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"When by the omission of confession, the neighbour would suffer loss, as if in the case preceding, some from his silence would be turned away from the faith." Tome ii. n. 43.

Here we find the almost obvious reason for which the appearance of dissimulation must be avoided, even the interest of the faith or the Church, which would suffer materially, as in the above cited cases, by apparent dissimulation, dissimulation well-disguised is lawful, nay, according to Liguori, often more conducive to the glory of God and the well being of the public. He considers it highly commendable for a Romanist to lie hid among Heretics, if he can thereby advance the interests of the Church more effectually.

In a letter which appeared in the Nottingham Journal, I supposed the following case, which I now quote as it was given in that paper. "According to these principles the following case may often occur:-A devout Romanist seeks for the office of Tutor or Governess; he or she dissembles his or her principles, even if interrogated, provided that the dissimulation is not so flimsy as to be seen through. That Romanist covertly disseminates unsound principles amongst the members of the family, and some of the children, in consequence, leave their father's house, and wound his feelings, by joining a Church against which he conscientiously protests. The Father too late finds out the source of his calamities, and too late mourns over the bitter and the awful consequences of ROMISH DISSIMULATION!"

The Church of Rome is truly an equivocating, dissembling, tergiversating, and Protean system,-ever the same in principle, uuchanged and unchangeable, it yet adapts itself to circumstances, that it may the more readily accomplish its designs. To dissemble religion, lie hid amongst Heretics, and cover the truth with ambiguities,

is quite lawful, nay laudable, when such means are likely to serve the Church. Hence Jesuitry in disguise: but if the circumstances of Rome are such as to call for even the greatest sacrifices, those sacrifices must be rendered-the votary, under other circumstances concealing his faith, dissembling and tergiversating, must openly, when the good of the Church demands it, endure any and every ill. Oh how different is the genius of true Christianity, whose crystal streams flow from the sacred fountains of divine truth. Christianity, the religion of Jesus, under no circumstances justifies dissimulation or dishonesty. Being "the truth," it would establish its saving and sanctifying influence by truthful means; lying lips are an abomination to the Lord, but they that deal truly are his delight." The woe is written, " that whosoever loveth and maketh a lie, shall have his part in the lake that burns with brimstone and fire." To dissemble the faith-to lie hid amongst those who hold opposite religious sentiments, to conceal religion under ambiguous words and badges,is, notwithstanding the assertion of Rome, to deny Christ. Oh how emphatic is the language of our Saviour, "Fear not them which kill the body but are not able to kill the soul, but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell. Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing, and one of them shall not fall to the ground without your Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered. Fear ye not, therefore, ye are of more value than many sparrows. Whosoever therefore shall confess me before men, him will I confess before my Father which is in Heaven; but whosoever shall deny me before men, him will I also deny before my Father which is in Heaven."

It is the Christian's duty to confess Christ, even though "bonds and imprisonments " awaited him, for with "the

heart man believeth unto righteousness, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation." This truth "the noble army of martyrs " felt and acted upon.

Satan is called "the Father of lies," Rome," the mother of harlots and abominations of the earth," whose mark is " the deceivableness of unrighteousness," teaches the lawfulness of dissembling and lying, in one of the most sacred duties—even the confession of Christ. Surely such a system is not only soul destroying, but even injurious to social well being, and necessarily calculated to undermine, by the most unhallowed means, the civil and religious liberty-the prosperity of this great Protestant country.

In the next place, we will consider the principle which Liguori establishes, of doing evil that good may come.

IT IS LAWFUL TO DO EVIL THAT GOOD MAY COME,

PROVED ΤΟ BE ONE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHURCH OF ROME.

Having treated on the nature of Heresy, Judaism, the love of God, &c., &c., he considers the duty of charity; in page 419, he says:

"Utrum liceat suadere, aut permittere minus malum ad majus evitandum. Prima sententia negat, prout tenet Laym. de Car. c. 12. n. 7. cum Azor et aliis. Ratio, quia comparativum non tollit positivum; unde qui suadet minus malum, vere malum suadet. Limitat vero Laym. cum Azor. nisi malum illud sit virtualiter inclusum in illo alio majori. Sic parato aliquem occidere potes suadere, ut manum tantum amputet; eidem tamen, non alteri designato; sic etiam volenti adulterari potes suadere forni

"Whether it may be lawful to induce or to permit a lesser evil for the avoiding of a greater one. The first opinion denies that it is, according as Laym. holds, de car. c. 12. n. 7. with Azor. and others. The reason of which opinion is because a comparative does not take away the positive evil; whence he who induces one to commit a smaller sin, truly induces him to commit a sin. But Laym. with Azor limits it unless that evil is virtually in cluded in that other greater evil. Thus you may be able to

cationem cum soluta in generali, non autem in particulari. Admittunt hoc Salm. loc. cit. dummodo ille decreverit utrumque malum patrare, cum Nav. etc. At Laym. indistincte loquitur, et Sanch. cum secunda sententia, ut mox dicetur, hanc limitationem expresse rejicit: quia (dicit) tunc minus malum proponitur, non ut alter illud perpetret, sed ut a majori retrahatur.

