacted before the laws of God or princes do require obedience; because the government of children is like the government of the sick and the madmen, it is a protection of them from harm, and an institution of them to obedience of God and of kings; and therefore the father is to rule the understanding of his child till it be fit to be ruled by the laws of God; that is, the child must believe and learn, that he may choose and obey; for so we see it in the baptizing infants, the fathers and susceptors first choose the child's religion, and then teach it him, and then he must choose it himself. For the father's authority to the understanding of the child is but like a false arch or temporary supporter, put under the building till it can stand alone: and it only hath this advantage, that the father hath the prerogative of education, the priority of possession, which how great it is all the experience of the world can tell. But that this is part of the paternal power is evident, because no child is to be baptized without his father's will. A Turk, a Jew, a heathen can reckon their children in sacris parentum; they have power, a natural and proper power, to breed up their children in what religion they please, but not to

keep them in it; for then when they can choose they are under no power of man, God only is the Lord of the understanding: and therefore it is no disobedience if a son changes his father's religion, or refuses to follow his father's change, for he cannot be injured in that where he hath no right and no authority.

§ 2. But this is so to be understood that the religion of the son must at no hand prejudice the father's civil rights, so that he must not quit his father's house, if he be under his father's power, and by the laws of his country be obliged under that government. Vigoreus in his sermon of S. Martin, tells that S. Martin being but a catechumen and yet unbaptized did still abide with his father and mother though they were heathens, and he nevertheless did all the offices of a Christian. And there is in this great duty, because one right must not destroy another; and a man may be of what religion he please without doing wrong to any man, for a man cannot be hindered in his persuasion, for though he dies he is of that religion; but no good religion does warrant the son to do wrong to his father's legal rights. And therefore Marius VictorP observes of Abraham,

Verum mente Deum venerans, gentilia sacra

Aversatus erat.

He was a great hater of his father's idolatry and the impious rites of his family, yet he did not leave his father's house till after his father's death.

Linqueret ut sedes' patrias, terramque nocentem,
Pollutamque domum,

Nisi postquam more parentis

Jussa sequi jam posse Dei sine fraude licebat.

He might do it justly when he had no just power over him to restrain him by the cords of another justice and a differing duty.

§ 3. There is only this variety to be added, that when either of the parents is christian, and the other infidel, the son is to be reckoned to the believing parent: the effect whereof can be this, that he or she that believes hath a right to educate the children in christianity without injury to the other, and the church may baptize the children against the will of the unbeliever and the reason of this is, the prerogative of God, and of Christ who is head of the church, and the sovereign of all the world; for if the child is sanctified and made holy by the believing parent, then it may be brought to Christ; that sanctification of it is Christ's seizure of it, it is His right, because He hath made a covenant with the parents for themselves and for their children.

§ 4. This is practised in the countries of the Roman communion to evil and if the father be a heretic in their account, they purposes;

teach their children to disobey their parents, and suppose heresy to destroy the father's right of power and government. Between Christian and Christian there is no difference as to matter of civil rights; no law allows that: but between heathen and Christian, so far as the soul is concerned, the right of Christ is indubitable; for we are sure christianity is the true religion: but amongst the sects of Christians the case is wholly differing, for they may both have enough to secure the souls of pious persons, and yet may both be deceived in their question and unnecessary article.

RULE V.

THE FATHER'S POWER OVER THE CHILDREN CAN REMIT AN INJURY DONE TO THEM WITHOUT THEIR LEAVE OR CONSENT.

§ 1. THE reason of this depends upon the former considerations, and is to have its understanding accordingly. So long as the son is within the civil power of the father, so long as he lives in his house, is subject to his command, is nourished by his father's charge, hath no distinct rights of his own, he is in his father's possession, and to be reckoned by his measures, and therefore cannot have any actions of injury for his own amendment.

§ 2. But this is to be limited only to the effects of law and external courts and trials of right, or external actions of injury. For although a son cannot repeat what the father hath legally acquitted, yet if it be a personal action, in which charity and peace are concerned, the injurious person is bound in conscience to ask the son forgiveness, upon the account of S. Paul's words, "Follow peace with all men, and holiness," and, "for as much as is possible live peaceably with all ment;" which no man can be said to do who hath done wrong to a person, to whom he will not do right. For besides the relation and the communication of its effect between father and son, the son is a person too, and in personal actions hath an interest naturally and unalterably, which no fiction of law, no supposition of case can take off. So that all the legal and external obligation the father may remit, but in the personal there is something of proper

concernment.

§ 3. This is also to be limited to an entercourse with extraneous persons, and is not true in actions between the son and a conjunct person to him. As if the injury be done by a wife, or a spouse, or a freedman, or a person endeared and obliged by the son, the father

cannot remit any such injury. The reason is, because although by the force of the civil or municipal laws the son be supposed to be still in the father's power, yet in such things he hath some peculiarity, and is as to those things free and in his own power. If the son's wife commit adultery, the father cannot forgive it, though the son be under his father's power by law; because as to all personal actions the son hath a personal right, and such things have great dependence upon the law of God and nature, and these things to some great purposes do not at all communicate with the civil laws.

§ 4. Lastly, this rule is so to be understood and practised, that it be no prejudice to the just interests of any other: and therefore a father cannot so forgive an injury done to his son, that he shall be tied not to witness it in public when he is required by the civil power; for it may concern the commonwealth that the criminal be punished, when it may become the father to pardon his and his son's share. He may remit all with which he hath to do, but not that which may pass into the exchequer. But in such cases the judge may enquire, but the son without the father's leave may be no voluntary accuser.

RULE VI.

A FATHER'S AUTHORITY CANNOT ABIDE AFTER HIS DEATH, BUT THE SON'S PIETY TO HIS FATHER MUST, AND MAY PASS UPON HIM SOME INDIRECT OBLIGATIONS.

§ 1. THE son after his father's death is as much lord of his person and his estate as his father was: and therefore although all the actions which the living father did, which by law or the nature of the thing have a permanent effect, still do abide as they were left; yet those things which are of an alterable nature, and to be administered by new counsels, and to be determined by emergencies and proper circumstances, or are directly subject to empire, or are personal concernments, these are in the power of the son after his father's death. A father cannot by his power command a son to marry a person whom the father does, but the son does not love: he cannot command the son by a just and a sufficient authority never to be a priest, or bishop, or a magistrate: for in those things in which his own mere interest is concerned, his own understanding must be his guide, and his will his ruler, for he alone does lie at stake whether it be good or bad; and it is not reasonable that he should govern who neither gets, nor loses, nor knows.

§ 2. But though the father's authority be extinct, yet his memory