tion dwell on the Idea, though we feel very painful Senfations at the fame Time. Animum picturâ pafcit inani. Our Author proceeds to divide our Paffions into Two general Claffes, viz. Self-prefervation, and Society; the Selfish and the Social Paffions would have been a better Diftinction, because Selfish includes all the Ideas of Self-prefervation, and all our other Gratifications. The Paffions which concern Self-preservation he rightly observes turn mostly on Pain and Danger; and thefe he adds, very justly, are the most powerful in our Nature. He then endeavours to graft the Sublime on our Paffions of Selfprefervation. 'Whatever is fitted,' fays he, to excite Ideas of Pain and Danger, or operates in a Manner analogous to Terror, is a Source of the Sublime; that is, excites the strongest Emotion which the Mind is capable of feeling. But furely this is falfe Philofophy: the Brodequin of Ravilliac, and the iron Bed of Damien are capable of exciting alarming Ideas of Terror, but cannot be said to hold any thing of the Sublime. Befides, why are our other

Paffions to be excluded? cannot the Sublime confift with Ambition? it is perhaps in confequence of this very Paffion, grafted in us for the wifeft Purposes by the Author of our Existence, that we are capable of feeling the Sublime in the Degree we do; of delighting in every thing that is magnificent, of preferring the 'Sun to a Farthing Candle, that by proceeding from greater to still greater, we might at last fix our Imagination on Him who is the Supreme of all. And this perhaps is the true Source of the Sublime, which is always greatly heightened when any of our Paffions are strongly agitated, fuch as Terror, Grief, Rage, Indignation, Admiration, Love, &c. By the strongest of thefe the Sublime will be enforced, but it will confift with any of them. As for inftance, when Virgil fays of Jupiter,

Annuit

Annuit et totum nutu tremefecit Olympum ;

Here we have a Sublime Image encreased by our Terror, when we think of his shaking the Poles with a nod. And on the other Hand, when the fame Poet defcribes the fame Perfonage,

Vultu quo cœlum tempeftate,que ferenat ;

With that Countenance with which he looks Storms and Tempests into a Calm, we still have a Sublime Idea of the Power which thus commands all Nature, and we feel it with Love and Admiration.

Our Author proceeds to the focial Paffions, which he claffes into Two Sorts, First, the Society of the Sexes; and next, the more general Society which we hold with Mankind and the whole Universe. With regard to the First he obferves, that Beauty is the Object of it; and he endeavours to refute Mr. Addifon's opinion, that Animals have a fense of Beauty to confine them to their own Species: but as he only supposes a Law of another kind, we think Mr. Addifon's may ftand till he will be pleased to fubftitute a better. He agrees that Beafts have no Perception of Beauty because they do not pick and choose: but furely it is probable that they may have an immediate Perception of fomething beautiful in their own Species, without waiting to compare it with others, and select for themselves. This would be to enjoy the Advantages of deliberate Reasoning and Reflection; Qualities of which they do not appear to be poffeffed.

Our Author himself affigns a Reason why the Brute Creation need not chufe for themselves. But Man, who is a Creature adapted to a greater Variety and Intricacy of Relation, connects with the general Paflion the Idea of fome focial Qualities, which direct and heighten the Appetite which he has in common with all other Animals: and as he is not de

figned like them to live at large, it is fit that he should have fomething to create a Preference, and fix his Choice; and this in general should be fome fenfible Quality; as no other can fo quickly, so powerfully, or fo furely produce its Effect.'

From hence it appears why a Beast in the Field, according to Mr. Addifon's ingenious Notion, may have a Senfe of Beauty in its own Species, without waiting to determine its Choice by Comparison,

