SERMON XIV.

AGAINST FOOLISH TALKING AND JESTING.

EPHES. V. 4.

-Nor foolish talking, nor jesting, which are not con

venient.

XIV.

MORAL and political aphorisms are seldom couch- SERM. ed in such terms, that they should be taken as they sound precisely, or according to the widest extent of signification; but do commonly need exposition, and admit exception: otherwise frequently they would not only clash with reason and experience, but interfere, thwart, and supplant one another. The best masters of such wisdom are wont to interdict things, apt by unseasonable or excessive use to be perverted, in general forms of speech, leaving the restrictions, which the case may require or bear, to be made by the hearer's or interpreter's discretion : whence many seemingly formal prohibitions are to be received only as sober cautions. This observation may be particularly supposed applicable to this precept of St. Paul, which seemeth universally to forbid a practice commended (in some cases and degrees) by philosophers as virtuous, not disallowed by reason, commonly affected by men, often used by wise and good persons; from which consequently if our religion did wholly debar us, it would seem chargeable with somewhat too uncouth austerity

XIV.

πόντες μηθὲν

σε λέγουσι

τες, άγριοι

καὶ σκληροὶ

a

SERM. and sourness: from imputations of which kind as in its temper and frame it is really most free, (it Oi μnr' ti- never quenching natural light, or cancelling the dic, tates of sound reason, but confirming and improvdurigaivo. ing them ;) so it carefully declineth them, enjoining Save us, that if there be any things poopiλ (lovely, or grateful to men,) any things evpnua, (of good report and repute,) if there be any virtue and any praise, (any thing in the common apprehensions of men held worthy and laudable,) we should mind those things, that is, should yield them a regard answerable to the esteem they carry among rational and sober persons.

Arist. Eth.

iv. 8.

Phil. iv. 8.

Whence it may seem requisite so to interpret and determine St. Paul's meaning here concerning eTрaneλía, (that is, facetious speech or raillery, by our translators rendered jesting,) that he may consist with himself, and be reconciled to Aristotle, who placeth this practice in the rank of virtues; or that religion and reason may well accord in the case; supposing, that if there be any kind of facetiousness innocent and reasonable, conformable to good manners, (regulated by common sense, and consistent with the tenor of Christian duty, that is, not transgressing the bounds of piety, charity, and sobriety,) St. Paul did not intend to discountenance or prohibit that kind.

For thus expounding and limiting his intent, we have some warrant from himself, some fair intimations in the words here. For first, what sort of facetious speech he aimeth at, he doth imply by the fellow he coupleth therewith; papoλoyía, saith he, EvTpaTexía, foolish talking, or facetiousness: such facetiousness therefore he toucheth as doth include

folly, in the matter or manner thereof. Then he SERM. further determineth it, by adjoining a peculiar qual- XIV. ity thereof, unprofitableness or impertinency; tà μn ȧvýkovτa, which are not pertinent, or conducible to any good purpose: whence may be collected, that it is a frivolous and idle sort of facetiousness which he condemneth.

But however manifest it is, that some kind thereof he doth earnestly forbid: whence, in order to the guidance of our practice, it is needful to distinguish the kinds, severing that which is allowable from that which is unlawful; that so we may be satisfied in the case, and not on the one hand ignorantly transgress our duty, nor on the other trouble ourselves with scruples, others with censures, upon the use of warrantable liberty therein.

And such a resolution seemeth indeed especially needful in this our age, (this pleasant and jocular age,) which is so infinitely addicted to this sort of speaking, that it scarce doth affect or prize any thing near so much; all reputation appearing now to vail and stoop to that of being a wit: to be learned, to be wise, to be good, are nothing in comparison thereto; even to be noble and rich are inferior things, and afford no such glory. Many at least, to purchase this glory, to be deemed considerable in this faculty, and enrolled among the wits, do not only make shipwreck of conscience, abandon virtue, and forfeit all pretences to wisdom; but neglect their estates, and prostitute their honour: so to the private damage of many particular persons, and with no small prejudice to the public, are our times possessed and transported with this humour. To repress the excess and extravagance whereof, nothing

SERM. in way of discourse can serve better, than a plain XIV. declaration when and how such a practice is allow

able or tolerable; when it is wicked and vain, unworthy of a man endued with reason, and pretending to honesty or honour.

This I shall in some measure endeavour to perform. But first it may be demanded what the thing we speak of is, or what this facetiousness doth import? To which question I might reply as Democritus did to him that asked the definition of a man, It is that which we all see and know: any one better apprehends what it is by acquaintance, than I can inform him by description. It is indeed a thing so versatile and multiform, appearing in so many shapes, so many postures, so many garbs, so variously apprehended by several eyes and judgments, that it seemeth no less hard to settle a clear and certain notion thereof, than to make a portrait of Proteus, or to define the figure of the fleeting air. Sometimes it lieth in pat allusion to a known story, or in seasonable application of a trivial saying, or in forging an apposite tale: sometimes it playeth in words and phrases, taking advantage from the ambiguity of their sense, or the affinity of their sound: sometimes prudenti- it is wrapped in a dress of humorous expression : sometimes it lurketh under an odd similitude: someta sunt, si times it is lodged in a sly question, in a smart anvenusta swer, in a quirkish reason, in a shrewd intimation, Quint.vi. 3. in cunningly diverting, or cleverly retorting an ob

Eadem

quæ, si im

bus exci

dunt, stul

simulamus,

creduntur.

jection: sometimes it is couched in a bold scheme of speech, in a tart irony, in a lusty hyperbole, in a startling metaphor, in a plausible reconciling of contradictions, or an acute nonsense: sometimes a scenical representation of persons or things, a counter

XIV.

omnis salse

tio in eo

est rectum

dicatur.

feit speech, a mimical look or gesture passeth for it: SERM. sometimes an affected simplicity, sometimes a presumptuous bluntness giveth it being: sometimes it riseth from a lucky hitting upon what is strange, sometimes from a crafty wresting obvious matter to the purpose: often it consisteth in one knows not what, and springeth up one can hardly tell how. Its ways are unaccountable and inexplicable, being answerable to the numberless rovings of fancy and windings of language. It is, in short, a manner of speaking out of the simple and plain way, (such as Et hercle reason teacheth and proveth things by,) which by a diceudi rapretty surprising uncouthness in conceit or expres-est, ut alision doth affect and amuse the fancy, stirring in it ter quam some wonder, and breeding some delight thereto. It verumque raiseth admiration, as signifying a nimble sagacity of Quint. apprehension, a special felicity of invention, a vivacity of spirit, and reach of wit more than vulgar : it seeming to argue a rare quickness of parts, that one can fetch in remote conceits applicable; a notable skill, that he can dexterously accommodate them to the purpose before him; together with a lively briskness of humour, not apt to damp those sportful flashes of imagination. (Whence in Aristotle such Eth. iv. 8. persons are termed idétio, dexterous men; and eτροποι, men of facile or versatile manners, who easily turn themselves to all things, or turn things to themselves.) It also procureth delight, gratifying curiosity with its rareness or semblance 2.5, of difficulty; (as monsters, not for their beauty, but vs. their rarity; as juggling tricks, not for their use, Eph. Or. but their abstruseness, are beheld with pleasure ;) by diverting the mind from its road of serious thoughts; by instilling gayety and airiness of spirit; by provok

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ευ

can Εὐτράπελος allies,

by?

λέγεται ὁ ποικίλος, ὁ παντοδαπός,

πάντα για

Chrys. in

17.