credit of one very wise man, against whom also very wise men were opposed, I know not why his authority should prevail farther now; for there is nothing added to the strength of his reason since that time, but only that he hath been in great esteem with posterity. And if that be all, why the opinion of the following ages shall be of more force than the opinion of the first ages, against whom St. Austin, in many things, clearly did oppose himself, I see no reason. Or whether the first ages were against him or no, yet that he is approved by the following ages, is no better argument; for it makes his authority not be innate, but derived from the opinion of others, and so to be precaria,' and to depend upon others, who if they should change their opinions (and such examples there have been many,) then there were nothing left to urge our consent to him, which when it was at the best was only this, because he had the good fortune to be believed by them that came after, he must be so still and because it was no argument for the old doctors before him, this will not be very good in his behalf. The same I say of any company of them, I say not so of all of them, it is to no purpose to say it; for there is no question this day in contestation, in the explication of which all the old writers did consent. In the assignation of the canon of Scripture, they never did consent for six hundred years together; and then, by that time, the bishops had agreed indifferently well, and but indifferently, upon that, they fell out in twenty more and except it be in the Apostles' creed, and articles of such nature, there is nothing which may with any colour be called a consent, much less tradition universal."-Taylor's Lib. of Prop., Sec. viii., 1, 2, 3.

Hooker's testimony, in the middle of an argument to shew the value of Patristical writings, runs thus:

66

I grant that proof derived from the authority of man's judgment is not able to work that assurance which doth grow by a stronger proof; and therefore, although ten thousand general councils would set down one and the same definitive sentence concerning any point of religion whatsoever, yet one demonstrative reason alleged, or one manifest testimony cited from the mouth of God himself to the contrary, could not choose but overweigh them all; inasmuch as for them to have been deceived it is not impossible; it is, that demonstrative reason or testimony divine should deceive. Howbeit in defect of proof infallible, because the mind doth rather follow probable persuasions than approve the things that have in them no likelihood of truth at all; surely if a question concerning matter of doctrine were proposed, and on the one

side no kind of proof appearing, there should on the other be alleged and shewed that so a number of the learnedest divines in the world have ever thought; although it did not appear what reason or what Scripture led them to be of that judgment, yet to their very bare judgment somewhat a reasonable man would attribute, notwithstanding the common imbecilities which are incident into our nature."- Hooker's Eccl. Pol., Bk. ii., ch. vii. 5.

Having thus settled the true use of the Fathers, we must receive them as invaluable witnesses of matters of fact, and living examples of the modes of thought and expression which prevailed in their day in things appertaining to the Christian religion. Without, therefore, always agreeing with their views, or even acknowledging the wisdom or judiciousness of them, we can consider what they propound to us. If we are told that their views were in a particular direction, we may examine their works to satisfy ourselves as to whether the statement is true, without acknowledging ourselves bound to accept what they held, nor in adducing proofs to the contrary, should we be acting in opposition to our own principles; for we should not insist on the adoption by others of what we adduce from the Fathers, because it was to be found in them. It would no doubt be a great satisfaction to find our Church at one with the churches of the earlier ages in faith and practice, and this phase of the "communion of saints" it is ours thankfully to enjoy.

CHAPTER II.

CONSECRATION, AS A CHARACTERISTIC OF THE HOLY EUCHARIST, NOT ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM CONSECRATION WHEN USED IN OTHER

CASES.

Archdeacon Wilberforce opens his book with the satisfactory declaration that "an enquiry into the nature of the Holy Eucharist must be founded upon Scripture, and upon that passage of Scripture by which the solemn rite was authorized as well as explained." And after quoting the few simple words of the Evangelists as to the institution, he proceeds to say:

