every Nation that fettled in that Part of the World, feems, by the Permiflion of every other Nation, to have made the fame Suppofition in its own Favour.

Here then, perhaps, it will be safeft to fix the Juftice of our Caufe; here we are apparently and indifputably injured, and this Injury, may, according to the Practice of Nations, be juftly refented. Whether we have not in return made fome Incroachments upon them, must be left doubtful, till our Practices on the Ohio fhall be stated and vindicated. are no two Nations confining on each other, between whom a War may not always be kindled with plaufible Pretences on either Part, as there is always paffing between them, a Reciprocation of Injuries, and Fluctuation of Incroachments.

There

From the Conclufion of the laft Peace perpetual Complaints of the Supplantations and Invafions of the French have been fent to Europe from our Colonies, and tranfmitted to our Minifters at Paris, where good Words were fometimes given us, and the Practices of the American Commanders were fometimes difowned, but no Redress was ever obtained, nor is it probable that any Prohibition was fent to America. We were ftill amufed with fuch doubtful Promifes as thofe who are afraid of War are ready to interpret in their own Favour, and the French pushed forward their Line of Fortreffes, and feemed to refolve that before our Complaints were finally difmiffed, all Remedy fhould be hopeless.

We likewise endeavoured at the fame Time to form a Barrier against the Canadians by fending a Colony to New-Scotland, a cold uncomfortable Tract of Ground, of which we had long the nominal Poffeffion before we really began to occupy it. To this those were invited whom the Ceffation of War deprived of Employment, and made burthenfome to their Country; and Settlers were allured thither by many fallacious Descriptions of fertile Vallies and

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elear Skies. What Effects thefe Pictures of American Happiness had upon my Countrymen I was never informed, but I fuppofe very few fought Provifion in those frozen Regions, whom Guilt or Poverty did not drive from their native Country. About the Boundaries of this new Colony there were fome Disputes, but as there was nothing yet worth a Conteft, the Power of the French was not much exerted on that Side; fome Disturbance was however given, and fome Skirmithes enfued. But perhaps being peopled chiefly with Soldiers, who would rather live by Plunder than by Agriculture, and who confider War as their best Trade, New-Scotland would be more obftinately defended than fome Settlements of far greater Value; and the French are too well informed of their own Intereft, to provoke Hoftility for no Advantage, or to felect that Country for Invafion, where they muft hazard much, and can win little. They therefore preffed on Southward behind our ancient and wealthy Settlements, and built Fort after Fort at fuch Distances that they might conveniently relieve one another, invade our Colonies with fudden Incurfions, and retire to Places of Safety before our People could unite to oppose them.

This Design of the French has been long formed, and long known, both in America and Europe, and might at firft have been eafily repreffed, had Force been used instead of Expoftulation. When the Englifh attempted a Settlement upon the Ifland of St. Lucia, the French, whether juftly or not, confidering it as neutral and forbidden to be occupied by either Nation, immediately landed upon it, and deftroyed the Houses, wafted the Plantations, and drove or carried away the Inhabitants. This was done in the Time of Peace, when mutual Profeffions of Friendship were daily exchanged by the two Courts, and was not confidered as any Violation of Treaties,

Treaties, nor was any more than a very soft Remonftrance made on our Part.

The French therefore taught us how to act; but an Hanoverian Quarrel with the House of Austria for fome Time induced us to court, at any Expence, the Alliance of a Nation whofe very Situation makes them our Enemies. We fuffered them to destroy Four Settlements, and to advance their own, which we had an equal Right to attack. The Time however came at laft, when we ventured to quarrel with Spain, and then France no longer fuffered the Appearance of Peace to fubfift between us, but armed in Defence of her Ally.

