He united feveral Species under a more general Name, as Oak, Ath, Elm, &c. under the more extenfive Word Tree; Kine, Sheep, Horfe, under the Word Cattle; by which Management were parcelled out the Objects of Nature, into several great Wards or Divifions, called Generals or Genus; each of which comprehends feveral Species, as each Species takes in various Particulars; whence it is manifeft, that general Expreffions do not ferve to represent or determine any Object of Nature, nor any idea we receive from the Senfes, which are always Particulars; but they are useful in Language, for their Property of being applicable to any One of divers Species out of View, and for determining the great Ward or Divifion in Nature, to which the particular Object or Species belongs. You may fay thofe general Expreffions represent abstract Ideas if you will; all that is neceffary to my Purpose, is, to render it clear, that general or abftract Terms, call them as you pleafe, do not reprefent any particular Objects exifting in Nature, but are mere Creatures of the Mind, formed to clafs the Objects of Perception into Platoons or Divifions, for the Sake of Perfpicuity and Order, and the Convenience of conveying general Knowledge.

4. Having premised thefe trite Obfervations, I proceed to fhew that Pleasure and Pain are Terms of general Import, and therefore have no particular diftinct Representation in the Mind. When I speak of Pleasure I enjoyed Yesterday, you are wholly at a lofs for a distinct Conception answerable to it: you may fearch your Imagination, but you will find no fenfible Idea annexed to the Word Pleafure, until, from the different Species of Pleasures, whereof you have had Experience, one particular Kind te fingled out. You may apply that general Word to the Charms of Mufic, to a delicious Banquet, to Exercife, or Reft; but the Charms of Mufic, the pleafing

pleafing Tafte of Food, agreeable Exercise, or Reft after Fatigue, are as different Species, and as diftant in their Relation to each other, as Oak, Afh, and Elm; or Apples, Pomegranates, and Strawberries: We may in the fame Manner fpeak of Pain; we have no particular or diftinct Idea in the Imagination annexed to it, until we have, from amongst various Species of Evils, felected a particular Kind; a difagreeable Smell, a grating Sound, the Death of a Friend, the Rigors of Cold or Burning. Nothing can be more obvious, than that thefe Evils do not differ from each other, as greater or leffer of one Kind, but as Evils of different Kinds; the Truth of which is not the Iffue of Reafoning, or Matter of Hefitation; it is the perfect Affurance of Senfe and Feeling, of which I request my Reader to fatisfy himself perfectly, at his Entrance on the Theory of Man, and try if the flightest Reflection on the Pleasures and Pains I mentioned, does not convince him without Liberty of doubting, that they are of different Kinds. If this be a Point then evident to Senfe and Feeling, it is certain, that Mr. Locke contradicts the cleareft Intuitions of the Mind, when he afferts that whatever delight or moleft us are, on the one Side, different Degrees of the fame Thing Pleafure, and on the other, different Degrees of the fame Thing Pain; and that he is under the fame Mistake, when he calls Pleasure and Pain fimple Ideas.

5. To conceive the vaft Extent of thefe Words, and the prodigious Distances by which the various Species of Pleafures and Pains are feparated, we need only recollect, that Pleasures and Pains arrive to the Mind, by every one of the Senfes. Some of the Sources of Pleasure may be wholly ftopped up, and a Species of Delight interrupted by the Want of a Sense; fo that we can have no Idea whatsoever of that Kind of Pleafure, while the Reft remain perfect,

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perfect, within our Knowledge and Enjoyment: The Glory of Light, and the beautuous Variety of Colours, can have no Exiftence in the Imagination of a Man born blind. The Melody of Mufic, and the Charms of the human Voice, are not in the Poffeffions of a deaf Man. However wide and various the Extent of the Senfes be, there is still a more diftant Order of Pleasures that depend remotely upon the Senfes, and are called Intellectual Pleasures.

