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one article, which is not a principal article of faith, such a sense should be affirmed, for which faith is exposed to the contempt of all that follow reason: and all this is, because in transubstantiation there are many natural and ordinary impossibilities. "In hâc conversione sunt plura difficiliora quàm in creatione," said Aquinas; "There are more difficulties in this conversion of the sacrament, than in the whole creation."

9. But then, because we are speaking concerning what may be done by God, it ought to be considered that it is rash and impudent to say, that the body of Christ cannot, by the power of God, who can do all things, be really in the sacrament, without the natural conversion of bread into him. "God can make, that the body of Christ should be de novo' in the sacrament of the altar, without any change of itself, and without the change of any thing into itself, yet some change being made about the bread, or something else." They are the words of Durand'. Cannot God in any sense make this proposition true; This bread is the body of Christ,' or this is bread and Christ's body too?' If they say, he cannot,-then it is a clear case, who it is that denies God's omnipotency. If God can, then how will they be able from the words of Scripture to prove transubstantiation? This also would be considered.

10. But now concerning impossibilities,-if it absolutely can be evinced, that this doctrine of transubstantiation does affirm contradictions, then it is not only an intolerable prejudice against the doctrine, as is the ordinary and natural impossibility; but it will be absolutely impossible to be true; and it derogates from God to affirm such a proposition in religion, and much more to adopt it into the body of faith. And, therefore, when St. Paul had quoted that place of Scripture; "He hath put all things under him;" he adds, "It is evident, that he is excepted, who did put all things under him;" for if this had not been so understood, then he should have been under himself, and he that gave the power, should be lessened, and be inferior to him that received it; which because they infer impossibilities, like those which are consequent to transubstantiation, St. Paul

3. q. 75. art. 2. ad. 3.

Sent. 4. dist. 11. q. 1.

6

makes no more of it but to say, 'The contrary is manifest,' against the unlimited literal sense of the words. Now for the eviction of this, these two mediums are to be taken. The one, that this doctrine affirms that of the essence, or existence of a thing, which is contrary to the essence or existence of it, and yet that the same thing remains; that is, that the essence remains without the essence, that is, without itself:'-The other, that this doctrine makes a thing to be and not to be, at the same time:' I shall use them both, but promiscuously, because they are reducible to one.

11. The doctrine of transubstantiation is against the nature and essence of a body. Bellarmine seems afraid of this; for immediately before, he goes about to prevaricate about the being of a body in many places at once;' he says, that if the essence of things were evidently and particularly known, then we might know what does, and what does not imply a contradiction; but, id non satis constat,' 'there is no certainty of that;' by that pretended uncertainty making way, as he hopes, to escape from all the pressure of contradictions, that lie upon the prodigious philosophy of this article: but we shall make a shift so far to understand the essence of a body, as to evince this doctrine to be full of contradictions.

12. First; For Christ's body, his natural body is changed into a spiritual body; and it is not now a natural body, but a spiritual; and, therefore, cannot be now in the sacrament after a natural manner, because it is so no where; and, therefore, not there; "It is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body." And, therefore, though this spirituality be not a change of one substance into another, yet it is so a change of the same substance, that it hath lost all those accidents, which were not perfective nor constitutive, but imperfect and separable from the body; and, therefore, in no sense of nature can it be manducated. And here is the first contradiction. The body of Christ is the sacrament. The same body is in heaven. In heaven it cannot be broken naturally; in the sacrament, they say, it is broken naturally and properly; therefore, the same body is and is not, it can and it cannot be broken. To this they answer, that this is

Lib. 3. Euch. c. 2. Sect. ult.

broken under the species of bread; 'not in itself;' Well! is it broken, or is it not broken? let it be broken under what it will, if it be broken, the thing is granted. For if being broken under the species, it be meant that the species be broken alone, and not the body of Christ,-then they take away in one hand, when they reach forth with the other. This being a better argument, 'The species only are broken, the species are not Christ's body, therefore, Christ's body is not broken:' better I say than this, 'The body of Christ is under the species; the species alone are broken; therefore, the body of Christ is broken.' For how can the breaking of species or accidents infer the breaking of Christ's body, unless the accidents be Christ's body, or inseparable from it? or rather, how can the breaking of the accidents infer the breaking of Christ's body, when it cannot be broken? To this I desire a clear and intelligible answer. Add to this, how can species, that is, accidents, be broken, but when a substance is broken? for an accident properly, such as smell, colour, taste, hath of itself no solid and consistent, nor indeed any fluid parts,-nothing whereby it can be broken, and have a part divided from a part; but as the substance, in which the accident is subjected, becomes divided, so do the inherent accidents; but no otherwise and if this cannot be admitted, men cannot know what one another say or mean; they can have no notices of things or regular propositions.