The Events of the War are well known, we pleased ourselves with a Victory at Dettingen, where we left our wounded Men to the Care of our Enemies, but our Army was broken at Fontenoy and Val; and though after the Disgrace which we fuffered in the Mediterranean, we had some naval Succefs, and an accidental Dearth made Peace neceffary for the French, yet they prescribed the Conditions, obliged us to give Hoftages, and acted as Conquerors, though as Conquerors of Moderation,

In this War the Americans diftinguifhed themfelves in a Manner unknown and unexpected. The New-English raifed an Army, and under the Command of Pepperel took Cape-Breton, with the Affiftance of the Fleet. This is the most important Fortress in America. We pleafed ourselves fo much with the Acquifition, that we could not think of restoring it, and among the Arguments used to inflame the People against Charles Stuart, it was very clamouroufly urged, that if he gained the Kingdom, he would give Cape-Breton back to the French.

The French however had a more eafy Expedient to regain Cape-Breton than by exalting Charles Stuart to the English Throne: They took in their Turn Fort St. George, and had our East-India Company

wholly

wholly in their Power, whom they restored at the Peace to their former Poffeffions, that they may continue to export our Silver.

Cape-Breton therefore was restored, and the French were re-established in America, with equal Power and greater Spirit, having loft nothing by the War, which they had before gained.

To the general Reputation of their Arms, and that habitual Superiority which they derive from it, they owe their Power in America, rather than to any real Strength, or Circumstances of Advantage. Their Numbers are yet not great; their Trade, though daily improved, is not very extenfive; their Country is barren; their Fortreffes, though numerous, are weak, and rather Shelters from wild Beasts, or favage Nations, than Places built for Defence against Bombs or Cannons. Cape-Breton has been found not to be impregnable; nor, if we confider the State of the Places poffeffed by the two Nations in America, is there any Reafon upon which the French thould have prefumed to molest us, but that they thought our Spirit fo broken that we durft not refift them; and in this Opinion our long Forbearance easily confirmed them,

We forgot, or rather avoided to think, that what we delayed to do must be done at laft, and done with more Difficulty, as it was delayed longer; that while we were complaining, and they were eluding, or anfwering our Complaints, Fort was rifing upon Fort, and one Invafion made a Precedent for another.

This Confidence of the French is exalted by fome real Advantages. If they poffefs in thofe Countries less than we, they have more to gain, and lefs to hazard; if they are lefs numerous, they are better united.

The French compofe one Body with one Head. They have all the fame Intereft, and agree to pursue

it by the fame Means. They are subject to a Governor commiffioned by an abfolute Monarch, and participating the Authority of his Mafter. Defigns are therefore formed without Debate, and executed without Impediment. They have yet more martial than mercantile Ambition, and feldom fuffer their military Schemes to be entangled with collateral Projects of Gain: They have no Wish but for Conqueft, of which they juftly confider Riches as the Confequence.

Some Advantages they will always have as Invaders. They make War at the Hazard of their Enemies The Conteft being carried on in our Territories, we must lofe more by a Victory than they will fuffer by a Defeat. They will fubfift, while they stay, upon our Plantations; and perhaps deftroy them when they can ftay no longer. If we pursue them, and carry the War into their Dominions, our Difficulties will increafe every Step as we advance, for we fhall leave Plenty behind us, and find nothing in Canada but Lakes and Forests barren and track!efs; our Enemies will fhut them-. felves up in their Forts, against which it is difficult to bring Cannon through so rough a Country, and which, if they are provided with good Magazines, will foon ftarve those who befiege them.

All these are the natural Effects of their Government and Situation; they are accidentally more formidable as they are lefs happy. But the Favour of the Indians which they enjoy, with very few Exceptions, among all the Nations of the Northern Continent, we ought to confider with other Thoughts; this Favour we might have enjoyed, if we had been careful to déserve it. The French, by having thefe favage Nations on their Side, are always fupplied with Spies and Guides, and with Auxiliaries, like the Tartars to the Turks, or the Huffars to the Germans, of no great Ufe against Troops ranged in

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