Sayfadaki görseller
PDF
ePub

You are undoubtedly impatient in the expectation of something. (Cries of "Yes! Yes!") I promised you last year that we would have a fine opportunity and I have kept my word. Will you believe me if I tell you that your impatience will be appeased some day? (Yes! Yes!)

Before I say one word about this sentiment, which is also mine, it is necessary that you become disciplined to the very limit in your daily work. The great hour does not strike every moment, and not on all clocks. The wheel of destiny turns; wise is the man who watches and knows the moment to grasp it as it passes by.

It is necessary that our divine and adorable Fascist Italy be vigilant and firm in the work of peace, and that she adapt herself to the needs of work and become systematic, tenacious and persevering.

I want to correct Italians of some of their traditional faults-their ready optimism and the negligence which often follows excessive diligence, their letting go after the first, in the belief that all has been accomplished despite the fact that much that should be accomplished has not even been begun.

If Fascism succeeds in thus forging the Italian character you may rest calm and certain that when the wheel of destiny turns we shall be ready to seize it, and turn it by our will. (Acclamations.)

Comrades, in the shadow of our flags which were blest here by a priest of the religion of our fathers, in which we believe, it is beautiful to live, but it will be still more beautiful, if it is necessary, to die.

Read in cold, lead, Anglo-Saxon linotype, this seems silly, but spoken with fervid eloquence in a Latin tongue, its effect upon the hand-picked Deputies surpassed the orator's anticipation. Nor did the abrupt transition from maritime exploits to more feasible conquests by land lack a certain cunning. Again the various countries within range of his vision are on edge to discover the direction likely to be indicated by the "iron hand" to an army of five hundred thousand soldiers backed by three millions of organized reserves.

Turkey, Greece, the Balkan States, Germany, Austria-all still remain within Il Duce's orbit, all are suspicious, and all are shivering to greater or less degree; even M. Briand's conciliatory phrases hardly concealed a lurking uneasiness, and England herself, in the midst of unprecedented domestic difficulties, frankly reveals grave concern over an added obstacle to the resumption of that peace abroad which has become essential to her very existence as a factor in the business of the world.

But the real danger no longer lies in Mussolini's verbal

truculence; his threats, indeed, show signs of becoming stale and ineffectual; it is another kind of apprehension that now hovers over the capitals of Europe. Thoughtful statesmen profited by the breathing spell afforded by Il Duce's futile tour abroad to note that, so far, actual application of his policy of blood and iron has been restricted to helpless little Greece, and that his diplomatic intercourse with the larger Powers has conformed strictly to recognized proprieties.

Much relief, as M. Briand with obvious thankfulness announced to the Chamber of Deputies, was derived from this reflection, as indicating that his sphere of prospective exploitation was perceptibly narrowing. English public journals promptly and happily deduced that he could not contemplate Italian expansion" to the north; nor in Africa "to the west at the expense of France or to the east at the expense of Britain"; nor in South America, in defiance of the Monroe Doctrine.

66

There is left only Asia Minor, perhaps Smyrna and its hinterland, and “that probably", divines The New Statesman, "is where he will have his war." For a war he must have; that is admitted. "All history shows that dictators must have wars or the people will tire of them,"-one rule to which even Napoleon bowed and which Il Duce himself plainly recognized when he faced his followers and promised to heed their "impatience" for action.

Here, then, seems to be the crux of the Italian situation: To retain his position as Dictator, even to save his own neck, Mussolini, willing or not, ready or not, must lead his Black Shirts to battle somewhere for conquest of the land which he has promised for excessive population, now denied admission to the United States, and for the remaking of the "Empire" of the Cæsars which he has flaunted so alluringly before their fiery eyes.

How soon? is the vital question, and the only one concerning Italy now being considered in the Chancelleries of Europe or probably in our own alert and watchful Department of State.

Meanwhile the attitude of Il Duce's representatives at the Preparatory Conference on Disarmament now convening in Geneva will be observed and studied with peculiar interest. Not that the outcome of that assemblage of secondary officials is expected to prove particularly salutary or even generally sug

gestive. To the twenty odd minor nations it appeals strongly as likely to afford an opportunity to emphasize their “equality” and exploit their "views". By the major Powers it seems already to be regarded as a bore at a time when domestic difficulties are paramount and as somewhat of a nuisance requiring constant and vigilant watchfulness.

