Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-Local Relations During the Reform EraCambridge University Press, 13 Kas 1999 - 371 sayfa "Huang argues that China now has a de facto federalist system in which the central government specializes in political responsibilities and the local governments specialize in economic responsibilities. This, he suggests, has a number of important normative implications. Under the condition of political authoritarianism, this combination of economic and fiscal decentralizations with political centralization may be an optimal governance structure. Economically, a degree of political centralization is useful to alleviate coordination problems when economic agents lack financial self-discipline and when indirect macroeconomic policies are ineffective. Premature political decentralization in the presence of soft-budget constraints may have contributed to runaway inflation in other reforming centrally planned economies. Politically, the Chinese style of federalism can also be optimal because fiscal decentralization helps check the enormous political discretion in the hands of the central government, on which the Chinese political system itself places no formal constraints. Given China's recent history, this ought to be an important consideration in designing China's economic system."--BOOK JACKET. |
İçindekiler
IV | 1 |
V | 4 |
VI | 8 |
VII | 10 |
VIII | 20 |
IX | 22 |
X | 25 |
XI | 27 |
XXXIII | 174 |
XXXIV | 177 |
XXXV | 179 |
XXXVI | 180 |
XXXVII | 186 |
XXXVIII | 206 |
XXXIX | 208 |
XL | 212 |
XII | 28 |
XIII | 32 |
XIV | 56 |
XV | 58 |
XVI | 63 |
XIX | 67 |
XX | 73 |
XXI | 85 |
XXII | 89 |
XXIII | 90 |
XXIV | 96 |
XXV | 107 |
XXVI | 119 |
XXVII | 122 |
XXVIII | 125 |
XXIX | 127 |
XXXI | 151 |
XXXII | 158 |
XLI | 214 |
XLII | 228 |
XLIII | 233 |
XLIV | 257 |
XLV | 258 |
XLVI | 265 |
XLVII | 267 |
XLVIII | 276 |
XLIX | 294 |
L | 297 |
LI | 305 |
LIII | 315 |
LIV | 317 |
331 | |
359 | |
363 | |
Diğer baskılar - Tümünü görüntüle
Sık kullanılan terimler ve kelime öbekleri
administrative allocation appointment approval austerity period austerity policy Beijing BINT bureaucratic integration bureaucratic variables cadres Center central government central investment central ministries central policy Chen Yun China Chinese political constraints costs CPEs Cultural Revolution decentralization Deng Xiaoping economic reforms effect enterprises example financing fiscal fixed-asset investment Gaige Gongzuo growth rates Guangdong Guanli Guanyu Guimo Heilongjiang Henan hypothesis incentive increase inflation inflationary institutions investment activities investment behavior investment control investment demand investment expansion investment growth investment projects investment reduction Jiangsu Jingji leaders leadership Li Peng localities macroeconomic macroeconomic policy measures ment million yuan monitoring moral hazard nomenklatura nomic Party secretaries percent personnel policy makers Politburo positions production provinces provincial officials reduce Renmin renovation investments Renshi revenue secondary officials sectors Soviet stability targets tenure Tianjin tion Touzi Wenjian Xuanbian World Bank Xuanbian Selections Yao Yilin Zhao Ziyang Zhongyang
Bu kitaba yapılan referanslar
Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform Jean C. Oi Sınırlı önizleme - 1999 |
Powering China: Reforming the Electric Power Industry in China Yi-Chong Xu Metin Parçacığı görünümü - 2002 |