understanding and a will peculiar to itself and is susceptible of obligations and rights." When he says, however, that a State is a "moral person", we must be on our guard. From what has preceded, it is evident that a State is not an independent personality, possessing the freedom of will, judgment, action and conscience of an individual. A sentient human being, possessing what might be termed integrity of personality and character, may make rational decisions, love, hate, sacrifice, and conform, even quixotically, to what he may consider the dictates of conscience. Ethical rules and considerations necessarily should play a very considerable rôle in all his actions. They may even involve him and his family in ruin or death.

It would be palpably untrue to say that the State is a “moral person" in the same sense as the individual, even in the case of the responsible officials entrusted with the direction of the affairs of a nation. No matter what their own personal predilections may be, they are not free to carry into effect their own conceptions of duty and responsibility unless it should happen that they are irresponsible tyrants. The official decisions and actions of a nation, as we have seen, proceed from the common judgment, will and conscience of all, and this is something quite distinct from the individual will, judgment and conscience. Ethical consideration naturally cannot be ignored by the State, but it would be entirely inaccurate to say that the State reacts as a "moral person" in identically the same manner as the individual. For these reasons, I take it that what Vattel meant when he spoke of the State as a "moral person" was that a State, in order to enjoy rights and to meet its responsibilities, must be considered a "moral person " in a legal sense. He was not attributing to the State a moral personality possessing the attributes of a human being.

We are accustomed under the influence of the recent war to look with distrust on German methods of political thought. Their exaggeration, their perversion of the idea of nationality, has led us to regard the German conception of the State as something unreal and fantastic, particularly when it involved the worship of the person of the Kaiser as the supreme embodiment of the State. It is true that the Germans were inclined to wor

ship the State as a sacred entity, as much the object of a cult as the statue of Buddha. I believe, however, that there is a substantial truth in the German theory of the State as enunciated by the Swiss publicist Bluntschli, when he said:

An oil-painting is something other than a mere aggregation of drops of oil and color; a statue is something other than a combination of marble particles; a man is not a mere quantity of cells and blood-corpuscles; and so too the nation is not a mere sum of citizens; and the State is not a mere collection of external regulations. In the State, spirit and body, will and active organs, are necessarily bound together in one life. The one national spirit, which is something different from the average sum of the contemporary spirit of all citizens, is the spirit of the State; the one national will, which is different from the average will of the multitude, is the will of the State. To extend the reputation and the power of the State, to further its welfare and its happiness, has universally been regarded as one of the most honorable duties of gifted men.

In properly estimating the value of this definition of the State, we must try to forget the ardent sentiment which led Germans in their patriotic zeal to exalt the State so highly. We should remember that German statesmen, such as Bismarck, were careful in their legislation to persuade these perfervid devotees of the State that it existed to further the welfare and best interests of all. This, it seems to me, is the essence of the best kind of nationalism, namely, the common realization of the fact that the highest evolution of the individual is to be found in organized society, and that a loyal devotion to one's own group is the most effective way of serving the interests of the greatest number. In this sense, therefore, I hold that in view of the vast differences of language, of sentiment, of tradition, of ideals and even of interests that characterize the many distinct national groups throughout the world, there is nothing more sacred, nothing more essential for the evolution of mankind, than the protection and the furthering of national aspirations. As in the animal kingdom, so in society, a man can only develop his best powers in the habitat and milieu to which he is by nature best adapted. This is merely the plea for the freedom of the individual within nations, exactly as we insist on the freedom of the individual in education, religion and other lines of activity. We must insist on the freedom of nations to work out their own problems ac

cording to the genius of their own national instincts and institutions, firmly believing that only in this way can groups of individuals make their richest contributions, scientifically or ethically, to the highest evolution of the human race.

If one can conceive this function and this supreme value of the State in the evolution of man as a "political animal”, he can more sympathetically as well as rationally understand what loyalty to the group, or national patriotism, really means. He

can more readily appreciate the justification as well as the explanation of national differences, yes, even rivalries, provided they be laudable rivalries for the ultimate benefit of the human race.

He can understand those extraordinary peculiarities of national temperament, the divergencies even in methods of thought and also of ethical standards, that variously characterize a Frenchman, a Britisher, a Dutchman, an American, a Japanese, a German, etc. He can better realize why it is that men of different nationalities feel a glow of sentiment and a willingness to submerge their own personalities into their respective nations. Under such conditions, a citizen comes to realize that not only is he not a free personality in a loose association or corporation of other individuals, but that he is integrally a unit in a vast organism which in a sense is immortal, which perpetuates itself, replenishes its life, and, in the Bergsonian sense, is very much like an onward flowing river, composed of patriots of many generations past as well as of the present, and receiving into itself generations yet unborn.

These, it seems to me, are the main reasons which justify the individual in making what would appear to be such great sacrifices of integrity of judgment and character. No matter how vaguely sensed, or feebly expressed, it is this realization of the ends of political, social and ethical evolution that justifies a man in making these sacrifices, and that convinces him that there are compensations that vastly outweigh them. He serves the State because the State best serves him. Any other conclusion would seem clearly to lead to anarchism.

There are two general conclusions of moment regarding international society which I think should be particularly borne in mind. The first is, that if the State is an entity quite distinct

from the individual, and responding to different standards of reason and ethics from those applied to the individual, it must necessarily follow that the law protecting the interests of nations and controlling their inter-relations is a vastly different kind of law from that governing the relations of individuals. This distinction is fundamental in any study of international society, for the reason that inevitably we are inclined to reason by analogy from municipal society and law. It is infinitely more simple, more restful, more satisfying, to think of nations as we would think of our own particular community; but this is utterly fatal when one once realizes the basic difference between the State and the individual. When one has a glimpse of the problem of protecting and advancing the interests of millions of human beings pursuing their own best ends along separate but convergent lines of national instincts and institutions, he realizes that ordinary reasoning by analogy is not only insufficient but quite disastrous.

This is particularly obvious in the case of those followers of Austin who are unable to think of law in any other terms than that of the policeman. To them law is an order, a command; and disobedience to the law is to be met immediately with punishment. They cannot think on the plane of law as it is to function between these mysterious entities that we call nations. This leads inevitably to futile arguments and conclusions, quite simple often in their nature, which have very little relation to the facts of international existence. In order to get anywhere in our task of understanding the problems of international society, we must, first of all, have a clear understanding of these fundamental problems we have been considering, namely, the nature of the State, the interests of the State, and the law which shall best protect and advance these interests among nations. I am frank to confess that as I consider the points of view of eminent publicists and statesmen on the subject of international law, I am perforce led to infer that they have not always understood the exact nature of international society. There is an immense need for original, hard thinking on this whole field before we can make much headway in solving the great problems that now confront the society of nations.

The second general conclusion is that the problem of international organization becomes increasingly difficult when viewed in the light of the preceding considerations. How can we even discuss to any great advantage the problem of international organization-more definitely, the organization and functioning of the League of Nations or of any conference of nations called for the purpose of furthering the best interests of all-when we have not even agreed as to the precise nature of this society or of the law which should reign supreme? Such discussion would not only seem futile, but even dangerous when it results in an accentuation of the sense of differences of interests among nations, and fails to accentuate their common ultimate interests. Under such circumstances we should charitably make all due allowances for our inability to agree on methods and programmes for international conciliation or organization. Lamenting the palpable fact that we are arguing from different premises, some of which are bound to be false, we should labor to encourage a more scholarly, dispassionate study of these vast problems of international society which it has been the purpose of this article to outline and suggest. PHILIP MARSHALL BROWN.