are of one, viz. by a unity of substance; and still, the mysterious economy which distributes unity into a Trinity is observed, marking out [distinguishing] Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. There are three, not in condition but in rank; not in essence but form; not in power but in kind; but they are of one substance, condition, and power, for there is one God from whom those ranks, and forms, and kinds, are reckoned by the name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost."

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A little farther on he says: Whatever, therefore, the substance of the Word (Logos) is, I call him a PERSON, and defend the application of this name to him; and while I acknowledge the Son, I maintain that he is second from the Father.... The third is the Spirit from God and the Son, as the fruit from the stalk is the third from the root; a sluice from the river [the third] from the fountain; the point from a ray of light [the third] from the sun. So the Trinity pro⚫ceeds, by interlinked and connected grades, from the Father."

In Cap. 9, he says: "They (the Trinity) are not separate from each other, although the Father may be said to be diverse from the Son and the Spirit."

And again: "We are baptized into the persons [of the Trinity] severally, by the use of their several names."*

* "Perversitas hæc (sc. Praxeae) se existimat meram veritatem possidere, dum unicum Deum non alias putat credendum, quam si ipsum eundemque et Patrem, et Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum dicat, quasi non sic quoque unus sit omnia, dum ex uno omnia, per substantiae scilicet unitatem; et nihilominus custodiatur oikovouías sacramentum, quæ unitatem in TRINITATEM disponit, tres dirigens, Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum. Tres autem non statu sed gradu; nec substantia sed forma; nec potestate sed specie: unius autem substantiæ, et status, et potestatis, quia unus Deus ex quo et gradus isti, et formæ, et species in nomine Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum deputantur."

-“Quæcunque, ergo, substantia Sermonis (Tov 2óyov) sit, illum dico PERSONAM et illi nomen vindico; et dum Filium agnosco, secundum a patre defendo.- -Tertius est Spiritus a Deo et Filio, sicut tertius a radice fructus ex frutice; a fonte rivus ex flumine; a sole apex ex radio. Ita TRINITAS per consertos et connexos gradus a Patre decurrit.

-"Inseparati tamen ab alterutro, etsi dicatur alium esse Patrem, alium Filium et Spiritum.

-"Ad singula Nomina, in personas singulas tingimur."

It is proper to observe here, how plainly and definitely the words person and Trinity are applied by Tertullian to the Godhead; which contradicts the very confident affirmations of many writers, that these terms were merely an invention of later ages and of scholastic divinity. I may add, that the familiar and habitual use which Tertullian makes of them, proves that they were commonly understood, or at least commonly used in the church, at a very early period, and in reference to the very distinction in the Godhead which is the present subject of discussion. I believe the writings of this father afford the earliest specimen, now extant, of the technical use (if I may so speak) of the word Trinity and Person. His object cannot be mistaken. His antagonist, Praxeas, denied that there existed any distinction in the Godhead, or any except a mere verbal one. Tertullian means to assert the existence of a threefold distinction; and to designate this he uses the word Trinity. To signify that this distinction is real, and not merely nominal, he uses the word person. The Latin word persona, which he employs, means, when applied to men, that quality, state, or condition, whereby man differs from a brute, or whereby one man differs from another. Analogically with this meaning, Tertullian applies the word to the Godhead, i. e. to the distinctions which he supposed to exist in it, and which he regarded as real.

But to explain Tertullian's similitudes, so frequently copied in after ages, is more than I shall undertake. Who does not see, that all similitudes drawn from created, limited, dependent beings or things, must be utterly inadequate to illustrate the mode in which an uncreated, infinite, and omnipresent Being exists? What is even the attempt at explanation, but "darkening counsel by words without knowledge?" I believe with Tertullian in a threefold distinction in the Godhead; but I believe simply the fact of a Trinity, and do not venture to make any attempt at explanation, by comparison with material objects.

In like manner, Origen, who began to flourish before Tertullian's decease, reprehends those "who do not attribute

person (vлóσταov) to the Word or Logos;" and shortly after he adds: "Three persons (τqeïs vлoorάous) we acknowledge, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost;" (Comm. in Johan. p. 24.) I adduce this passage, however, only to show how early the use of the word person, as applied to the distinction in the Godhead, came to be employed by Christians, and not to prove the strict orthodoxy of Origen.

