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He united several Species under a more general Name, as Oak, Ath, Elm, &c. under the more extensive Word Tree; Kine, Sheep, Horse, under the Word Cattle; by which Management were parcelled out the Objects of Nature, into several great Wards or Divisions, called Generals or Genus; each of which comprehends several Species, as each Species takes in various Particulars; whence it is manifest, that general Expressions do not serve to represent or determine any Object of Nature, nor any Idea we receive from the Senses, which are always Particulars; but they are useful in Language, for their Property of being applicable to any One of divers Species out of View, and for determining the great Ward or Division in Nature, to which the particular Object or Species belongs. You may say
those general Expressions represent abstract Ideas if · you will; all that is necessary to my Purpose, is, to render it clear, that general or abstract Terms, call them as you please, do not represent any particular Objects existing in Nature, but are mere Creatures of the Mind, formed to class the Objects of Perception into Platoons or Divisions, for the Sake of Perspicuity and Order, and the Convenience of conveying general Knowledge.
4. Having premised these trite Observations, I proceed to Mew that Pleasure and Pain are Terins of general Import, and therefore have no particular distinct Representation in the Mind. When I speak of Pleasure I enjoyed Yesterday, you are wholly at a loss for a distinct Conception answerable to it : you may search your Imagination, but you will find no sensible Idea annexed to the Word Pleasure, until, from the different Species of Pleasures, whereof you have had Experience, one particular Kind te singled out. You may apply that general Word to the Charins of Music, to a delicious Banquet, to Exercise, or Rest; but the Charms of Music, the
pleasing Taste of Food, agreeable Exercise, or Rest after Fatigue, are as different Species, and as distant in their Relation to e:ch other, as Oak, Ash, and Elm; or Apples, Pomegranates, and Strawberries : We may in the same Manner speak of Pain; we have no particular or distinct Idea in the Imagination annexed to it, until we have, from amongst various Species of Evils, selected a particular Kind; a disagreeable Smell, a grating Sound, the Death of a Friend, the Rigors of Cold or Burning. Nothing can be more obvious, than that these Evils do not differ from each other, as greater or lesser of one Kind, but as Evils of different kinds; the Truth of which is not the Issue of Reasoning, or Matter of Hesitation, it is the perfect Assurance of Sense and Feeling, of which I request my Reader to satisfy himself perfectly, at his Entrance on the Theory of Man, and try if the flightest Reflection on the Pleasures and Pains I mentioned, does not convince him without Liberty of doubting, that they are of different kinds. If this be a Point then evident to Sense and Feeling, it is certain, that Mr. Locke contradicts the clearest Intuitions of the Mind, when he asserts that whatever delight or moleft us are, on the one Side, different Degrees of the same Thing Pleasure, and on the other, different Degrees of the same Thing Pain ; and that he is under the fame Mistake, when he calls Pleasure and Pain fimple Ideas,
5. To conceive the vast Extent of these Words, and the prodigious Distances by which the various Species of Pleasures and Pains are separated, we need only recollect, that Pleasures and Pains arrive to the Mind, by every one of the Senses. Some of the Sources of Pleasure may be wholly stopped up, and a Species of Delight interrupted by the Want of a Sense; so that we can have no Idea whatsoever of that Kind of Pleasure, while the Rest remain
perfect, within our Knowledge and Enjoyment: The Glory of Light, and the beautuous Variety of Colours, can have no Existence in the Imagination of a Man born blind. The Melody of Music, and the . Charms of the human Voice, are not in the Possessions of a deaf Man. However wide and va. rious the Extent of the Senses be, there is still a more distant Order of Pleasures that depend remotely upon the Senses, and are called Intellectual Pleasures.
6. The Manner in which we acquire a Knowlenge of Pleasure and Pain, will direct us to the real particular Species, that give Occasion to the general Names.
