Religion and Morality: Their Nature and Mutual Relations, Historically and Doctrinally Considered |
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according action ancient authority become belief called cause Chap character Christian civilization claim conception concerning conclusion condition conduct conscience consequences considered consistent constituted dependence derived desire determine distinction divine doctrine duty elements entire essential established eternal Ethics evil existence expressed fact faculty feelings followed force frequently future give gods happiness heaven human idea implies importance individual influence intelligence judgment Kant kind knowledge London look means mind moral law moral obligation motive nature necessary notion object obligation origin perfect person philosophy pleasure practical present prevailed principle punishment question race rational reach reason recognized reference relations religion religious representative requires respect reward rule sanction savage says sense social society soul Spencer spirit standard teaching theory things tion true truth universal utilitarian various virtue worship wrong
Popüler pasajlar
Sayfa 293 - has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other...
Sayfa 258 - As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as you would be done by and to love your neighbor as yourself constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.
Sayfa 263 - Those only are happy (I thought) who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness ; on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as itself an ideal end.
Sayfa 265 - Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures ; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.
Sayfa 256 - ... pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.
Sayfa 256 - It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that, while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.
Sayfa 256 - But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded — namely, that pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends...
Sayfa 269 - To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can give him no other reason than general utility.
Sayfa 302 - He, like every other man, may properly consider himself as one of the myriad agencies through whom works the Unknown Cause ; and when the Unknown Cause produces in him a certain belief, he is thereby authorized to profess and act out that belief.
Sayfa 257 - No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good ; that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.
Kaynakça bilgileri
| Başlık | Religion and Morality: Their Nature and Mutual Relations, Historically and Doctrinally Considered 3. cilt/Studia theologica, Catholic University of America 3. sayı/Studies in sacred theology |
| Yazar | James Joseph Fox |
| Yayıncı | W.H. Young, 1899 |
| Orijinalin kaynağı: | Princeton Üniversitesi |
| Dijital ortama aktarılmış | 18 Mar 2008 |
| Uzunluk | 322 sayfa |
| Alıntıyı Dışa Aktar | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |