speaking carried out, for that confessor answers as man, noi as the Minister of Christ. He says "I have not heard it," understanding thereby, I have not heard it as a man, or so as to make it known to another. Here is absolute perjury! perjury too, of which Rome unblushingly is the advocate and the teacher; here is restriction not purely mental, carried into practice. Surely this is sufficient to shew, that the division of mental restriction, first, into that which is purely mental, and, secondly, into that, which though mental is not purely such, is a distinction, in practice without any difference. But to proceed to other instances of equivocation and mental restriction: - "II. Reus, aut testis, a judice non legitime interrogatus, potest jurare, se nescire crimen, quod revera scit; subintelligendo, nescire crimen, de quo ligitime possit inquiri, vel nescire ad deponendnm." "Ita Caj. Opusc. tom. i. tr. 31. r. 5. Sporer de 2 Præc. c. 1. n. 120. et 121. Azor. tom. 1. 1. 11. cap. 4. Ronc. de 2 Præc. c. 4. q. 2. r. 3. Sanch. Dec. 1. 3. c. 6. num. 23. et 26. cum Navarr. Tolet. Val. etc. ex eodem D. Thom. 2. 2. qu. 69. art. 1. Idem, si testis ex alio capite non teneatur deponere ; nempe si ipsi constet crimen caruisse culpa, ut Salm. d. c. 2. n. 259. et Elbel n. 145. Vel. si sciat crimen, sed sub secreto, cum nulla præcesserit infamia, ut Card. ibid. n. 51." "The accused, or a witness not properly interrogated, CAN SWEAR that he does NOT know a crime, which in reality he does know, by understanding that he does not know the crime, concerning which legitimately he can be inquired of, or that he does not know it so as to give evidence concerning it." "Thus Caj. Opusc. tom. 1. tr. 31. r. 5. Sporer de 2. Præc. c. 1. n. 120. et 121. Azor. tom 1. 1. 11. cap. 4. Ronc. de 2. Præc. c. 4. q. 2. r. 3. Sanch. Dec. 1. 3. c. 6. num. 23. et 26. cum Navarr. Tolet. Val. etc. ex eodem D. Thom. 2. 2. qu. 69. art 1. The same is true if a witness on another ground is not bound to depose; for instance, if the crime appears to himself to be free from blame, as Salm. d. c. 2. n. 259. et Elbel. n. 145. or if he knows a crime which he is bound to keep secret, when no scandal may have gone abroad, as Card. ibid. n. 51." Here then the accused or the witness is authorized to F tell lies. When he considers that he is not justly interrogated, he may deny that he is aware of certain crimes, which, however, at the same moment he is well acquainted with ; the same also may be done by a witness, if he thinks that the crime of which the accused is charged, is unblameable, or if he was bound to secrecy. But to proceed: "Reus tamen, vel testis, vel legitime a judice interrogatus, nequit ulla æquivocatione uti, quia tenetur justo præcepto superioris parere. Est communis. Salm. c. 2. n. 146. cum Sot. Less. Sanch. etc. cum Bus. n. 2. Et idem dicendum de juramento in contractibus onerosis, quia alias injuria alteri irrogaretur, Salm. ibid. Excipe in judicio, si crimen fuerit omnino occultum; tunc enim potest, imo tenetur testis dicere reum non commisisse. Tamb. c. 4. § 2. n. 4. cum Card. et Pot. ut sup. Et idem potest reus, si non adest semiplena probatio etc. Tamb. § 3. n. 2. cum communi; quia tunc judex non legitime interrogat." "However, the accused, or witness, or one legitimately interrogated by a Judge, can not use any equivocation, because he is bound to render obedience to the just command of his superior. This opinion is common to Salm. c. 2. n. 146. with Sot. Less. Sanch. and others, with Bus. n. 2. and the same is to be said concerning an oath in important contracts, because if it were not so, another would suffer injury, Salm. ibid. Make an exception in a trial where the crime is altogether concealed. For, then he can, yea, the witness is bound to say, that the accused did not commit the crime. And the same course the accused can adopt, if the examination is not complete Tamb. 3. n. 2. cum communi, because then