Indeed, but for the fact that President Coolidge, justly annoyed by the postponement from February, finally acquiesced, it is more than likely that the date would have been changed to September or October without a session. The possible nonattendance by the United States as a consequence of the exhaustion of the President's exemplary patience is almost certainly responsible for keeping to the time fixed. "Anything to get America in" continues to be the actuating motive of Europe. The fully anticipated lack of tangible results is already being attributed to the refusal of Russia to participate. But the Powers themselves gave the Soviet Government its excuse for declination when it designated Geneva as the meeting place, and it is incredible that they were not aware that representation of Russia on Swiss soil could not be expected so long as the Swiss Government persisted in its refusal to express even traditional "regrets" at the assassination of Varovski. While hesitating to accept, we cannot ignore, the "conclusion" of the Soviet Government "that it is not sincerely desired that we participate in the Disarmament Conference and that the Conference itself, to the great regret of all those who really desire disarmament, will remain without effect." Russia probably would not have participated in any case, but the deliberate presentation to her of so plausible a pretext, if not due to the reason assigned by Ambassador Rakovski, can be attributed only to stupidity such as is seldom remarked of Foreign Offices of Europe taught to realize that a blunder is worse than a crime. In view of the common admission, therefore, that the adjoining States, notably Poland backed by France, cannot be reasonably expected to reduce their forces while the Red Army hovers menacingly over them, it is probable that the astute Mussolini's representatives will sit tight at Geneva, without being compelled either to affirm or to deny his asseveration that Force alone can or should control the world.

THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

BY WILLIAM HOWARD GARDINER

I

We have been told that the Government of the United States believes in disarmament because, it is alleged, the reduction of armaments is imperative if taxes are to be lightened, and because so-called competitive armaments promote war. Are these comprehensively reasoned decisions, or are they instances of an American tendency to think in terms of words and slogans rather than of knowledge and understanding? A very few figures will give proper perspective to costs; and then we can consider whether armaments necessarily produce wars or prevent them, and some of the problems confronting the Preparatory Commission on the Reduction of Armaments that is scheduled to meet at Geneva as these lines are being written.

It is undoubtedly staggering that last year the United States, the British Empire, the Japanese Empire, France and Italy spent a sum equivalent to nearly two billion dollars for armaments. But if it assured their security, the cost was relatively cheap; for it averaged only $2.86 a thousand on their total national wealth, which approaches seven hundred billion dollars. It is unfortunate for the other Powers that their average cost was nearly $4 a thousand whereas the cost of armaments to the United States was considerably less than $2—while the average cost of fire insurance with us is said to be over $9 a thousand. But further figures show more clearly how much of a burden armaments

are to us.

In 1924 the cost of the United States Army and Navy was $646,000,000, although in 1903 it had been only $228,000,000. But according to a recent publication by the National Industrial Conference Board, in 1903 the total expenditures of our Federal, State and local governments amounted to $1,570,000,000, or 7.7

per cent. of our then national income, while by 1924 our cost of government had increased to $10,252,000,000 and was taking 16.1 per cent. of our national income. This means, in terms of present day money, that while our disbursements for arms rose from $4 to nearly $6 per capita-largely because of more expensive mechanical equipment—we allowed our other governmental expenditures to multiply more than threefold, from about $24 to almost $86 a head, an increase of nearly $62.

It is noteworthy that the relative cost of our martial establishment has dropped from 14.5 per cent. of our governmental outlay in 1903 to only 6.3 per cent. of what we spent in 1924 for government. But it is far more interesting to find that the net increase for civilian purposes is almost $62 per capita-and that this net increase for civilian government alone is over ten times as great as our total current costs for armaments. Government expenditures that amount to $92 per capita and take 16 per cent. of our income may well be considered onerous. But common sense suggests reducing materially the excess $62 we lavish on civilian government before we worry over much about the reduction of such part of $6 as we spend on national defense.

II

The question as to whether so-called competitive armaments cause wars or prevent them raises the entire subject of the rôle that force has played in the evolution of civilization; for as President Coolidge said in his Inaugural Address:

If we wish to erect new structures, we must have a definite knowledge of the old foundations. We must realize that human nature is about the most constant thing in the universe and that the essentials of human relationship do not change. We must frequently take our bearings from these fixed stars of our political firmament if we expect to hold a true course.

On turning back to the earlier pages of history we see small nuclei of men of some intelligence surrounded by hordes of lower barbarians. Unarmed, these progenitors of civilization inevitably would have been overwhelmed by the weight of numbers. Each glimmer of intellectual progress would have been extinguished as soon as its material concomitants had attracted contemporary cupidity. But, from the start, greater intelligence in

« ÖncekiDevam »