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the Removal of the Restrictions upon European Trade", commonly called the Bankers' Manifesto, but actually signed not only by many leading bankers in all the great commercial countries of the world, but also by many merchants and manufacturers. "There can be no recovery in Europe," it says, "till politicians in all territories, old and new, realize that trade is not war but a process of exchange, that in time of peace our neighbors are our customers, and that their prosperity is a condition of our own well-being."

So far, the manifesto has not had a very "good press," for the European press is largely dominated by politicians, against whose prejudices the manifesto declares war. But it will have enormous effect on the side of sanity.

CLOUDS IN THE FRANCO-AMERICAN SKY

BY STÉPHANE LAUZANNE

Editor-in-Chief of Le Matin, Paris

WHY deny it or try to conceal it? There is a cloud in the Franco-American sky, a big, dark, unpleasant cloud. It is better to see it as it is. It is always better to see the clouds when they appear on the horizon. It does not help to turn the eyes away, or lower the head, or keep a stereotyped smile on the lips. The only thing to do is to look at it sternly, coldly, and let it pass by.

Many causes bring clouds. But, as far as the Franco-American cloud is concerned, there is only one cause for it, at least if it is observed from a French meteorological office: the settlement of the debt. Nineteen Frenchmen in twenty are against the settlement of the debt as it was agreed upon in Washington, between the American War Debt Commission and Ambassador Bérenger. Until now all the efforts, all the arguments, all the power of persuasion of the Frenchman who is for the ratification have failed to convince the nineteen Frenchmen who are against it. Will there be a change? Nobody knows, nobody can tell. Practically all the élite is for the ratification. The élite includes the Government (any Government for governmental reasons will be in favor of ratification), the bankers (the French experts have unanimously recommended the ratification in their July report), the economists, and a few responsible public men. But the crowd, the immense crowd, led by the ex-combatants and by irresponsible politicians, is against the ratification. All the newspapers— except the one to which I have the honor to belong-are against. And the further we go, the more the feeling against ratification increases and crystallizes. However deplorable it may be, one must pay attention to it; one must always take heed of a cloud in the sky.

I will try to explain this sentiment, as one endeavors to explain the causes of a storm. But in order to make myself well understood, I must first of all explain one thing, that is that there are

two categories of Frenchmen: those who know America, because they have visited it, and those who do not know it, because they have never set foot on it. But even among those who know America, because they have visited it, one must discern those who have understood America and those who have not understood it. The Caillaux Mission, sent in September, 1925, to Washington to negotiate the settlement of the debt, is a typical example of the understanding and the misunderstanding of America. Six of its members, outside of the head of the delegation, had never crossed the Atlantic: Senators Bérenger, Chapsal, Dausset; Deputies Bokanowski, Lamoureux, Auriol. Three have come back having understood the American spirit splendidly: Senator Bérenger, Senator Chapsal and Deputy Bokanowski, today Minister for Commerce. All three are in favor of ratification. The three others have completely misunderstood the American spirit, and are against ratification. As for the chief of the mission, M. Joseph Caillaux, his case is more complex and curious. I do not think that he has really understood America, but with him it is not a question of intelligence, for he is exceptionally intelligent: it is a question of temperament. M. Caillaux is an aristocrat, and aristocrats will never understand America. The country of their choice will always be Great Britain, which is the oldest aristocratic nation in the world, and the democratic American climate will never have any attraction for them. However, although he may not have understood America, M. Joseph Caillaux has understood the necessity of liquidating the American debt: and very courageously, very vigorously, he has recommended his fellow citizens to ratify the agreement he had not been able to conclude and which Ambassador Bérenger has concluded.

Matters being thus, a clash was inevitable in France concerning the agreement of Washington between those who know and understand America and those who do not know nor understand her.

Those who neither know nor understand America particularly protest against the long period of time over which the payments have been spread out. "We shall have to pay an annual tribute to America," they are complaining, "during sixty-two years; that is, during three generations. Our children and our chil

dren's children will have to pay the tribute. How can we enter into such an agreement? And what will happen if the agreement fails to be kept?"

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In vain, those who believe they know and understand America object that nothing will happen. In vain they quote the declaration made by Secretary Herbert Hoover to Senator Chapsal, during the negotiations of 1925: "Should any unforeseen obstacle prevent you from keeping your engagements, you will not keep them, that is all. You will then find yourselves exactly in the same situation you are in today. What do you risk? We shall not go and bombard your coasts any more than we go and bombard them today. . ." In vain, they quote the formal declaration of Senator Smoot, on April 1, 1926, in answer to a question of Mr. Borah: "If an unforeseen event prevents the debtor nations from fulfilling their obligations, we shall not have the right to force them. Everybody agrees to this." The average Frenchman answers: "Well, if everybody agrees to this, let us write it down on paper." The average Frenchman believes only in what is written down in black and white. He has been trained to that from his youth. He belongs to a race where the law is written down since centuries and centuries. He belongs to a country where in the remotest village there is a notary whose business it is to draw up in a solemn contract the smallest transaction. The average Frenchman believes that, when a written engagement has been subscribed, nothing in the world can suspend the engagement, and therefore he believes, sincerely, honestly, that during sixty-two years his descendants will have to work and pay America, whatever may happen. Reciprocally, he does not believe in verbal promises, even when they rest on good faith and good sense, and, like Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna, to those who tell him, "It goes without saying," he answers: "It will go much better in saying it and writing it."

Then, the average Frenchman is a great retorter and arguer. He has not forgotten that the difficulty of transferring huge sums of money from one country to another has been if not discovered at least brought to light by the American experts of the Dawes Commission and has been opposed to the French claims of reparations. He knows by heart that passage of the Dawes report:

"We estimate the amount which we think Germany can pay in gold marks by consideration of her budget possibilities; but we propose safeguards against such transfers of these mark payments into foreign exchange as would destroy stabilization and thereby endanger future reparations." And he asks: "Where are the safeguards against transfers of our franc payments into dollars? Why should not our stabilization be destroyed by our payments as well as German stabilization by German payments?"

On both points, safeguard in case France's capacity of payment would be altered, safeguard in case France's payments would destroy the stabilization of her money, the average Frenchman is practically unshakable. He refuses to listen to any argument. The boiling M. Franklin-Bouillon, President of the Commission for Foreign Affairs at the Chamber, symbolizes him very well, when he exclaims: "I will overthrow two Ministries, ten Ministries if need be. I will cling to the tribune and they will have to drag me away by force, rather than permit the ratification of the abominable agreement of Washington."

Of course, there are a great many other elements in the French resistance to the ratification. There is the sentimental element: "We have fought side by side for the same cause; is it possible that our account is an ordinary account?" There is the popular element: "We have to collect money from Germany: if we can't collect it, how can we pay the United States?" There is the human element: "The Americans are rich and we are poor: can the rich man not overlook the debt of the poor man?" There is the political element: "If we ratify and ask for some kind of credit, we put ourselves under America's financial domination: what then about our economical independence?" But the two principal strongholds are those which I have depicted: the fear of being submitted during sixty-two years to an obligation which it is impossible to fulfill; the fear of seeing the franc fall if too large sums are transferred to America.

Now, it must be admitted that, in his resistance, the average Frenchman has received encouragements from the outside: first of all from Great Britain; then also, strange to say, from some Americans.

British propaganda has been most active and most successful

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