arrangement that an account of every grant out of this fund should, as a matter of course, and without address, be laid before the House in every session, immediately after such grant. So that the only distinction remaining between him and the honourable and learned gentleman, would be whether the grant should be discussed in the House in the first instance, and be conferred in consequence of a parliamentary vote; or whether it should first proceed from the Crown, and then be submitted to the cognizance of Parliament. He did not mean to say that this distinction was a trifling one, or one that did not deserve the most serious examination. All he meant to say was, that the Ministers of the Crown were not prepared to propose that a long and almost immemorial usage should be abolished without the most striking proof that such usage, though co-existent with the practice, was incompatible with the spirit of the Constitution. He came now to another part of the honourable and learned gentleman's speech, a part in which the honourable and learned gentleman must himself acknowledge, on mature reflection, he could not have spoken his genuine sentiments when he proposed the change which he did propose in the revenues of the Crown. The honourable and learned gentleman had admitted that there was no remarkable abuse in the application of the funds in question, and that many of the pensions would have been readily granted by Parliament. To Lord St. Vincent, Lord Nelson, the Duke of Wellington, Parliament would have granted pensions without any hesitation, according to the honourable and learned gentleman; but it would not be so with pensions for political services, if submitted to parliamentary investigation.

"The honourable and learned gentleman states truly (said Mr. Canning) what he says of those on this side of the House, and what I would say were I where he sits; but I

think it better that the patronage of the Crown should reward public services by property under its peculiar protection, than that a democratic assembly should dole out largesses and favours according to the impulse and force of passion, party, or canvass. We have had instances enough in our own memory of what party canvass can do. Setting on the one side the chances of favour, canvass, party, and inadvertency, on the other, the chances of extravagance, I do think the Crown the better trustec. I complain, therefore, of this part of the speech, because the honourable and learned gentleman is too well read in the principles and practices of popular assemblies to be ignorant of the change that would take place to the prejudice of the people and of public men, if he were taken at his word, and if this task of giving pensions for political services were abandoned by the Crown, and should fall into the management of this House: I complain that, for the sake of a rhetorical flourish, he had used such an argument, independently of the change which must attend its success. If the present state of the Droits in consideration is sanctioned by long usage, if it is not stained by abuse, and in the long period of sixty years the honourable and learned gentleman has hit upon only one questionable case, and that case questionable only in the view which he has taken of it; and I confess that I am not sufficiently 'acquainted with its circumstances to go into details; but when that pension was given it was discussed, and this House gave its opinion upon it: if in sixty years only one suspicious case can be found, then, in addition to usage, there is the recommendation of experience and practice not to depart from the course hitherto pursued.

"I come now to the more general argument, which I have already alluded to; it is, that in aggravation of funds being at the disposal of the Crown without previous sanction from Parliament, that for obtaining those funds, and for pecu

niary purposes, the Crown is likely to conduct the country to war wantonly and lightly. I entreat of the honourable and learned gentleman not to concede any thing to the moral character of the Administration-I entreat of him not to concede any thing to the character of the existing Sovereign-and in a constitutional view, nothing of this kind ought to be conceded. The honourable and learned gentleman spoke properly of Charles II., for a king once departed from life is fair subject of animadversion. But I ask, whether, on the average virtue of kings and ministers, if you place four millions and that is beyond any case that can be imagined-if you place four millions against all the evil, the danger, and the disgrace that must overwhelm them when the proceeding, perhaps in twelve hours after, becomes known to Parliament-I ask, whether, in such a case, any Administration would rush into war? I ask, whether, in times such as we live in, for the sake of any haul of Droits of Admiralty; I do not say the SovereignI do not say his Ministers; but whether the vilest mind that ever meddled with public affairs, or contemplated public administration, could recommend a wanton and unjustifiable war?

"So far as to the motive supplied by the Droits for going to war. Against this we can set on the other side the salutary practice of the Crown. During the long period of the last reign, only £9,000,000 have been accumulated. If we were to enter into the causes of war, we should find, not in one, in two, in three, but in many-in all cases, the arrangement which the honourable and learned gentleman opposes, and of which he wishes the contrary to be adopted, has tended to save the country from war. If the Droits were not committed to the Crown through the proper courts of law, but were submitted to Parliamentary controul, the difficulties of amicable adjudication would be increased

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tenfold. The desire to hold the balance equal—and, if wrong was done on one side or the other, to make amicable reparation-would be counteracted by national heat, high and romantic honour, and other feelings, which would naturally prevail in an assembly like this. It would be impossible to avoid war. For the very purpose, therefore, of avoiding rash and unnecessary war, it is necessary to exclude such questions from the knowledge that is, from the official knowledge of Parliament, till every claim has been heard, and a final adjudication made.

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If any private wrong should have been committed, if any inadvertent measure should have been adopted, not only the difficulty, but the inconvenience of retracing the first step, or of persevering in the course once hastily taken, would be increased by the change. If it were necessary to come down at once to Parliament, and state that so many ships had been captured, and were at the control of Parliament, the question would arise, was the capture just or unjust. If it should be judged unjust, the Administration would be condemned; but what has this to do in repairing the wrongs of a nation? If it were thought just, war must be entered into, although policy might dissuade strongly from war. No reason, then, can be found in the usage, in any constitutional defect, or in the application of the Droits for the change proposed. Every reason and every argument, arising from the first nucleus of their formation to the expenditure of the last farthing, distinctly shows that we should be wrong in changing the control of the Droits in question. In the hands of the Crown, then, they are best placed, to be exercised as every prerogative of the Crown ought to be for the benefit of the people for whom the royal prerogatives exist. The only other argument for departing from usage on this subject is, that the whole department of the monarchy may be recast, and for the sake

of doing away with every vestige of feudal monarchy. That we could erect something new that would merit great praise, I am not prepared to deny. The new fabric might be clean and neat as the American Government, and intelligible as the presidency of the United States. But I am unwilling that every trace of antiquity should be done away in the British Constitution. Nothing is so easy as to frame a system that will look neater on paper-a system that, by stripping the King of all exclusive and princely ornaments, would render the Monarch and his Ministers, in dignity and form, what they are in reality, but in a more suitable and efficient character-the mere functionaries of the people. There is but one step further to complete the improvement; it is, as the King is paid a fixed and calculated salary, that Ministers he removed in form as they are in substance, as well as new Ministers appointed by this House. The Monarch would then be separated from all the darkness of ancient times; but I do not think that the admirers of Paine's plans would be satisfied with all this. I admit that the honourable and learned gentleman would be satisfied with seeing the Monarch thus stripped naked, but they would say that his salary was still too large."

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He (Mr. Canning) did not think that they would be satisfied without removing all the lines of circumvallation, which, thank God, the arm of a traitor must pierce before the Constitution of this country would remove. honourable and learned gentleman had amused the House by reading on the 7th head of the civil list many ludicrous charges. Much as he admired the talents of the honourable and learned gentleman, he thought they were here misapplied, for he answered all the observations of this sort when he admitted, at the conclusion of his speech, that he had not made up his mind whether the insulated King should have the control of his own household; whether the