In contradiction to his former Affertions, he fays, that Solitude is as great a pofitive Pain as can be conceived and yet the Pain of Solitude, is a Privation of Pleasure, and is merely a Disappointment, and a Grieving for the Lofs of Company. In talking of the Social Paffions, he fays, I am convinced we have a Degree of Delight, and that no finall one, in the real Misfortunes and Pains of others; for let the Affection be what it will in Appearance, if it does not make us fhun fuch Objects, if on the contrary it induces us to approach them, if it makes us dwell upon them, in this Cafe I conceive we must have a Delight or Pleasure of fome Spieces or other in contemplating Objects of this kind.' But this is certainly very false Reafoning: we have no Delight in the real Misfortunes of others; and if we go near them, it is because our Fondness attaches us to them, and we cannot keep away, even though the Sight is painful. This he has afterwards obferved himself, when he fays, Pity is a Paffion accompained with Pleasure, because it arifes from Love and Affection." He therefore should have said, we have a Pleasure in feeling and compaffionating the Misfortunes of others. With regard to the Pleasure refulting from Tragedy, he afcribes it to Imitation, and then retracts it again when he fays, we shall be mistaken if we imagine our Pleasure arifes from its being no Reality: the nearer it approaches to Reality, the more perfect its Power.' This is certainly true, but it is because

the

the more perfect is the Imitation; and Imitation fuppofes no Reality: if we really faw the Earl of Effex's Head ftruck off on the Stage, no body would go there for Pleasure, which fhews that we are fecretly pleased the Tragic Distress is not Reality. Choose a Day on which to reprefent the moft fublime and affecting Tragedy which we have; appoint the most favourite Actors; fpare no Coft upon the Scenes and Decorations; unite the greatest Efforts of Poetry, Painting, and Mufic; and when you have collected your Audience, juft at the Moment when their Minds are erect with Expectation, let it be reported that a State Criminal of high Rank is on the Point of being executed in the adjoining Square; in a Moment the Emptiness of the Theatre would demonftrate the comparative Weakness of the imitative Arts, and proclaim the Triumph of the real Sympathy.'

But here he does not observe that there is an adventitious Motive: Curiofity would begin to operate, and our Love of Novelty would hurry us away to a Sight uncommon. But choose a Cart for Tyburn, fpare no Pains in filling it with Malefactors, &c. then tell the Audience of it; or tell them that an House is on fire, and then we fhall fee the Triumph of imitated Woe over real. Sympathy. The Fact is this: in real Distress we have a Joy in finding an Aptitude in ourselves, to indulge the Feelings of Humanity; in fictitious Reprefentations, we have the fame Pleafure, and the additional Delight of seeing beautiful Imitation, and confidering that the Distress is not real. It is upon thefe Principles that the Abbe du Bos and Fontenelle, have juftly accounted for Tragic Pleasure. In talking of Imitation our Author fays, When the Object reprefented in Poetry or Painting is fuch, as we could have had no Defire of feeing in Reality, then I may be fure the Pleasure is owing to the Power of Imitation; as a Cottage, a Dunghill, &c. But when the Object is fuch as we fhould run to fee if real, we may rely

upon

upon it, that the Power of the Poem or the Picture is more owing to the Thing itfelf, than any Confidera tion of the Skill of the Imitator, however excellent." But furely in the imitative Arts we can never lofe the Idea of Imitation. If the Object be inconfiderable, or even odious, it will please in a just Representation; and if the Object be Sut lime or Beautiful, it will please the more on this Account, if the Imitation be just; but if the Imitation be defective, we revolt from it, notwithstanding the Excellence of the Original. For Example: no body will go to the Theatre to fee an Actor of the meaner Clafs; and yet let Hogarthgive a Portrait of him, and we shall all admire the Strokes of his Pencil. On the other Hand, we all go to fee Garrick, and yet if an Artift fhould draw him ill, we fhould unanimously reject the Piece; but when Hogarth prefents him in Richard, we acknowledge Garrick's Face, his Eyes, his Brow, &c. and though the Idea of Garrick in that Attitude excites an agreeable Recollection, yet it is the Imitation that is uppermoft in our Thoughts, and which we principally admire. Our Author in the next Place takes notice of Ambition; and then adds, that having con fidered the Paffions, he shall proceed to examine into the Things that caufe the Sublime and Beautiful. With regard to the Sublime, he fays, the Paffion raifed by it is Aftonishment: and Astonishment he defines That State of the Soul in which all its Motions are fufpended with fome Degree of Horror.' But Astonishment is perhaps that State of the Soul, when the Powers of the Mind are fufpended with Wonder. Horror may tincture it, and Love may enliven it. As for Inftance: when we are told, afflavit Deus et diffipantur, He blew with his Wind, and they were fcattered, we are fufpended with Wonder, and are astonished at fuch exalted Power, not without a Mixture of Horror: but when we read, God faid, let there be Light and there was Light;'

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