the Judge does not legitimately interrogate." It appears that when the crime is altogether concealed, and it is probable that no ill rumour will be the consequence, the witness may, nay he is bound to say, that the accused did not commit it. Liguori now proceeds to answer various queries; here we shall find the principle of swearing with equivocation carried into practice and exemplified. "Sed quæritur hic 1. an, si "But here it is enquired 1. talis reus, vel contrahens æquivoce jurando decepit, possit absolvi, nisi veritatem manifestet. Negant aliqui non improbabiliter; sed probabilius affirmant Sanch. Dec. 1. 2. c. 7. n. 8. et Salm. c. 2. n. 147. cum Philiarch. quia tali juramento (quod perjurium nequit dici) non peccavit contra justitiam commutativam, sed contra legalem, et obedientiam judici debitam, cujus præceptum detegendæ veritatis transiens est duratque solum, dum judex interrogat. Idemque dicit Sanch. ibid. de teste mentiente. Et ideo uterque absolvi potest, quin veritatem revelet. Tenentur vero ambo alteri satisfacere si possunt alia via. At si non possint, dicunt Salm. teneri eos denuo in judicio detegere debitum. Sed etiam excusarem si omnino essent impotentes ad satisfaciendum in præsenti, et in futuro." 63 if such an accused person, or one, who making a contract, deceives by swearing with equivocation, may be absolved unless he makes known the truth. Some not improbably answer in the negative, but more probably Sanch. Dec. 1. 2. c. 7. n. 8. et Salm. c. 2. n. 147. cum Philiarch. SAY THAT HE CAN BE ABSOLVED, because in such an oath, (WHICH CAN NOT BE CALLED A PERJURY) he has not sinned against commutative justice, but against legal justice, and due obedience to a Judge whose command of unfolding the truth is transient, and only lasts while the Judge interrogates. And the same thing Sanches says in the same book concerning a lying Witness. And, therefore, each of them can be absolved, but he should reveal the truth. But both are bound to render satisfaction to the other, if they are able in another way. But if they are not able, Salm. says, that they are bound again to make known the debt in trial. But I would even excuse them, if they were altogether unable to make satisfaction for the present or even the future." Here Liguori teaches that the man, who in making a contract deceives another by swearing equivocally, may be absolved; such an oath is not a perjury. The contractor too, if he be unable to fulfil the debt, is excused. "Quæritur 2. an reus legitime interrogatus possit negare crimen, etiam cum juramento, si grave damnum ex confessione ipsi immineat." "It is asked 2. WHETHER THE ACCUSED LEGITIMATELY INTERROGATED, CAN DENY A CRIME, EVEN WITH AN OATH, IF THE CONFESSION OF THE CRIME, WOULD BE ATTENDED WITH GREAT DISADVANTAGE ?" Mark now the answer which the Saint gives to this important question. "Negat Elbel n. 44. cum D. Th. d. art 1. ad 2. et quidem probabilius, quia reus tenetur tunc pro communi bono damnum illud subire. Sed satis probabiliter Lugo de Just. d. 40. n. 15. Tamb. lib. 3. c. 4. § 3. n. 5. cum Sanch. Viva q. 7. art. 4. n. 2. Sporer de Præc. c. 1. num. 13. item Elbel dict. num. 144. Card. in Propt. Innoc. XI. diss. 19. num. 78. cum Nav. Less. Sa. et Fill. et aliis plurib. dicunt, posse reum, si sibi immineat poena mortis,vel carceris, aut exilii perpetui, amissionis omnium bonorum, triremium, et similis, negare crimen, etiam cum juramento (saltem sine peccato gravi) subintelligendo, se non commisisse, quatenus teneatur illud fateri, modo sit spes vitandi pœnam ratio, quia lex humana non potest sub gravi obligare homines cum tanto onere. Additque Elbel hanc sententiam, licet minus probabilem, insinuandam tamen esse reis et confessariis, ut liberentur illi a culpa gravi, in quam facillime incident, si ad confessionem criminis obstringentur. Vid. dicenda 1. 