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ed, is so great, I am compelled to relinquish the idea, which I at first entertained, of pursuing the investigation of the topics presented by the remainder of your sermon.

I have but a few considerations to add, on the subject of the preceding pages; which must be reserved for another Letter.

LETTER V.

REVEREND AND DEAR SIR,

IN page 14th of your sermon you inform us of the method in which you explain those passages which seem to speak of the divine nature of Christ. The paragraph is as follows:

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"I am aware that these remarks will be met by two or three texts in which Christ is called God, and by a class of passages, not very numerous, in which divine properties are said to be ascribed to him. To these we offer one plain answer. We say, that it is one of the most established and obvious principles of criticism, that language is to be explained according to the known properties of the subject to which it is applied. Every man knows that the same words convey very different ideas, when used in relation to different beings. Thus, Solomon built the Temple in a different manner from the architect whom he employed; and God repents differently from man. Now, we maintain, that the known properties and circumstances of Christ, his birth, sufferings, and death, his constant habit of speaking of God as a distinct being from himself, his praying to God, his ascribing to God all his power and offices,-these acknowledged properties of Christ, we say, oblige us to interpret the comparatively few passages, which are thought to make him the supreme God, in a manner consistent with his distinct and inferior nature. It is our duty to explain such texts by the rule which we apply to other texts, in which human beings are called gods, and are said to be partakers of the divine nature, to know and possess all things, and to be filled with all God's fulness. These latter passages we do not hesitate to modify and restrain, and turn from the most obvious sense, because this sense is opposed to the known properties of the beings to whom they relate; and we maintain that we adhere to the same principle, and use no greater latitude, in explaining, as we do, the passages which are thought to support the Godhead of Christ.

I must hesitate, however, to adopt this principle, without examining its nature and tendency. On the supposition that you admit the Bible to be a revelation from God, as you aver, permit me to ask, whether it is the object of a revelation to disclose truths which are NOT known, or are insufficiently established; or whether it is the object of a revelation to disclose truths already known and established?

If you answer, The latter; then your answer denies, of course, that it is a revelation. What the book of nature exhibits, the Scriptures do not reveal. Is there, then, any thing in the Scriptures, which the book of nature does not exhibit? If you concede this, then I ask, How are we, on your ground, to obtain any notion of that thing which was unknown before it was revealed ?-e. g. the resurrection of the body is revealed. Now, it is a known property of the human body to corrupt and perish. Shall I construe a passage of Scripture, then, in such a manner as to contradict this known property? If not, then I can never suppose the resurrection of the body to be revealed. I, however, do construe the Scriptures so as to contradict this apparently known property of the human body-following the obvious assertion of the sacred writers, and not allowing myself to force a constructive meaning upon their language. Yet, if I understand you, I am at liberty "to restrain and modify, and turn the words from their most obvious sense," because this sense is opposed to the known properties of the matter of which our bodies are composed.

The case is just the same in regard to any other fact or doctrine. What I know already of a thing is, if you are correct," to modify and restrain, and turn from their obvious sense," the words which are employed in revealing it, because what is revealed I suppose to be at variance with some known doctrines or properties. Is there not room here for great caution, and great doubt as to the correctness of your principle?

According to this principle, moreover, the Scriptures may be construed very differently by persons of different degrees of knowledge. One man knows the properties of things far more extensively than his neighbour. He sees that what is revealed may consist with known properties of things: but his neighbour, who lacks this knowledge, is unable to perceive the consistency of revelation with what he knows; and this, because his knowledge does not qualify him to judge, or because what he thinks he knows, he is really ignorant of. The same text in the Bible, therefore, may be received by one as a consistent part of revelation, and rejected by the other. The measure of a

man's knowledge, consequently, cannot be a proper test by which the meaning of Scripture is to be proved.

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But you will say, "I can never believe in the reality of a revelation which contradicts my reason." I accede. And here is the very place where I find the greatest difficulty with your theory of interpretation. You do not seem to me to carry your objections back to the proper place. If God manifest in the flesh be an absurdity,palpable contradiction-" an enormous tax upon human credulity," as you aver-then the claims of the book which asserts this are no doubt to be disregarded. What is palpable contradiction we certainly can never believe. But, in determining what the Scriptures have taught, we have no right to say, that because any particular doctrine is repugnant to our views, therefore we will " modify and restrain, and turn from the obvious sense," the words in which it is conveyed. The rules of exegesis are not a mass of wax, which can be moulded at pleasure into any shape that we may fancy. We do as great violence to reason to the first principles of all reasoning-when we reject these rules, as when we admit absurdities to be true.

In case an obscure term is used, I acknowledge that clear passages, relating to the same subject, are to be adduced to ascertain its meaning. If Christ had been simply called God, I should allow that this term might be explained by its use as applied to inferior beings: but when the sacred writers themselves have explained the meaning which they attach to it, by telling us that Christ is the God who created and governs the world-who is omniscient and eternal-the object of religious worship and prayer-God over all, or supreme God (not to mention "the true God," and the "Great God")—there is no law of exegesis, no method of interpretation, which can obscure their meaning, that is not violence-an infringement of the fundamental principles of interpretation-and therefore an abandonment of the first principles of our reason. It does appear to me, therefore, that my only resource in such a case is, to reject their authority, if I disbelieve the doctrine. To say that they did not mean to teach what they most obviously have taught, I cannot-must not ;-no book can be understood-no writer can be interpreted at all-by

such a rule of exegesis, without forcing upon him the opinions of his readers. My system of philosophy, we will say, differs from yours. What you view to be a palpable contradiction and absurdity, I view as rational and consistent. This, we know, is not an uncommon fact. In reading a book, then, that respects the subject of our differing opinions, you hold yourself bound to construe it, so as to save all that appears to you contradictory or absurd : I interpret it just as its language obviously means, by the common laws of exegesis, which do not depend on my philosophy. This book, then, may have two different meanings, according to us, in the same passages. Is this so? Can it be? Or rather, are not the laws of interpretation independent of you or me? If not, how can the meaning of any writer be ever obtained?

You and I differ as to what John has taught in the first chapter of his gospel. I commence reading him with the full conviction that I cannot determine a priori, in all respects, what the nature of God and Christ is, and with the belief that John wrote what is a revelation from heaven. I read John and interpret him just as I do any other author, ancient or modern, by the general rules of exegesis, modified by the special circumstances and dialect in which he wrote. I am as well satisfied that he meant to assert the truly divine nature of the Logos, as I am that he has made any assertion at all. I receive this assertion, therefore, as declaring a fact which I ought to believe, and which, if I admit his inspiration, I must believe. In the same manner I treat all other passages which respect this subject. I come in this way to the conclusion that Christ is truly divine-that he has a human and divine nature so united (I undertake not to tell in what manner), that he speaks of either nature as himself. The passages which seem to imply his inferiority to God, I find to be capable of explanation without contradiction, or doing violence to the language, by the obvious fact that he has two natures united, which the sacred writers seem to me so plainly to inculcate. In this way I find one consistent whole. I save the laws of exegesis. I admit, indeed, on the authority of revelation, doctrines which natural religion never

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