ideas not only so unlike, but so directly opposite, and therefore the word post is not so used?

Again, the Latin word "inducere" is used to denote the marking down, or recording of items in an account; "inducere pecuniam in rationem," to charge money in an account, Cic. And yet the same Cicero uses the word inducere to denote the erasure of what is written, as "inducere Senatus consultum, seu locationem," to erase a decree of the Senate, or a lease; also, “inducere nomina," to erase names. This use arose from the fact that writings on wax tables were erased by drawing the wax over the tablets. But shall we say the same word cannot possibly distinguish ideas so opposite as to introduce into a record, and to blot out from a record, and therefore induco is not so used?

Can anything be more opposite than to cut or tear roughly, and to smoothe and polish? And yet the word to mangle is used to denote both. The mangled body of a soldier might repose in nicely mangled linen sheets.

The truth is, common sense and the context always guide us, in such cases, and the actual usages of language refuse to be bound by à priori canons as to what is possible or impossible.

2. In certain situations, two words, OR EVEN SEVERAL WORDS, MAY WITH EQUAL PROPRIETY FILL THE SAME PLACE, THOUGH THEY ARE

ALL ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT IN THEIR SIGNIFICATIONS, p. 57; e.g. a man who is immersed, and is wet, and washed, and purified by it, may, in describing the transaction, say truly, I was immersed; or I was wet; or I was washed; or I was purified; and yet it does not follow that all of these words mean the same thing. Hence if, in describing the baptism of Christ, it is said he was purified; it does not follow of course that purify is a synonyme of baptize. It may be that it is merely used in its place. Dr. Carson introduces this canon with great authority: "I do not request my readers to admit my canon. I insist on their submission: let them deny it if they can." Dr. Carson obviously looks upon this as a profound and original view; for he says, "it is from ignorance of this principle that lexicographers have

given meanings to words which they do not possess," p. 57. Its truth I do not deny; of its profundity and originality let others judge.

3. "One mode of wetting is figured as another mode of wetting by the liveliness of the imagination," p. 38; e. g. "A cold shuddering dew dips me all o'er,"-MILTON. This canon is designed to exclude the meaning to wet from Sarw, in the case where it is said of Nebuchadnezzar: ἔβαφη ἀπὸ τῆς δρόσου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ, i. e. his body was wet by the dew of heaven; according to Dr. Carson, his body was dipped, is a lively and imaginative mode of expressing his thorough wetting by the dew ; which in fact was not a dipping. This canon exhausts its full force in a vain effort to dispose of this passage.*

4. "Metaphor is not bound to find examples to justify its par ticular figures; but may indulge itself wherever it finds resemblance.” Reply, p. 436. This canon is introduced, as we shall see in its place, to repel my allegation that there are no examples in the use of language to justify the figure, "immerse in the Holy Spirit."

5. We are to distinguish between the nature of the rite and the meaning of its name: e. g. when Chrysostom says, "Christ calls his cross baptism, because by it he purified the world ;" he may refer not to the import of the name of the rite, but to its nature as a rite of purification. "It is quite immaterial whether the idea of purification be found in the name or in the nature of the ordinance."-Reply, p. 471. Such are Dr. Carson's leading canons of trial.

It is plain on looking at them, that they are all designed for one end, to explain away alleged secondary senses, by proving that the primary may be retained; they do not prove that it is retained, but that it may be,—that we are not compelled to admit a secondary sense.

Dr. Carson's final step is to introduce what he calls the testi

*The preposition àrò forbids this interpretation.

mony of the word Sarria itself; i. e. the fact that it clearly has the sense immerse in other cases; this, and the fact that it may have it in this case, proves that it actually has it, however improbable it may be, from the nature of the subject spoken of.