4. n. 274." "Pœnitens, interrogatus a confessario de peccato confesso potest jurare, se non commisisse, subintelligens illud, quod confessus non sit. Ita Carden. diss. 19. n. 48. Salm. num. 118 "Elbel denies that he can cum D. Th. d. art. 1. ad 2. and indeed more probably because the accused is then bound for the general good to undergo the loss. But SUFFICIENTLY PROBABLE Lugo de Just. d. 40 n. 15. Tamb. lib. 3. c. 4 § 3. n. 5. cum Sanch. Viva q. 7. art. 4. n. 2. Sporer. de Præc. c. 1. num. 13. item Elbel dict. num. 144. Card. in Propt. Innoc. XI. diss. 19. num. 78. cum Nav. Less. Sa. et Fill, WITH MANY OTHERS, SAY, that the accused, if in danger of death, or the prison, or perpetual exile,-the loss of all property-the danger of the gallies, and such like, CAN DENY THE CRIME EVEN WITH AN OATH, (at least without great sin) by understanding that he did not commit it so that he is bound to confess it, only let there be a hope of avoiding the punishment. The reason is, because human law can not lay men under so great an obligation with so severe a penalty. And Elbel adds that this opinion, although less probable, should be suggested to the accused and confessors, that they may be delivered from great blame, in which they would easily fall, if they should be bound to the confession of the crime." "A Penitent, interrogated by a Confessor concerning a sin confessed, can swear that he did not commit it, understanding that which he may not have confessed. Thus Carden in fin. Sanch. lib. 3. cap. 6, num. 14. Spor. de 2. Præc. cap. 1. n. 105. Hoc tamen intelligendum, nisi confessarius juste interroget ad noscendum statum pœnitentis, ex prop. 58. damn. ab Inn. XI." "Indigens bonis absconditis ad sustentationem, potest judici respondere, se nihil habere. Salm. n. 140. Pariter heres, qui sine inventario occultavit bona, si non teneatur ex illis satisfacere creditoribus, potest judici respondere, se nihil occultasse, subintelligens de bonis, quibus satisfacere teneatur. Salm. loc. cit. et Ronc. c. 4. reg. 2. in Praxi." "Qui mutuum accepit, sed postea satisfecit, potest negare, se accepisse mutuum, subintelligens, ita ut debeat solvere. Salm. n. 140. et Sporer de 2 Præc. c. 1. n. 122. cum Suar. Nav. Az. Laym. Sanch. Cov. et aliis. Sic pariter, si quis fuerit coactus ad matrimonium potest judici asserere etiam cum juramento, se non contraxisse, scil. libere, ut par erat; Tol. lib. 4. c. 21. Laym. c. 14. n. 8. Nav. in c. Humanæ aures 22. q. 5. et Spor. loc. cit. qui idem ait de eo, qui irrita sponsalia inivit. Pariter qui matrimonium promisit, sed inde non teneatur ad illud, potest negare promissionem, scilicet, ut ex illa teneatur." Salm. n. 140." diss. 19. n. 48. Salm. num. 118. in fin. Sanch. lib. 3. cap. 6. num. 14. Spor. de 2. Præc. cap. 1. n. 105. However this is to be understood according to the condemnation of the proposition 58. by Innocent XI., unless the Confessor justly interrogates for the purpose of knowing the state of the Penitent." "A poor man, absconding with goods for his support, CAN ANSWER THE JUDGE THAT HE HAS NOTHING, Salm. n. 140. In like manner, a master who has concealed his goods without an inventory, if he is not bound to settle with his creditors with them, can say to a Judge, that he has not concealed anything, in his own mind meaning those goods with which he is bound to satisfy his creditors." "He who receives a loan, but afterwards returns it, can deny that he received a loan, understanding so as that he should pay it, Salm. n. 140. et Sporer de 2. Præc. c. 1. n. 122. cum Suar. Nav. Az. Laym. Sanch. Cov. et aliis. Thus, likewise, if any one may have been forced into matrimony, he can assert to a Judge, even with an oath, that he did not contract marriage, to wit, freely, as it was fit; Tol. lib. 4. c. 21. Laym. c. 14. n. 8. Nav. in c. Humanæ aures 22. q. 5. et Spor. loc. cit. who says the same thing concerning a man who has entered into marriage which is null and void. Likewise he who hath promised! marriage, but thence is not. bound to marriage, can deny |