[This is a respectful way of callBib. Rep. April, 1840, p. 359,† mean what they cannot mean. ing him a liar."]* I had said, "The question is not: Will we believe that the couches were immersed, if the Holy Ghost says so, but this, Has he said so?" and I decided that he has not. This, according to Dr. Carson, is a respectful way of calling him a liar. Now, in reply to all this, I totally deny Dr. Carson's whole ground work, in general, and in particular-in the whole, and in all its parts. There is no such testimony of the word Barrigw, as he alleges. It is all a mere fiction of Dr. Carson's, sustained by no evidence but his own unproved assertion. It is a mere dream. Does Dr. Carson allege passages in which the meaning immerse clearly occurs? I do not deny the meaning in those cases: in other cases I do deny it, and claim that there is satisfactory evidence of another sense. And am I to be answered by such a mere figment as an alleged testimony of the word as to its own use in all cases in the whole language, when in fact all that this testimony amounts to, is Dr. Carson's unproved assertion? And on such grounds as these, am I to be charged with giving the lie to the Holy Spirit? And yet, this is the whole foundation of Dr. Carson's argument against me. His whole logical strength lies here. This mere petitio principii, dressed up in all shapes, and urged with unparalleled assurance, figures from beginning to end of his reply. In this consists its whole heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, and life. It has no energy that is not derived from this. Such, then, are Mr. Carson's principles-such is his system, and such the mode in which he applies his principles. § 47. My Principles-How Dr. Carson represents them. Of my principles he speaks fiercely; and calls them false, fanatical, and subversive of all revealed truth. It is important, then, *This sentence is omitted in the last edition of Dr. Carson's reply to me. † See § 14. to inquire what are they? and has Dr. Carson truly represented · them? In answer to this, I reply, he has not. He has nowhere fairly stated or answered my principles at all; and no one from his reply could imagine what they are. What then has he done? He discusses no principles at the outset. He merely says that I have proved no secondary sense of βαπτίζω, and that " my dissertation is no more to critical deduction than Waverley or Kenilworth to history. Indeed the relation is not so true; it wants that verisimilitude which is to be found in the novels of the illustrious Scott. To the ignorant there is an appearance of philosophy and learning, but sound criticism will have little difficulty in taking the foundation from under the edifice which he has labored to erect," page 429. He then takes up the passages on which I rely, and proceeds, in his way, to take out the foundation. That is, he assumes the truth of his own principles, though I had proved them to be false-suppresses or misrepresents mine, and then declares that all the evidence I have adduced is no proof-and is filled with unutterable amazement at my excessive want of perspicacity, etc. All of which amounts to merely this, that I rely on arguments which his principles reject, but which are sound and unanswerable according to my own. In other words, though I have proved his principles to be false, yet because I do not see with his eyes, therefore I do not see at all, but am stupid, blind, etc. At length, on p. 464, he thus represents my principles. "Mr. Beecher proceeds on an axiom that is false, fanatical, and subversive of all revealed truth—namely, that meaning is to be assigned to words in any document, not from the authority of the use of language, ascertained by acknowledged examples, but from views of probability of the thing related independently of the testimony of the word." Dr. Carson does not pretend that this axiom is stated in my words; but he gives it in his own words, and in italics too, as a condensed summary of my principles. To all this I have but one reply to make, and that is a direct denial. I reject this statement of my views, as entirely delusive, and totally unfair. Do I indeed avowedly disregard the authority of the use of language, ascertained by acknowledged examples, in assigning meaning to words? All my principles are avowedly derived from the use of language, ascertained by acknowledged examples, and rest upon this use. What I actually do is this. In assigning a secondary meaning to words, I regard three things at least, and not one alone. I regard, 1. General laws of language, established by examples. 2. The original and primary sense of particular words. 3. The circumstances of the speaker, and the nature of the subject spoken of. It is by considering all these that I decide when a word has a secondary sense. § 48. True Statement of my Principles. My principles are fully and carefully set forth in §§ 1-7, occupying in all nearly 18 pages. No one who will carefully read them, can mistake them, or think that I hold the views ascribed to me by Dr. Carson. I cannot again go over all that ground; but for the sake of perspicuity, I will here briefly recapitulate the most important of my principles. 1. In assigning secondary senses, we are to be guided, as just stated, by general laws of language, the primary meaning of the word, the circumstances of the speaker, and the nature of the subject spoken of. 2. One of these general laws is, that, inasmuch as in all languages, a large number of words have left their primary sense and adopted secondary senses, it is never à priori improbable that the same should be true of any particular word. 3. But whilst such transitions are common in all words, they are particularly common in words of the class of Barrilw, denoting action by, or with a reference to a fluid. This is owing to the fact, that the effects produced by the action depend not on the action alone, but on the action and the fluid combined, and of course may be varied as the fluid or its application varies. And this I illustrated at great length, by acknowledged examples of the use of language in the case of cognate words. From this I inferred that the usages of languages create no probability against a secondary sense of the word Bansiw, but that the probability is decidedly in its favor. Still further, I alleged, 4. That the existence of manners and customs tending to such a result, renders such a result still more probable; and that among the Jews such manners and customs did exist. 5. That this probability is still more increased according to the laws of language, by the fact that Barrio refers to the work of the Holy Spirit, and that this is to purify, and that no external act has in itself any fitness to present this idea to the mind. For the effects of pouring, sprinkling, and immersion, depend not on the act, but on the fluid. The act being the same, ink, or oil, or wine, or pure water, or filthy water, would produce effects entirely unlike. The law of language in this case is, that in the progress of society new ideas produce either new words or new senses of old words—and that Barrigw, when applied to the operations of the Holy Ghost, was applied to a subject of thought unknown to the writers of classic Greek, and therefore had probably undergone a change to qualify it for its purpose, i. e. to designate his peculiar work. Now all of these principles relate to general laws of language, and in proof of them I appealed to acknowledged facts in the use of language. But I clearly stated that these principles do not of themselves prove that Barrilw means to purify, but merely open the way for such proof, and enable us to decide what, and how much proof is needed in order to prove the point. I also definitely stated that it was to be proved as other facts are, i. e. by appropriate evidence. And here comes up the real ground of difference between Dr. Carson and me. 1. Dr. Carson assumes, against all these previous probabilities, that a secondary sense in the word Barril cannot be established except by the highest possible proof, i. e. a case in which the primitive sense is impossible. This I totally deny, and maintain that a lower degree of proof is amply sufficient to establish a meaning, which the laws of language have already rendered so probable. 2. Dr. Carson totally disregards not only the lower degrees of moral evidence, but the laws of cumulative evidence also. He takes each passage separately, and if he can prove that it does not come up to his canon of proof, i. e. if it cannot be shown that the sense immersion is impossible, he sets it aside as a cipher, and so of every other one in detail. He then says, "each of the cases considered separately is nothing; all taken together, then, must be nothing. It is the addition or multiplication of ciphers." -Reply, p. 465. All this I totally deny, and maintain that it is entirely at war with the laws of moral and cumulative evidence. Because the reasoning of philology is not demonstrative, but moral and cumulative, and an ultimate result depends upon the combined impression of all the facts of a given case as a whole, on the principle that the view which best harmonizes all the facts, and falls in with the known laws of the human mind, is true. And where many separate and independent facts all tend, with different degrees of probability, to a common result, there is an evidence over and above the evidence furnished by each case in itself, in the coincidence of so many separate and independent probabilities, in a common result. And to prove that each may be explained otherwise, and is not in itself a demonstration, cannot break the force of the fact that so many separate and independent probabilities all tend one way. The probability thus produced, is greater than the sum of the separate probabilities; it |