"Our Lord's words (this is my body) involve this main truththat consecration is the essential characteristic of the Holy Eucharist. For our Lord does not speak of bread at large, or wine in general, but of This, i. e., of that which was consecrated, or set apart. No doubt His words had a further application; their ultimate reference was to the inward part or thing signified,' which was the real object under consideration; but they had also an indirect relation to the outward and visible sign.' Now viewing the thing in reference to this last, it was the bread which He had blessed, over which He had given thanks, and which He had broken; and the cup over which He had given thanks; which were the subject-matter of His declaration. The consecration, therefore, by which these elements were separated from all co-ordinate specimens of the same material, is that circumstance which gives them the peculiar character which His words express. And so we may learn also from the only other passage of Holy Scripture in which this subject is formally treated. When St. Paul explains the nature of the Holy Eucharist to the Corinthians, he refers to the consecration of the elements as its distinguishing characteristic. The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the Blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the Body

of Christ?' We may infer, therefore, that the elements, as consecrated, are the subject spoken of: Our Lord's awful words do not refer to bread and wine at large, but to that which He held in His hands, and which He had blessed."-Doct. H. Euch. pp. 7, 8.

Now, in the whole of this extract, although I feel that the idea intended to be expressed by the Archdeacon is wholly beyond and at variance with my own, yet there is but one sentence from which I would dissent. That sentence is, "No doubt His words had a further application; their ultimate reference was to 'the inward part or thing signified,' which was the real object under consideration; but they had also an indirect relation to the outward and visible sign.'" The rest is all expressive of sound Scriptural, Protestant doctrine, and in unobjectionable phraseology; and it was because it was felt not to go far enough in conveying the erroneous idea of transubstantiation, or whatever else the Archdeacon would call it,- (I shall use this word, which he does not repudiate, for want of a better),—that he put in that unwarrantable sentence.

It is hardly to be supposed that any person could be found to assert that, when our blessed Lord said "this," as he handed the bread to his disciples, he meant all bread, and not exclusively the piece which he then held. I never yet met with any individual who contended for any real or virtual connection between bread as bread (i.e. bread in general) and our Lord's body, between wine as wine (i.e. wine in general) and his precious blood. No doubt it is the consecration (i.e. the separation of a given portion by prayer to a sacred use) which constitutes the bread and the wine, in a sense, holy, and typical of those saving realities, the names of which they sometimes bear. "The consecration, by which these elements were separated from all other co-ordinate specimens of the same material, is that circumstance which gives them the peculiar character which our Lord's words express." His "awful words do not refer to bread and wine at large, but to that which he held in his hands, and which he had blessed."

In exact accordance with this idea are the quotations from the Fathers, made by the Archdeacon. It is "the food which is sanctified by the word of prayer," which is "no longer common bread and common drink," but "the flesh and blood of the incarnate Jesus," according to the figurative mode of speaking, common amongst orientals and generally adopted by the early Fathers, when they refer to the physical things used in the ordinances of religious worship. It is when "the bread from the earth receives the invocation of God," that it is "no longer common bread, but Eucharist, consisting of two things, an earthly and a heavenly."+ Augustin well says:

“Our bread and our cup is not any one,' i.e. any specimen of the food partaken, but it is a mystical one, which is produced by a fixed consecration, and does not come by growth. That which is not produced in this way, though it may be bread and a cup, is a means of bodily refreshment, not a sacrament of religion.' of the sacred words another species is named; after consecration the Body is signified.' Before consecration it is called a different thing; after consecration it is called Blood."§

Before the blessing

We are free to confess that we have no other idea than that which is so properly expressed in these quotations—viz., that it is the prayer which is offered over the physical elements which gives them their religious significance. Without this they would have remained common;" by means of this they become in a

sense "holy."

But on what ground can it be asserted that the word this refers not to the bread, visible and tangible, which was extended to the disciples, in its primary and direct application, but that it only made an indirect allusion to it? Nay; with what consistency can such an assertion be made by the Archdeacon, when he himself, but a moment before, had logically divided the expression "this is my body" into a subject (this), copula (is), and predicate (my body)? "This gives us," he says, "three topics,

* Just. Mart. Apol. i. 66.

+ Iren iv., 18, 5.

§ S. Amb. de Myst. ix. 54.

S. Aug. Con. Faus. xx. 13.

D