6. The Manner in which we acquire a Knowlenge of Pleasure and Pain, will direct us to the real particular Species, that give Occafion to the general Names. We never feel any but particular Pleafures and Pains. An Infant feels Hunger, Thirst, Cold, and Sicknefs; by advancing his Hand too near a Candle, he burns himself; when in Course of Time he comes to learn Language, he is taught to give these, and all other offenfive Senfations of different Kinds, the Name of Pain, juft as he learns the Ufe of other general Expreffions: Pain at large then is nothing elfe but thofe different Senfations. Let us fuppofe a Statute, gradually endowed with Life and the human Character, first receiving indifferent Perception, fuch as glides over the Mind in a Revery or Inattention; in which State it is devoid of a Principle of Pain: Let it be next roufed from a State of calm Perception, by the Appetite Hunger; here is one Door opened for Pleasure and Pain, although there be nothing distinct from the mere Appetite introduced into the Breast. Yet what are underftood by the Words Pleafure and Pain, Self-Love and Self-Intereft, have already found Footing there. Let there be added further, the whole Groupe of human Paffions, Appetites, and Averfions; you have then before you the selfish Creature Man; and you fee a Creation made of the Love of Pleafure, and Aversion to Pain, although in fact, there is not Existence given to any

Thing, befide the human Inclinations, Averfions, and Senfations; fuch as Hunger, Sickness, Thirt Love, Pride, Ambition, &c. The Love of Pleafure and Averfion to Pain then is nothing different from the various Inclinations and Averfions we feel.

The Love of Pleafure, and Averfion to Pain, cannot therefore be Principles of Action in the Mind, nor indeed have any Exiftence there, but as general Terms. Here I must expect an Outcry against me, from the whole Race of felfish Philofophers. Are not the Love of Pleasure and Averfion to Pain, the original Principles, and radical Stems, from which the Paffions, Appetites, and Inclinations, vegetate, and the Hinges on which they turn? If my indulgent Reader will please to give his Attention to the laft Paragraph, he will find fatisfactory Proofs, that the Appetites and Inclinations do not spring from the Love of Pleasure or Hatred to Pain, Self-love, or Intereft; seeing that Pleafure, Pain, Self-love, -and Intereft, depend themselves ultimately on the Paffions and Appetites; that is, we are not hungry because we love Pleasure, nor because it is our Intereft to eat. Hunger is not the Effect of Judgment or Choice, it is involuntary. The Truth is, we are pleased with Eating because we are hungry, and not hungry because we are willing to be fo, or have discovered that it is our Intereft to nourish the Body with Food. We may fay in the fame Manner of Thirst, of Love, of Ambition, and Jealoufy; they are not the Effects of Design and Choice, they proceed not from our Love of Pleasure, or Self-interest; but our Interefts, our Pleasures, and Pains, are formed by them.

The whole Difficulty of conceiving what I say, confifts in diftinguishing clearly, between general and particular Expreffions. Are we not fenfible of fuch Motives in the human Breaft, as Pleasure and Pain;

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and does not every one feel them, fays a modern Philofopher? Yes, juft as there are in the World fuch Things as Trees and Fruit; and every one who does not want his Sight fees them; but the Word Tree does not meant any Thing in Nature, diftinct from the various Species of Trees, nor the Word Fruit any Thing diftinct from the various Kinds of Fruit. In the like Manner, there are fuch Percep→ tions as Pleasure and Pain; we all feel them, when by thofe Words you mean to make a general Expreffion for the particular Pleafures and Pains we have experienced; abstracted from which, they are mere Sounds, that have no Reality in Life, but lefs than fick Mens Dreams.

7. From what has been obferved, it is obvious that it can no more be faid with Propriety or Truth, that Pleasures and Pains are the firft Springs and Movers of human Action, when we have not a tacit Reference to the particular Species of Pleasures and Pains, than it can be faid, that we make a Fire of Wood in general, without any particular Species of Wood: And as it is neither Self-love, nor a Love of Pleasure, makes an Infant eat when he is hungry, or drink when he is thirsty, but the Appetites; by looking clofely into the Motives of human Actions, we fhall find those universal Paffions, that make fuch a Parade in modern Philofophy, wholly useless and inactive; and that all the Operations attributed to them, are really performed by Ambition, Envy, Pride, and the other particular Inclinations and Appetites of the human Breast.

8. Philofophers, in framing of Syftems, generally take care to have a potent Principle in referve, to perform all their Drudgery, and extricate them out of all Difficulties. The Peripatetics had their fubftantial Forms; the Adepts in the animal Motion have their animal Spirits; the eternal Drudges of n.odern Philofophy are Self-love and Self-interest:

But