Have the venerable Council of Nice, held A. D. 325, succeeded any better than Tertullian, in their attempts to define the specific relation of the Son to the Father? Their words are: "We believe in one God, the Father almighty, the maker of all things visible and invisible; and in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the only begotten of the Father, that is, of the substance of the Father, God of God, light of light, very God of very God, begotten not made, of the same substance with the Father, by whom all things were made."*

This Council believed, no doubt, in the eternal generation of the Son; and meant to affirm, by the peculiar phraseology which they have here exhibited, that one real and essential distinction between the Father and the Son consists in the fact of the eternal generation of the latter. Arius affirmed, that the Son was begotten (by which he meant produced or created) in time. The special object of the Nicene creed was, to express dissent from, and opposition to, the opinions of Arius and his partisans as to this particular. In order to do this, the Nicene fathers maintained that the generation of the Son was eternal.

For myself, I must confess that I am unable to attach any definite meaning to the phrase eternal generation. Or, to speak more explicitly, I cannot attach any definite meaning

* Πιστεύομεν εἰς ἕνα Θεόν, πατέρα, παντοκράτορα, πάντων ὁρατῶν τε καὶ ἀοράτων ποιητήν· καὶ εἰς ἕνα Κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, τὸν ὑιὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὸν γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς μονογενῆ, τουτ ̓ ἔστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός, θεὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ, φῶς ἐκ φωτός, θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ θεοῦ ἀληθι νοῦ, γεννηθέντα οὐ ποιηθέντα, ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί· δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο, κ.τ.λ. Symb. Nicaenum.

which consists with a tolerable explanation of these words, without virtually conceding that Christ is not God supreme. After all that has been said, or can be said, about the mysterious manner of Christ's generation, and in fact conceding for the moment that all which has been said in respect to it is true, it still remains a thing so plain as to be incapable of reasonable denial, that the generation of the Son in his divine nature, however mysterious or incomprehensible, imports at least a derivation in some sense or other. It is impossible to deny this, unless all regard to the proper meaning of words is laid aside. And if the Logos, i. e. Christ in his divine nature, was derived, then he can be neither self-existent nor independent. Indeed, the strenuous and consistent advocates of the Nicene creed do not admit the self-existence and the independence of the Son. Taking it for granted that sonship is applicable to the divine nature, (and the Nicene creed is plainly built on this), and that it must of necessity imply derivation in some sense, or at least with respect to that nature, they must of course, in order to be consistent, deny that Christ is autóvɛos or self-existent; and consequently, if still consistent, they must maintain that he is not independent.

With this view of the Nicene fathers I cannot here enter into controversy; but it may justly be demanded of me, in present circumstances, to be explicit as to my own views of this doctrine. Very briefly then would I say, that, instructed as I have been in respect to the nature of true Godhead, it is impossible for me to predicate this quality of any being who is neither self-existent nor independent. These are the ultimate, highest, plainest, and most certain of all the discretive attributes of Godhead, i. e. attributes which separate the divine Being from all other possible beings. If the Son possess not these attributes, then he can be only a veòs devtegos, i. e. a God of secondary rank; and so Origen and others have actually named him. The ancient fathers, many of them nurtured in the bosom of a heathen religion which admitted the endless generation and multiplicity of gods, felt much less difficulty in believing in the generation of a nature

which was in their view truly divine, than we of the present day must feel, after all the discussions which have taken place about the true spiritual nature of the Godhead. Applying the sonship of Christ to his divine nature, and overlooking the declarations on this subject of a celestial interpreter (Luke 1: 35), they felt themselves bound to maintain a generation of the divine nature of the Son, while they still most explicitly avowed their belief in his true divinity; for θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, i. e. very God of very God, most surely implies this. I believe that what they substantially aimed at, is a doctrine of Scripture. But I cannot subscribe to their terminology, for the reasons stated above. If their words are to be interpreted by any of the common laws of exegesis, they must import a derivation and dependence of the Son, in his divine nature. But how can a being be regarded as supreme God, who is neither self-existent nor independent? Still, if the Nicene fathers failed as to proper modes of expression, this should not be put to the account of the Bible. John says not one word of the LOGOs, as such, which would lead us, in the way of simple interpretation, to conclude that in this nature he is either derived or dependent; and John is the only New Testament writer who has expressly treated of the Logos, and disclosed to us his original

state.

The Nicene creed then is not, I must confess, sufficiently orthodox for me. I believe that Christ is "God over all, and blessed for ever;" that he is "the true God and eternal life;" that "he made all things;" and that "he who did make all things is GOD." A 9ɛòs dɛúrɛgos—a God of secondary rank-seems to me altogether incompatible with the true spiritual doctrine of scriptural Christianity. Yet I am far from thinking that the Nicene fathers designed to assert and maintain the actual inferiority of the Son; although they do so strenuously maintain his generation or derivation. We must not scan their metaphysical notions by the philosophy of the present day. I agree with them in their most important position, (i. e. in what I deem to be their most impor