LETTER II.

Of the Being of a God.

GENTLEMEN,

WHEN I fay that there is a God, I mean

that there is an intelligent author of nature, and I maintain that it is most agreeable to natural analogy to admit this. Becaufe marks of defign, which we univerfally confider as indications of mind, are as confpicuous in the works of nature, as in those of art.

Would any perfon, after confidering the ftructure and obvious ufe of a telescope, maintain that it was made without any defign, and not intended to give us a diftinct view of remote objects, and therefore that it proves the existence of a mind in which that defign was formed, previous to the construction of the inftrument? Can the fame perfon, then, confider the ftructure of the eye, and not fay

that

that it was a work of design alfo, its use being exactly fimilar to that of the telescope, and at least as well adapted to answer its end? Are not, alfo, hands, feet, and every other part of the human body, as clearly adapted to answer their several purposes? May not the fame obfervation be made with respect to every part of nature? Is not every thing we see a part of one great whole? Does there not, then, exist a mind capable of comprehending this whole, and a caufe that produced the whole? Is it not as abfurd to say that the visible univerfe had no caufe without itself, as that a telescope had none?

Whatever difficulty may attend the farther queftion, what was the cause of this caufe, thus far we proceed on the clearest grounds, following the most indubitable analogies; and difficult as it may be to conceive that this great cause of all things exifts, and has exifted, uncaused from all eternity, it is not fo difficult as to believe that any thing could begin to be without any caufe; for this you cannot but acknowledge to be an abfolute impoffibility.

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poffibility. For if ever there was a time when nothing had exifted, nothing could have exifted. The actual existence, therefore, of fuch a world as this of which we make a part, a world which bears every poffible mark of the most exquifite defign, is an irrefragable proof that there exifts, and has existed from all eternity, a Being poffeffed of a mind capable of comprehending it, and that must be deemed the proper author of it.

That we do not fee this great Being, is no evidence of his non-existence. For as many things do not affect fome of our fenfes, which are the inlets of all our ideas, others may elude them all. Nor is it of any moment. whatever in what kind of fubftance the attributes of power and intelligence, which we muft afcribe to the author of the visible univerfe, refide. In fact, we know nothing of any fubftance, having no idea of any thing but what we call properties, which, as we say, inhere in, or belong to, the feveral things, or fubftances, that we are acquainted with. It is enough for us that there are evident marks of

defign in what we fee, to infer the existence of a defigning caufe, whatever that cause be, and whether, with refpect to its fubftance, it be visible or invifible, tangible or intangible, &c. &c. &c.

I am, &c.

LETTER III.

Of the Attributes and Providence of God.

GENTLEMEN,

ADMITTING the being of a God, or a principle of intelligence in the Universe, we must judge of the defigns of this Being as we would of those of any other, viz. by the character of his works. And the works of nature, I think you cannot but admit with me, are the works of a benevolent author; all percipient creatures being formed capable of enjoyments fuited to their nature, and furnished with the means of procuring them, and alfo of avoiding, or mitigating, the evils to which they are neceffarily expofed.

The

The more we fee into the economy of nature, the more fenfible we are that all evil is fubfervient to good, and, as far as we can judge, infeparable from it; fo that, for any thing that appears, the most benevolent Being

would not have conftituted the univerfe otherwife than it is. That we fhould not be able to fee the uses of all particular evils, and should not be able to comprehend the whole of fo immenfe a fyftem as that of the universe, cannot appear furprifing, when one man ist not always able, without particular inftruction, to comprehend the works of another

man.

It is also most agreeable to analogy to afcribe the whole univerfe to one author, on account of the uniformity that is evident through the whole, and the fubferviency of one part to another, immenfe as this great whole is, and incomprehenfible as the great Author of it muft be. If it would be unreafonable to fuppofe that one being formed the head of a man, another the hands, and others the remaining parts of the body, equally unreafonable would