So Athanasius says: "We speak of one hypostasis, -deeming hypostasis and ovora, substance, the same.”† The opposition to hypostasis, in such a sense, was generally in the Latin churches, because they translated both vooraris and ovora substantia, substance; and they refused to say that there were three substances in the Godhead. How far Origen, and others of his school, were implicated in the condemnation passed by them upon such a use of hypostasis, does not certainly appear. Origen maintains three hypostases; but, that he asserts them in such a sense as to exclude numerical unity of essence and attributes in the Godhead, I have not seen satisfactorily evinced. After the Sabellian opinions were propagated in the Church, many of the Greek fathers maintained, in opposition to them, that there were three hypostases in the Godhead. Contentions soon arose about this phraseology, because it was deemed by some to imply too much. These contentions were in some measure composed, however, by the Synod of Alexandria, (a.D. 362,) at which Athanasius was present, who decided that "any one was at liberty to aver that there was but one hypostasis in the Godhead, provided the threefold distinction therein was preserved, or to maintain three hypostases, provided that only one substance was meant."+ About this time, in order to avoid the ambiguity of hypostasis, the Greeks began to substitute pоowπOV, person, in imitation of the Latin persona, which was used in the Western churches. The classical use of * Epist. ad Antioch, + Hardouin, tom. i. 734. both the Greek and Latin word is indeed quite different from the ecclesiastical one. But προσωπον and persona evidently assumed a technical use in the churches. After the Synod of Alexandria, the Greek Church used both ὑποστασις and προσωπον in the same sense-as did the Latins persona and hypostasis-in respect to the subject in question. It remains now, after having given this sketch of the history of ὑποστασις and προσωπον in the Greek Church, and persona and hypostasis in the Latin, to show that a distinction in the Godhead was designated by them, which was deemed consistent with numerical unity of substance and attributes, and was not intended to designate person in such a sense as admitted only specific unity. It will of course be seen that this question does not regard the use of vroσraσis in the classic sense of substance or essence-a sense which some of the fathers gave to it when they affirmed that there could be but one hypostasis in the Godhead; but the use of hypostasis to designate person or distinction in the Godhead. In a word, when the Greek fathers use hypostasis, or προσωπον, for a distinction in the Godhead, or the Latins persona or hypostasis in the same way, do they use them so that we must fairly understand them as admitting a numerical unity of essence or attributes, or only a specific unity of the Godhead? That a uniformity among the fathers, in the use of these terms, existed without exception, and that no inconsistency or inaccuracy in respect to the use of them can be found, is more than any one would undertake to prove, who knows how loosely many of the fathers have written, and how little the study of accuracy, in the use of language, prevailed among them. Making only proper allowances for this, (allowances which must be made for modern as well as ancient times,) I think it can be shown that the view which I have given, in the paragraph of my Letters that occasioned this discussion, is substantially correct. Tertullian, the earliest father who presents us with the terms Person and Trinity,* in the passage quoted hereafter in these Letters more at length,† seems plainly to use the word person in the sense which I have attached to it. His antagonist Praxeas denied that there was any distinction in the Godhead, or any except a verbal one. "This perversity (i. e. of Praxeas) thinks itself," says Tertullian, "to be in possession of pure truth, while it supposes that we are to believe in one God, not otherwise than if we make the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost the self-same,—as if all were not one, —while all are of one, viz. by a unity of substance." Farther on he says, "I call him (the Logos) a person, and pay him reverence." And again, "We are baptized into the persons (of the Godhead) severally, by the use of their several names." The key to this language is plainly to be found in the opinions of Praxeas, which denied any distinction in the Godhead. Tertullian means to assert it; to do which, he uses the word person and persons, while he expressly acknowledges a unity of substance. That this unity is numerical, and not specific, seems to me to be plainly indicated by the manner in which he expresses himself, -which is equivalent to saying, "About the unity of the Godhead as to substance, we do not dispute with * Lib. advers. Prax. c. 2. + See page 31. Praxeas-we only maintain that there is a distinction, which we call person, not inconsistent with such a unity." In regard to Origen, it has generally been thought that he maintained nothing more than a specific unity in the Godhead, while it is beyond a doubt that he asserts the existence of three hypostases.* To ascertain in every case the exact meaning of words, in a writer who uses them so carelessly (sometimes, to appearance, inconsistently) as Origen does, would be a task difficult indeed to be performed. That he believed in the doctrine of the eternal generation and divinity of the Son, can scarcely be doubted, when the various assertions which he has made on this subject are compared together. That the three hypostases which he predicates of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, do not imply persons in the sense of the word which is now common, may be inferred probably from what he says of the indivisibility of the divine nature. God," he says, "is altogether incorruptible, and simple, and composite, not divisible." Again: "The only-begotten, God our Saviour, the only-begotten of the Father, is Son by nature, not by adoption. He is born of the mind of the Father, as the will of the mind. For the divine nature is not divisible, i.e. of the unbegotten Father, that we should think the Son is begotten by any division or diminution of his substance."§ While Origen, therefore, maintains the doctrine of three hypostases, or persons, he does it in such a sense as consists with the indivisibility, i.e. the numerical * See Com. in Johan. p. 24. † See Bulli Op. pp. 105, &c. Lib. iv. cont. Cels. p. 169. § Lib. ii. in Johan. as cited by Pamphilius in Apolog. unity of the Godhead. But to explain, or to justify all his speculations about the generation of the Son, is what I shall by no means attempt. Cyprian, cotemporary with Origen, has little in his writings which concerns the present question. In his letter to Jubianus, however, after mentioning the Father, Christ, and the Holy Spirit, he says, "These three are one;" and he afterwards speaks of Christ's "commanding to baptize into the full and one (adunata) Trinity." Lactantius (about A. D. 300,) speaking of the Father and Son, says, "To each belongs one mind, one spirit, one substance." The testimonies of the Antenicene fathers to the eternity of the Son, may be seen in the works of Bishop Bull, above referred to: but as they have not a determinate bearing upon the point in question, I pass them over. Omitting the minor fathers, let us come to the Nicene Creed, the collected sense of the great body of the Church at the beginning of the fourth century. This declares the Son to be oμoovoios, consubstantial, with the Father. Does this exclude or imply numerical unity of substance? The meaning of the word ouoovσios must be here investigated. Originally it was applied to things which belong to the same species, or have the same nature. Thus Aristotle calls the stars oμoovoia, consubstantial; and Chrysostom† says that Eve was consubstantial, oμoovolos, with Adam. So the Pseudo Justin, in opposing some of Aristotle's doctrines, says, "In respect to a rational nature, angels and demons are consubstantial." Lib. iv. c. 49. Hom. xvi. in Gen. |