"Secunda igitur sententia probabilior tenet, licitum esse minus malum suadere, si alter jam determinatus fuerit ad majus exequendum. Ratio, quia tunc suadens non quærit malum, sed bonum, scilicet electionem minoris mali. Ita Sanch. de Matrim. lib. 7. d. XI. n. 15. cum Sot. Mol. Nav. Medin. Sylvest. et aliis pluribus, ac Salm. tract. 21. c. 8. n. 58. cum Cajet. Sot. Pal. Bonac. etc. probabilem putat Croix lib. 2. n. 223. Hinc docet id. Sanch. n. 19. cum Cajet. Sot. Covar. Valent. parato aliquem occidere, licite posse suaderi, ut ab eo furetur, vel ut fornicetur. Et probat ex S. August. in c. Si quos verius, 33. q. 5. ubi: Si enim facturus est, quod non licet, jam faciat adulterium, et non faciat homicidium; et vivente uxore sua, alteram ducat, et non humanum sanguinem fundat. Ex quibus verbis, jam faciat adulterium, probat Sanch. dict. n. 15. cum Soto, Mol. Nav. Abb. etc. S. doctorem, non tantum permittendo, sed etiam suadendo locutum fuisse. Et hoc addit Sanch. n. 23. cum Sal. licere non solum privatis,

persuade any one who is determined to commit murder that he should only cut off the hand, however, of the same person, not another chosen person: thus also, you may persuade a man wishing to commit adultery to commit fornification with an unmarried person, in general, but not with any one in particular. This Salm, in the place cited with Nav. etc. admits, provided that he hath determined to commit either evil. But Laym. speaks indistinctly with the second opinion, (as will hereafter be shown) and Sanches rejects expressly this limitation, because he says then a less evil is proposed to him, not that the other should perpetrate that, but that he should be drawn from a greater.

"Therefore, the second opinion is the more probable one, THAT

IT IS LAWFUL TO INDUCE a

man to commit a less evil, if the other has already determined to perpetrate a greater. The reason is, because he that persuades does not seek an evil but a good, to wit, the choice of a lesser evil: thus Sanch. de matrim lib. 7. de xi. n. 15. with Sot. Mal. Nav. Medin. Sylvest, and many others, and Salm, Tract 21, c. 8. n. 58. with Cajet Sot. Pal. Bonac. etc. croix. lib. 2. n. 223. thinks it probable. Hence Sanches teaches, n. 19, with Cajetan Sot. Covar. Valent, that it is lawful to PERSUADE a man, determined to slay some one, that he should commit THEFT FORNICATION, and he proves

or

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it from St. Augustin, in c. si
quos verius, 33. c. 5. ubi. 'For
if he is about to do that which
is not lawful, in that case he
may commit adultery, and he
may not commit homicide;
and, though his own wife is
alive, he may marry another,
and he may not shed human
blood.' From which words,
now he may commit adultery,
'jam faciat adulterium,' San-
ches proves, with Soto. Mol.
Nav. Abb. etc., that the doctor
not only was speaking of per-
mitting, but EVEN OF PER-
SUADING. And this, adds
Sanches, n. 23. with Sal., that
it is lawful not only for private
persons, but even confessors,
parents, and others, upon whom
the duty is officially incumbent
to prevent the sins of those
under them."

How truly awful are these sentiments; when I first read them I could scarcely credit my senses, and believe that any man would teach such iniquitous and demoralizing principles,-"A man may do evil that good may come," this is the antichristian sentiment of the Church of Rome. Liguori, Sanches, Cajetan, &c., &c., hold that it is lawful to induce or persuade ("suadere ") a man to commit a smaller offence, that he may abstain from what is esteemed by Rome a greater; of this, illustrations and examples are given. A certain man is determined to commit adultery, but fornication is a lesser crime; therefore use, says Liguori, all the powers that you possess, in leading that man to commit fornication, if thereby you will keep him from committing adultery! Another example is given; a man is determined to commit murder, but adultery is not so great a crime as

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