life of man, and the life of man has four periods.1 At the end of each day Dante rests and sleeps; before dawn on each day except the first, a vision prepares him for the work of the day the work which cannot commence or proceed save in the light of the sun, for man can advance no step in this spiritual expiation without the light of God's grace. But the fourth day does not close, like the other three, in night; for it corresponds to that fourth and last stage of man's life, in which the soul "returns to God, as to that port whence she set out, when she came to enter upon the sea of this life" (Conv. iv. 28). There are three main divisions of the Mountain. From the shore to the gate of St. Peter is Ante-Purgatory, still subject to atmospheric changes. Within the gate is Purgatory proper, with its seven terraces bounded above by a ring of purifying flames. Thence the way leads up to the Earthly Paradise; for by these purgatorial pains the fall of Adam is repaired, and the soul of man regains the state of innocence.

In Ante-Purgatory Dante passes Easter Day and the following night. Here the souls of those who died in contumacy of the Church are detained at the foot of the mountain, and may not yet commence the ascent ; and the negligent, who deferred their conversion, and who now have to defer their purification, are waiting humbly around the lower slopes. Here purgation has not yet commenced; this is the place where "time by time is restored" (Purg. xxiii. 84). . . .

Within the gate is Purgatory proper with its seven terraces, each devoted to the purgation of one of the seven capital sins, out of which other vices spring,

1 Convito, iv. 23, 24.

especially by way of final causation (Aquinas). Whereas in the Inferno sin was considered in its manifold and multiform effects, in the Purgatorio it is regarded in its causes, and all referred to disordered love. The formal element, the aversion from the imperishable good, which is the essence of Hell, has been forgiven; the material element, the conversion to the good which perishes; the disordered love, is now to be purged from the soul. In the allegorical or moral sense, since every agent acts from some love, it is clear that a man's first business is to set love in order; and, indeed, the whole moral basis of Dante's Purgatory rests upon a line ascribed to St. Francis of Assisi: Ordina quest' Amore, O tu che m' ami; "set love in order, thou that lovest me." In the first three terraces, sins of the spirit are expiated; in the fourth terrace, sloth, which is both spiritual and carnal; in the fifth, sixth, seventh terraces, sins of the flesh. This purgation, which involves both pain of loss for a time and punishment of sense, is effected by turning with fervent love to God and detesting what hinders union with Him. Therefore, at the commencement of each terrace, examples are seen or heard of virtue contrary to the sin, in order to excite the suffering souls to extirpate its very roots; and at the end examples of its result or punishment (the "bit and bridle "). These examples are chosen with characteristic Dantesque impartiality alike from Scripture and legend or mythology; but in each case an example from the life of the Blessed Virgin is opposed to each deadly sin. At the end of each terrace stands an Angel-personification of one of the virtues opposed to the deadly sins. These seven Angels in their successive apparitions are

among the divinest things of beauty in the Divine Comedy. It is only when the sin is completely purged away that man can contemplate the exceeding beauty, the "awful loveliness" of the contrary virtue.

The Earthly Paradise is the type of blessedness in this life (De Mon. iii. 16); it is the condition of innocence which man enjoyed before the fall, and, his will being free and right, he has no need of the directive authority of imperial and ecclesiastical powers, but is a crowned and mitred master of himself. Here Dante shows in apocalyptic imagery what God does for man's salvation by means of Church and Empire, and what man must do for himself, if he desires to attain spiritual freedom. The pageant is also prophetic of the degradation of the Church and State. The innocent soul is fitted to ascend to the stars by passing through the river Lethe, which washes away all memory of sin, and the river Eunoë, which restores the weakened energies and quickens the memory of all good done.

The probable symbolical meaning of the persons and objects introduced is as follows: Cato is the type of moral liberty; the "four holy lights aureoling his face" represent the four cardinal virtues, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance; the three stars shining over the Valley of the Princes are the theological virtues, Faith, Hope, Charity; the Eagle is the type of the Spirit, and Lucia of Divine Grace; the three steps are the three parts of the sacrament of penance-confession, contrition, satisfaction; the Angel at the Gate of Justification is the Confessor, with the silver and gold keys of Judgment and Absolution; the seven P's signify Peccata, i. e. the seven mortal sins; Leah and Rachel are respectively the Active and the Contemplative life, both self-centred; Matilda is the Active Life made unselfish by Christian love; Vergil is human Reason enlightened by Divine Grace, and Beatrice is Divine Revelation; Lethe is the river of forgetfulness, and Eunoë the restorer of the good. (D.)

IX

THE MORAL TEACHING OF ST. THOMAS

AQUINAS

ON HAPPINESS.1

Is happiness an activity of the speculative or of the practical understanding?

R. Happiness consists rather in the activity of the speculative understanding than of the practical, as is evident from three considerations. First from this, that if the happiness of man is an activity, it must be the best activity of man. Now the best activity of man is that of the best power working upon the best object; but the best power is the understanding, and the best object thereof is the Divine Good, which is not the object of the practical understanding, but of the speculative. Secondly, the same appears from this, that contemplation is especially sought after for its own sake. But the act of the practical understanding is not sought after for its own sake, but for the sake of the action, and the actions themselves are directed to some end. Hence it is manifest that the last end cannot consist in the active life that is proper to the practical understanding. Thirdly, the same appears from this, that in the contemplative life man is partaker with his betters, namely, with God and the

1 Aquinas Ethicus, translated from the second part of the Summa Theologica, Jos. Rickaby, S. J., vol. i. p. 23. (By permission.)

angels, to whom he is assimilated by happiness; but in what concerns the active life other animals also after a fashion are partakers with men, albeit imperfectly. And therefore the last and perfect happiness which is expected in the world to come must consist mainly in contemplation. But imperfect happiness, such as can be had here, consists primarily and principally in contemplation, but secondarily in the activity of the practical understanding directing human actions and passions.

The practical understanding has a good which is outside of itself, but the speculative understanding has good within itself, to wit, the contemplation of truth; and if that good be perfect, the whole man is perfected thereby and becomes good. This good within itself the practical understanding has not, but directs a man towards it.

Does man's happiness consist in the vision of the Divine Essence? 1

R. The last and the perfect happiness of man cannot be otherwise than in the vision of the Divine Essence. In evidence of this statement two points are to be considered: first, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as there remains anything for him to desire and seek; secondly, that the perfection of every power is determined by the nature of its object. Now the object of the intellect is the essence of a thing: hence the intellect attains to perfection so far as it knows the essence of what is before it. And therefore, when a man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there is in him an outstanding natural 1 Vol. i. p. 24.