13. Secondly; but I demand, when we speak of a body, what we mean by it? For, in all discourses and intercourses of mankind, by words we must agree concerning each other's meaning: when we speak of a body, of a substance, of an accident, what does mankind agree to mean by these words? All the philosophers, and all the wise men in the world, when they divide a substance from an accident, mean by a substance, that which can subsist in itself, without a subject of inherence.

But an accident is "that, whose very essence is to be in another":' when they speak of a body and separate it from a spirit, they mean that a spirit is that, which hath no

n Aristot. lib. i. posterior c. 6. et lib. ii. c. 10. Metaph. lib. vi. c. 4. Idem significatur per ipsum nomen σvμßß»xò;; quod abit cum substantià, iv dexóμevov, receptum scilicet in subjecto. Accidens quod accidit.

material, divisible parts, physically; that which hath nothing of that which makes a body, that is, extension, limitation by lines, and superficies and material measures. The very first notion and conception of things teaches all men, that what is circumscribed and measured by his proper place, is there and no where else. For if it could be there, and be in another place, it were two, and not one. A finite spirit can be but in one place, but it is there without circumscription; that is, it hath no parts measured by the parts of a place; but is there after another manner than a body, that is, it is in every part of his definition or spiritual location. So it is said, a soul is in the whole body; not that a part of it is in the hand, and a part of it in the eye, but it is whole in the whole, and whole in every part; and it is true that it is so, if it be wholly immaterial because that which is spiritual and immaterial, cannot have material parts. But when we speak of a body, all the world means that, which hath a finite quantity, and is determined to one place. This was the philosophy of all the world, taught in all the schools of the Christians and heathens, even of all mankind, till the doctrine of transubstantiation was to be nursed and maintained, and even after it was born, it could not be forgotten by them, who were bound to keep it. And I appeal to any man of the Roman persuasion, if they can show me any ancient philosopher, Greek, or Roman, or Christian of any nation,-who did not believe it to be essential to the being of a body to be in one place:' and Amphitruo in the old comedy, had reason to be angry with Sosia upon this point.

Tun' id dicere audes? quod nemo unquam homo antehac

Vidit, nec potest fieri, tempore uno,

Homo idem duobus locis ut simul sit°?

And, therefore, to make the body of Christ to be in a thousand places at once, and yet to be but one body,to be in heaven, and to be upon so many altars, to be on the altar in so many round wafers,-is to make a body to be a spirit, and to make a finite to be infinite; for nothing can be so but an infinite Spirit.

14. Neither will it be sufficient to fly here to God's omnipotency for God can indeed make a body to be a spirit;

• Plaut. Amphitr, act. 2. se. 1. 16. Schmieder, p. 40.

but can it consist with the Divine Being, to make an infinite substance? Can there possibly be two categorematical, that is, positive substantial infinites? or can it be that a finite should, remaining finite, yet not be finite, but indefinite and in innumerable places at once?? God can new create the body, and change it into a spirit; but can a body, remaining a body, be at the same time a spirit? or can it be a body, and yet not be in a place? is it not determined so, that remaining in a place it cannot be out of it? If these things could be otherwise, then the same thing, at the same time, could be a body and a spirit,-limited and unlimited,-wholly in a place, and wholly out of it,-finite, and infinite,— a body, and yet no body,- one, and yet many,- the same, and not the same, that is, it should not be itself. Now, although God can change any thing from being the thing it is, to become another thing, yet is it not a contradiction to say, it should be the same it is, and yet not the same? These are the essential, immediate consequents of supposing a body remaining a body, whose essence it is to be finite and determined in one place, can yet, so remaining, be in a thousand places.

Thirdly; The Socinians teach, that our bodies at the resurrection shall be (as they say Christ's body now is) changed substantially. For corruptible and incorruptible, mortal and immortal, natural and spiritual, are substantial differences and now our bodies being natural, corruptible, and mortal, differ substantially from bodies spiritual, immortal, and incorruptible, as they shall be hereafter, and as the body of our Lord now is. Now I am sure, the church of Rome, allows not of this doctrine in these; neither have they reason for it; but do not they admit that' in hypothesi,' which they deny in thesi?' For is it not a perfect change of substance, that a body from finite is changed to be at least potentially infinite, from being determined in one place to be indefinite and indeterminable? To lose all his essential properties must needs infer a substantial change; and that it is of the essence of a body to be in one place, at least an

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ν ὅπερ σώματι παρεῖναι ἀδύνατον, ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὅλον εἶναι καὶ τὸ μέρος ὅπερ τὸ hov imágxv. Plotin. lib. de Anim. apud Euseb. præpar. Evang. lib. 15.

¶ Quomodo erit sol splendore privatus? vel quomodo erit splendor, nisi sol sit à quo defluat? Ignis verò quomodo erit calore carens? vel calor unde manabit, nisi ab igne? Cyril, Alex. lib. i. in 1. c. Joh.

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