But Dr. Carson commonly takes this last step, by assuming the very point in debate; i. e. that he has proved that the word Sarril never means anything but immerse, in the whole range of the Greek language; when the very question in debate is: Has it not another meaning? For,

1. He has made only a limited examination of the uses of the word. Quite large, indeed, in one view of the matter. Far larger than was necessary if he merely aimed to prove that immerse is a meaning of Barril. But if he aimed to exclude every other meaning, far too limited. The word Barrigw and its derivatives occur in the writers of ecclesiastical Greek ten times, not to say a hundred times more frequently than in all the classic Greek writers taken together. For as a leading ordinance of Christianity, through which the forgiveness of sins and eternal life were supposed to come, baptism was to them a subject of deep and incessant interest; it filled all their thoughts-it gave color to all their emotions-it pervaded all their voluminous works. For successive folio pages, Barríw or its derivatives meet the eye incessantly on every page. In them also the word is used with direct reference to the Christian ordinance of baptism-so that nothing can be more in point than their testimony. And Dr. Carson earnestly maintains that they must have known the sense in which it was used by the apostles. Yet from this part of the language, in his work on baptism, he produced few examples, yea, I had almost said none. Nor have I yet been able to find any proof that he had ever read the Greek Fathers on this subject-I do not say that he had not, but merely that he has made assertions that I know not how to explain if he had, as I shall soon show.

2. On this limited examination of the uses of the word, he has based the affirmation that he has "by the use of language FOUND

that the word has this meaning (i. e. immerse), and no other." He says he has found this to be so. What does this mean? Has he examined every case of its usage in the Greek language? He does not pretend it. Nay, he clearly declares that he has not.

"I regret," he says, "that I have not every passage in which the word occurs in the Greek language." (On Baptism, p. 24.) How, then, did Dr. Carson find that the word Barriga means immerse in passages which, even according to his own showing, he never saw ? There can be no way except that in which he establishes one of his canons, p. 90: WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE

PRACTICE OF LANGUAGE AND ON THE AUTHORITY OF SELF-EVIDENT

TRUTH!! Truly this is a convenient way of settling the meaning of words. If this is not the way in which Dr. Carson has found out the meaning of Barril in cases which he has never seen, I wait to learn by aid of what undiscovered principle he has found it.

3. Upon a basis so frail Dr. Carson, with unparalleled boldness, makes assertions as to the use of the word in the whole range and history of the Greek language. P. 448, “Immersion is the only meaning of the word in every instance in the whole compass of the language." P. 449, "I tell Mr. Beecher it never signifies to purify. My authority is the practice of the Greek language." P. 464, he calls this "the ascertained meaning of the word." P. 451, "its established meaning."

4. Incredible as it may seem, yet it is true, that on an assumption so totally devoid of proof, on such a mere petitio principii, Dr. Carson's whole argument against me is based. Having thus found out and ascertained the meaning of the word, he calls it "the testimony of the word known by its use," p. 451; "the authority of the word," p. 452, and gravely informs us, p. 459, that " probability, even the highest probability avails nothing against testimony ;" and p. 464, "to allege probability against the ascertained meaning of a word, is to deny testimony as a source of evidence, for the meaning of testimony must be known

by the words used." But what is this testimony? Is the word Barril a living intelligent being? Is it conscious of its own meaning? Has it testified to Dr. Carson as to its universal use? If not, and if Dr. Carson has seen but a few out of the multitude of its usages, how dares he to call the little that he has seen, the universal, absolute, and exclusive sense of the word, and then to personify it, as a witness in a court of justice, swearing down all probable evidence by direct testimony? Never was there a more perfect illusion than such reasoning as this. It is neither more nor less than proving the point in question by incessantly and dogmatically assuming it. For until he has first assumed, without proof, that he has "found" or "ascertained," that Barrigw means immerse, and nothing else, "in every instance in the whole compass of the language," even in those cases which he never saw, how can he make the word testify to that point?

And yet this is his all-subduing argument in every case. First, by his canons of trial he makes the sense immerse possible, and then brings forward his witness, Barri(w, to testify that it has but one sense in the whole range of the Greek tongue, and that one immerse. He compares, p. 449, the meaning that he claims, to a client whose title to the whole estate is in evidence. P. 451, "The couches were immersed, because the word has this signification and no other." P. 450, " To deny this is to give the lie to the inspired narrators. The word used by the Holy Spirit signifies immersion, and immersion only." P. 453, "In fact, to allege that the couches were not immersed, is not to decide on the authority of the word used, but in opposition to this authority, to give the lie to the Holy Spirit. Inspiration employs a word to designate the purification of the couches which never signifies anything but immerse. If they were not immersed, the historian is a false witness. This way of conferring meaning on words is grounded on infidelity." Again: "When the Holy Spirit employs words whose meanings are not relished, critics do not say that he lies, but they say what is equal to this, that his words