not at all embarrassed by these questions. We do not maintain that the Godhead is three in the same respects that it is one, but the reverse. In regard to X, we maintain its numerical unity: in regard to Y, we maintain a threefold distinction. I repeat it: We maintain simply the fact, that there is such a distinction on Scripture authority. We do not profess to understand in what it consists.

Will you not concede now, provided the statements made above are correct, that we are not very unreasonable, when we complain, that, from the time in which Tertullian maintained the doctrine of the Trinity against Praxeas, down to the present period, the views and statements of Trinitarians, in regard to this subject, should have been so frequently misunderstood or misrepresented?

I have dwelt sufficiently on my statement of the doctrine of the Trinity, and of the difficulties that lie in the way of proving this statement to be erroneous or contradictory. Before I proceed to the next topic, I will merely mention, in a brief way, two of the most formidable objections to our views which I have seen, and which were adduced by two men, who must be reckoned among the most intelligent that have embraced the cause of Unitarianism. The first is from Faustus Socinus, and runs thus:

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'No one is so stupid as not to see that these things are contradictory that our God, the creator of heaven and earth, should be one only in number, and yet be three, each of which is our God. For as to what they affirm that our God is one in number, in respect to his essence, but threefold in regard to persons; here again they affirm things

which are self-contradictory, since two or three persons cannot exist, where there is numerically only one individual essence; for, to constitute more than one person, more than one individual essence is required. For what is person, but a certain individual intelligent essence? Or in what way, I pray, does one person differ from another, unless by the diversity of his individual or numerical essence? This implies, that the divine essence is numerically one only, yet that there is more than one person; although the divine essence, which is numerically one, and divine person are altogether identical." (Opp. tom. i. p. 697.)

Here, however, it is obvious that the whole weight of the objection lies in an erroneous use of the words person and essence. Socinus attaches

to them a sense which Trinitarians do not admit. How then can Trinitarians be charged with inconsistencies, in propositions which they do not make?

Of the same tenour with the objection of Socinus, is the objection mentioned by the famous Toellner,* which, to save room, I shall merely translate, without subjoining the original. ·

"The most considerable objection (against the doctrine of the Trinity,) is this," says he, "that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are each a particular substance endowed with understanding; and, at the same time, neither of them is said to have his separate being, his separate understanding, his separate will, his separate power of action; but all three together have only one being, one understanding, one will, one power of action. As it appears, then, it is affirmed that there are three real beings, truly separate; each consequently having his own individual power of action, and not having it; three separate persons, and three persons not separate."

All the difficulty which this masterly writer has, in his usual way, so strikingly portrayed, lies merely in the representations of those Trinitarians,

* Theolog. Untersuchungen, b. 1. p. 29.

who have expressed themselves on this subject so incautiously, as to be understood to affirm that there are three separate beings (persons in the common sense of the word,) in the Godhead, with distinct powers, volitions, &c. If there be any now who defend such a statement of this subject, I must leave them to compose the difficulty with Toellner as they can. The view of the doctrine of the Trinity given by Toellner, in his statement of the objection, is not that which I have presented, or which I should ever undertake to defend. Of course it cannot be adduced as an objection against the statement which I have given, and have undertaken to defend.

The second objection appears, at first sight, more formidable and perplexing. It comes from Taylor, and was inserted in the English Theological Magazine, Vol. I. No. 4, p. 111. 1770. I have not opportunity of access to the original, and take the ideas from a Latin translation of the piece, which was published in Germany.

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There can," says Taylor, "be no real distinction between the Father and the Son, unless they so differ from each other, that what is peculiar to the Father, is wanting in the Son; and what is peculiar to the Son, is wanting in the Father. Now, that property which belongs exclusively to the Father, or the Son, must be numbered among the perfections of God; for in the divine nature no imperfections can exist. It follows then, that some perfection is lacking both in the Father and in the Son, so that neither is endowed with infinite perfection, which is essential to the divine nature. It must be conceded then, that the essence of the Father and the Son is not one and the same."

Ingenious and specious as this is, still I am unable to see that it settles the point in debate. The essence and attributes of God, so far as they are known to us, are numerically one, as we have already admitted. If by "perfection," Taylor means all which belongs to the Godhead, then I answer merely by saying, it is essential to the perfection of the Godhead, that the distinction between the Father and Son should exist; for that otherwise there would be imperfection. My right to make such a statement, is just the same as his to make the assertion, that the distinction between Father and Son involved an imperfection in each. The very distinction between the Father and Son is essential to complete divinity; and, did not these exist, something would be wanting to complete the perfection of the Godhead. I acknowledge this is assumption; but so is Taylor's statement; and an argument which is built on assumption, may surely be opposed by another argument which has the same foundation.

My object in the present Letter has been, thus far, to compare our views of the Trinity with those which you have ascribed to us; to show that we are not exposed, on account of our belief, to be justly charged with gross and palpable absurdity, or with "subverting the unity of the Godhead;" and to prove that the question, after all, whether there is a distinction in the Godhead, must be referred solely to the decision of the Scriptures.

To them I shall appeal, as soon as I have made

a few remarks on the twofold nature which we

ascribe to Christ. You say (p. 11.)

“We (Unitarians) believe in the unity of Jesus Christ. We believe that Jesus is one mind, one soul, one being, as truly one as we are, and equally distinct from the one God. We complain of the doctrine of the Trinity, that, not satisfied with making God three beings, it makes Jesus Christ two beings, and thus introduces infinite confusion into our conceptions of his character. This corruption of Christianity, alike repugnant to common sense, and to the general strain of Scripture, is a remarkable proof of the power of a false philosophy in disfiguring the simple truth of Jesus."

You will admit that this is expressed in terms of severity. Whether we are really deserving of it, who hold the doctrine in question, every lover of truth will permit to be brought to the test of fair examination.

I am not certain that I have rightly apprehended your meaning, when you say that the twofold nature of Christ is "" repugnant to common sense.” Do you mean that common sense may determine first, independently of revelation, that the doctrine cannot be true; and then maintain the impossibility that revelation should exhibit it? If so, then we are able to decide, à priori, what can be revealed, and what cannot; consequently, what we may believe, and what we must disbelieve. It follows, then, that a revelation is unnecessary, or rather that it is impossible,- at least one which shall be obligatory upon our belief; for we have only to say, that our common sense decides against the propriety or the possibility of the