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those which induce him thereto, and indispensably require it.

Again, God in the scripture is proposed to us as the Supreme Judge of all, acting in rewards and punishments according to his own righteousness, or what the rectitude and holy properties of his own nature require. That God should have any external rule or law in his government of the world, is absolutely and infinitely impossible. But his law and rule is the holiness and righteousness of his nature.

§8. The whole of what hath been thus far pleaded, may be reduced to the ensuing heads:

1. God is naturally and necessarily the Supreme Governor of his rational creatures, with respect to their utmost end, which is his own glory. Upon the supposition of his being and their's, an imagination to the contrary would imply all sorts of contradic

tions.

2. The law of obedience to such creatures ariseth naturally and necessarily from the nature of God, and their own; for this original law is nothing but that respect which a finite dependent creature hath upon an absolute, infinitely wise, holy, and good Creator, suitable to the principles of the nature with which it is endowed; therefore, it is indispensably necessary.

3. The annexing of a penalty to the transgression of this law, was nothing but what the righteousness of God, as the Supreme Ruler of his creatures, did make necessary; as that, without which, the glory and holiness of his rule could not be preserved upon the entrance of sin.

4. The institution of punishment answereth to the sanction of the law, is an act of justice in God, and necessary to him, as the Supreme Governor of the universe.

*

$9. Socinus contends, that the righteousness we here plead for is contrary to that mercy, whereby God forgiveth sins; and therefore, that they cannot be properties of his nature, but only external acts of his will and power. But we reply, that absolutely and essen+ tially, they are the same; nor are their effects contrary to each other, though divers. To punish, where punishment is deserved, is not contrary to mercy; but to punish, where punishment is not deserved, is cruelty. And yet, to punish without desert, is more opposite to justice itself, than to mercy. And so it is where punishment exceeds guilt, or where proceedings are not according to an equal standard.. Nor is "to spare" by mercy, contrary to justice; for if to spare and pardon be not for the good of the whole, for the preservation of order, and the end of rule, it is not mercy to pardon or spare, but facility, remissness in government, or foolish pity. Secure those things in rule and government, which justice takes care of and provides for, and then to spare in mercy, is in no way contrary to it. If these things be not provided for, to spare is not an act of mercy, but a defect in justice. And if these things

were not so, it would be impossible that any one could be just and merciful also; yea, or do any act either of justice or mercy; for if he punish, he is unmerciful; that is, wicked, if punishment be contrary to mercy; and if he spare, he is not just, if sparing be opposite to justice. And on this supposition, upon an alike act of the will of God, sin might have been made to be virtue, and obedience sin; and so it might have been the duty of man to have hated God, and to have opposed him to the utmost of his power. For all the merely free acts of God's will might have been otherwise, and contrary to what they are. And if you say it could

*De Jesu Christo Servatore, lib. i, cap. i; lib. iii, cap. i.

not be so in this case, because the nature of God, and his righteousness required it should be otherwise, you grant all that is contended for.

Moreover, actually to pardon is no way opposite to justice, where satisfaction is made; nor is to punish opposite to mercy, where the law of obtaining an interest in that satisfaction is not observed. And all that God declares in the scripture, concerning his justice and mercy, with the exercise of them towards sinners, is grounded on the supposition of the interposition and satisfaction of Christ; where that is not, as in the case of the angels that sinned, no mention is made of mercy more or less, but only of judgment, according to their desert.

$10. That justice and mercy are properties of the Divine nature, contrary to the Socinian creed, we may even argue from the light of nature; as not only teaching us by the conduct of right reason, that there is a singular perfection in these things, which must, therefore, be found in him, who is so the author of all goodness and limited perfections to all others, as to contain essentially and eminently all goodness and perfection in himself; but also, it is not difficult to evince the actual consent of all mankind who acknowledge a Deity, to this principle, That God is just and merciful, with that justice and mercy which have respect to the sins and offences of men. When God shewed to Moses his glory, and made a declaration of himself by his name, he did it not by calling over the free acts of his will, or shewing what he would or could do if he pleased; but described his nature to him by the essential properties of it, that the people might know who and what he was with whom they had to do, Exod. xxxiv, 6, 7. And yet among them is that mercy reckoned, which is exerted in the pardoning of

substituted was always to undergo that very penalty, whether by loss of limb, liberty, or life, that the other should have undergone. And in like manner, if the Lord Christ suffered in our stead, as our substitute, he suffered what we should have done.

§12. It is still objected, "That the punishment "which we should have undergone, was death eter"nal."

Death, as eternal, was in the punishment due to our sin; not directly, but consequentially; and that a natura subjecti, not a natura cause; for that the punishment of sin should be eternal, arose not from the nature and order of all things, viz. of God, the law, and the sinner; but from the nature and condition of the sinner only. This was such, as that it could no otherwise undergo a punishment proportionable to the demerit of sin, but by an eternal continuance under it. This, therefore, was not a necessary consequent of guilt absolutely, but of guilt with respect to such a subject. And if it be said, "That the "admission of one to suffer for another, who could dis"charge the debt in much less time than the offender "could, is not the same that the law required;" we answer, that it is true the law requires no such thing as one to suffer for another, nor absolutely considered, doth admit of it; but the substitution was from God's graciously dispensing with the law, as the supreme Lord and Ruler over all. The law takes notice only of offenders, nor doth it include any supposition, that the offenders must suffer, "or a mediator" in their stead. But, notwithstanding, it is inseparable from the law, that this kind of punishment is due to the transgression of it; and by God's gracious substitution of Christ in the room of sinners, there was no re

laxation made of the law, as to the punishment it required.

§13. It is yet farther pleaded, "That if the same be "paid in a strict sense, then deliverance would have "followed ipso facto; for the release immediately fol"lows the payment of the same.” Howsoever we allow of that expression of "paying the same," it is only suffering the same for which we contend. Christ underwent the same punishment that the law required, but that his so doing should be a payment for us, depended on God's sovereign dispensation; yet so, that when it was paid, it was the same which was due for us. This payment, therefore, as such, and the deliverance that ensued thereon, depended on a previous compact and agreement, as must all satisfaction of one for another. Deliverance, therefore, doth not naturally follow on this satisfaction, and therefore was not to ensue ipso facto, but (jure fœderis) in the way and order disposed in that covenant. The actual deliverance of all the persons for whom Christ suffered, to ensue ipso facto upon his suffering, was absolutely impossible; for most of them were not when he suffered. And that the whole of the time, way, and manner of his deliverance dependeth on compact, is evident from them who were delivered actually from the penalty, long before the actual sufferings of Christ, merely upon the account of his sufferings, which should afterwards ensue. Deliverance is no end of punishment considered merely as such, none is punished properly that he may be delivered: however, the cessation of punishment may be called a deliverance. Mere deliverance was not the whole end of Christ's sufferings for us; but such a deliverance as is attended with a state and condition of superadded blessedness. And the duties of faith, repentance, and obedience, which are

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