We never feel any but particular Pleasures and Pains. An Infant feels Hunger, Thirst, Cold, and Sickness; by advancing his Hand too near a Candle, he burns himself; when in Course of Time he comes to learn Language, he is taught to give these, and all other offensive Sensations of different Kinds, the Name of Pain, just as he learns the Use of other general Expressions : Pain at large then is nothing else but those different Sensations. Let us suppose a Statute, gradually endowed with Life and the human Character, first receiving indifferent Perception, such as glides over the Mind in a Revery or Inattention ; in which State it is devoid of a Principle of Pain: Let it be next roused from a State of calm Perception, by the Appetite Hunger; here is one Door opened for Pleasure and Pain, although there be nothing distinct from the mere Appetite introduced into the Breast. Yet what are understood by the Words Pleasure and Pain, Self-Love and Self-Interest, have already found Footing there. Let there be added further, the whole Groupe of human Passions, Appetites, and Aversions; you have then before you the selfish Creature Man; and you see a Creation made of the Love of Pleasure, and Aversion to Pain, although in fact, there is not Existence given to any
Thing, beside the human Inclinations, Aversions, and Sensations, such as Hunger, Sickness, Thirit, Love, Pride, Ambition, &c. The Love of Pleasure and Aversion to Pain then is nothing different from the various Inclinations and Aversions we feel.
The Love of Pleasure, and Aversion to Pain, cannot therefore be Principles of Action in the Mind, nor indeed have any Existence there, but as general Terms. Here I must expect an Outcry against me, from the whole Race of selfish Philosophers. Are not the Love of Pleasure and Aversion to Pain, the original Principles, and radical Stems, from which the Passions, Appetites, and Inclinations, vegetate, and the Hinges on which they turn? If my indulgent Reader will please to give his Attention to the laft Paragraph, he will find fatisfactory Proofs, that the Appetites and Inclinations do not spring from the Love of Pleasure or Hatred to Pain, Self-love, or Interest; seeing that Pleasure, Pain, Self-love, and Interest, depend themselves ultimately on the Passions and Appetites; that is, we are not hungry because we love Pleasure, nor because it is our Interest to eat. Hunger is not the Effect of Judgment or Choice, it is involuntary. The Truth is, we are pleased with Eating because we are hungry, and not hungry because we are willing to be fo, or have discovered that it is our Interest to nourish the Body with Food. We may say in the fame Manner of Thirst, of Love, of Ambition, and Jealousy; they are not the Effects of Design and Choice, they proceed not from our Love of Pleasure, or Self-interest; but our Interests, our Pleasures, and Pains, are formed by them.
The whole Difficulty of conceiving what I say, consists in distinguishing clearly, between general and particular Expressions. Are we not sensible of such Motives in the human Breast, as Pleasure and Pain;
and does not every one feel them, says a modern Philosopher ? Yes, just as there are in the World such Things as Trees and Fruit; and every one who does not want his Sight fees them ; but the Word Tree, does not meart any Thing in Nature, distinct from the various Species of Trees, nor the Word Fruit any Thing distinct from the various Kinds of Fruit. In the like Manner, there are fuch Perceptions as Pleasure and Pain; we all feel them, when by those words you mean to make a general Expression for the particular Pleasures and Pains we have experienced, abstracted from which, they are mere Sounds, that have no Reality in Life, but less than fick Mens Dreams.
7. From what has been observed, it is obvious that it can no more be faid with Propriety or Truth, that Pleasures and Pains are the first Springs and Movers of human Action, when we have not a tacit Reference to the particular Species of Pleasures and Pains, than it can be said, that we make a Fire of Wood in general, without any particular Species of Wood: And as it is neither Self-love, nor a Love of Pleasure, makes an Infant eat when he is hungry, or drink when he is thirsty, but the Appetites; by looking closely into the Motives of human Actions, we shall find those universal Passions, that make such a Parade in inodern Philosophy, wholly useless and inactive, and that all the Operations attributed to them, are really perforined by Ambition, Envy, Pride, and the other particular Inclinations and Appetites of the human Breast.
8. Philosophers, in framing of Systems, generally take care to have a potent Principle in reserve, to perform all their Drudgery, and extricate them out of all Difficulties. The Peripatetics had their subftantial Forms; the Adepts in the animal Motion have their animal Spirits ; the eternal Drudges of n.odern Philosophy are Self-love and Self-interest :