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now proposed to transfer to his new deputy, though the Master of the Rolls does not exercise them. Motions may, indeed, be made at the Rolis, but at no period of the history of the court have many been made there; the Master of the Rolls has not, like the Lord Chancellor, days regularly appointed for the sole hearing of them, a few motions of course are all that, according to the practice which now prevails, ever come before him, and these are. made only during term, and just when, after having disposed of the appointed business of the day, the court is about to rise. The Master of the Rolls, therefore, will be trusted with the decision of important questions only when. they are presented to him upon the solemn hearing of the cause, after an examination upon interrogatories, and what passes in the Court of Chancery by the name of a cross examination of witnesses, while the same questions will in a summary way, upon affidavits, be disposed of by the Vice Chancellor, his inferior in rank, and therefore it is to be presumed his inferior in learning and in talents.

The consequence of this will probably be to introduce another novelty, and a most important one, in the Court of Chancery-appeals upon motions. As the Lord Chancellor has hitherto always heard all important motions himself, such an appeal has, it is believed, never yet been known; but there can be no doubt that it will be perfectly competent to every suitor who thinks himself aggrieved by the decision of a motion against him, to appeal to the Lord Chancellor. An appeal now lies from the orders of the Lord Chancellor on motion to the House of Lords, and unquestionably a similar appeal would lie from the Vice Chancellor to the Chancellor. To what an extent these appeals will be carried, no man can foresee, but it may happen that these, together with the rest of the appeals from the decisions of the two subordinate judges, between

whom all the ordinary business of the court is to be distri buted, may be so numerous, that the disposing of them may demand from the Lord Chancellor as large a portion of time as he now devotes altogether to the business of the court. That he will then have as much to do in the court as he has now, cannot be represented, but that he will then have as much to do there, as he is now enabled to do, is by no means improbable, and it will surely be admitted, that if that should be the case, the expedient will have wholly failed of its object.

It will not merely have failed, it will have been productive of the greatest evil, that of greatly enhancing the expense of suits, already grievously and oppressively high, of multiplying the business of the court, and of protracting the final decision of causes.

It has been already observed that appeals from the decrees of the Master of the Rolls to the Lord Chancellor were, till lately, very few in number, and that in Lord Hardwicke's time they were much fewer. A plaintiff has a right to set down his cause where he pleases, and till of late years it was never usual to set down cases of much difficulty or importance at the Rolls. Such causes were, on account of the probability that the party against whom the decree was pronounced would appeal, and to avoid the expense of a second hearing, generally set down in the first instance before the Lord Chancellor, there being from his Lordship's decree only an appeal to the House of Lords, while from the decree of the Master of the Rolls, there lies an intermediate appeal to the Lord Chancellor. Among the Reports in the time of Lord Macclesfield, Lord Talbot, and Lord Hardwicke, few decisions of Masters of the Rolls are to be found, with the exception of those of Sir Joseph Jekyl, all the great doctrines of the court having been settled by the successive Chancellors and upon original

decisions. Of late, however, this has been considerably altered, and in a great degree from the difficulty of obtaining any decision from the Lord Chancellor.

Not only has the number of causes set down before the present Master of the Rolls, very greatly increased, but they are, for the most part, causes very different in their nature, and of much greater difficulty and importance, than those which were used to be set down before him. If the plan of appointing an additional judge should be adopted, it will not be in the power of the parties to prevent these intermediate appeals, and no doubt can be entertained that such appeals will become more numerous, as long as a high opinion shall be entertained of the person who is appointed to the office of Lord Chancellor. If ever indeed a time should arrive when the learning and talents of the persons appointed to the two subordinate judicial offices in Chancery, or indeed of either of them, shall be more highly estimated by the public than those of the person who is selected for the high office of Lord Chancellor, and that this opinion should even be entertained and acknowledged by the Chancellor himself, so that he shall come to sit in his court of appeal only to acknowledge the superiority of the Judge who is appealed from; whenever this shall happen, there will perhaps be few appeals, and the expence and delay of such proceedings will be avoided, but the evil will be of another character and of a much greater magnitude.

The alteration proposed may be described in a few words, but it should seem with great accuracy to be a division of the Chancery into two courts, and the creation of an intermediate court of appeal between the Chancery and the House of Lords.

It may seem extraordinary, that in the preceding obser vations, the functions of the intended Vice Chancellor should have been spoken of as doubtful, when a bill has

been actually brought into Parliament for the appointment of such a Judge: but the truth is, that the bill leaves it altogether uncertain what his functions are to be. It should seem, that they will be whatever the Lord Chancellor for the time being shall think proper. He is to hear what business the Lord Chancellor shall appoint, and at such times and in such places as his Lordship shall appoint. He is not even to have the discretion in this respect, which a man acting under a general power of attorney is allowed to exercise. Like an inferior artisan employed by some master manufacturer, he is to do just such work as his employer shall direct, and just when and where he shall be pleased to direct. The dignity of the judicial character will surely be but ill consulted in these uncertain and novel duties which are to be imposed on this subordinate Judge.