State likes to begin. It is the case of the proposal of a general disarmament,-"Que messieurs les assassins commencent." Practically, therefore, an amendment to the Constitution is necessary, which will prohibit the election of the whole college by general ticket.

Wisdom upon this subject may be drawn from the case of the election of members of Congress. The Constitution left that subject with the States, in the absence of legislation by Congress. The politicians in some of the States soon saw the power they and their States would gain, in all parts and aspects of political authority, if they could introduce a general-ticket system in the election of members of the House. To be sure, it was something like the gambler's stake, win all or lose all; but it was the magnitude of the stake which gave the importance to those who should be playing the game. New Hampshire, New Jersey, and even as large a State as Georgia chose their entire delegation to Congress by general ticket. The political minority, however large, was unrepresented, and the political influence of the State and of the persons ruling it was increased in importance indefinitely. However unjust the method, competition and self-defence would have caused it to spread rapidly, and we might have seen the scandal of the largest States sending unanimous delegations to Congress, elected by ever so small a majority or plurality in the State at large. But Congress, in 1847, under the power reserved to it by the Constitution, interfered and required that representatives should be elected by single districts. It having no such power to regulate the choice of electors, the only practical remedy is, as we have said, by an amendment of the Constitution.

The Electoral Colleges.

If the Constitution is to be amended, the first question in logical order, though not, as we think, in intrinsic importance, is whether the electoral colleges shall be retained? There are men of eminence who think they should be retained, on the ground that if their action is only formal they are not a serious inconvenience, and that a time may come when the people may be willing to resort to them, in the manner intended originally, as the real selectors as well as electors of the President. But we see not the least probability of this. Their intended function of selectors of the Presi

dent broke down the first time there was contested election. In 1800 the Democratic party, through the press and popular meetings, had designated Jefferson as their candidate for President and Burr for Vice-President, and so literally did the electors carry out the will of the party, that every Democratic elector voted for those two candidates, so as to make a tie, as the manner of voting then was. This caused the Amendment of 1804. From that time on, the electors have not pretended to select the President. The respective parties have selected their candidates, and the contest at the polls has been practically between such two candidates, the forms of the Constitution being preserved by the people choosing between two sets of electors, designated by the two parties and pledged to vote for the respective candidates. We may digress a moment to reflect upon the extraordinary nature of this proceeding. Not only is it a most striking illustration of the essential superiority of human instincts and will over prepared constitutions, observing their forms scrupulously, but reversing their spirit and purpose absolutely; but it is a remarkable proof of the manner in which, under certain circumstances, faith is kept with the people. For seventy-six years, that is, for nineteen Presidential elections, no member of an electoral college has failed to vote for the candidate designated by his party, or been subjected to the imputation of being open to any influences in that direction. Yet the party takes from the elector no written pledge, and indeed exacts no oral pledge. From the fact that he is nominated by his party as a Presidential elector, the party having first designated whom it wishes to have made President, he comes under the implied obligation to vote for that candidate, and to disregard the obligation the Constitution intends to put upon him of selecting and voting for a President according to his own judgment. The number of electors who during this period have so kept faith with their parties must have been between three and four thousand.

To return to the line of our argument. The machinery of electoral colleges not only complicates the process of election, but, in our judgment, gives greater scope for fraud than would a direct vote by the people. It is true that the colleges of electors have been composed of eminently respectable men. There is a certain air of dignity which surrounds the post, although its functions have become purely formal. When such is the case, and there is no

power, profit, or patronage involved, we may ordinarily rely upon seeing a row of respectable figure-heads. But suppose the system had worked as intended; suppose these colleges, of limited numbers, meeting in secret session, and protected, as far as could be, from outside inquiry or knowledge, had the actual power of making the original selection and designation of the President, and then to dissolve without having any other function to perform, and with no field for the exercise of those powers and qualities by which fame or popularity is to be gained. How long would such assemblies have remained incorrupt? As the experiment has never been tried, the answer is a matter of opinion. But we cannot repress the fear that in time they would have become the most corrupt and most detested functionaries in the whole line of our government. Far better is the open nomination by popular conventions, with all the objections to which they are subject, and the open election by the people, than would have been, as we believe, the results of the secret collegiate elections, when brought down to such times as these, and subjected to such influences as have beset the politics of this country for many years past.

Direct Popular Vote for President, Counted by Federal Numbers. Assuming, then, that, if the Constitution is amended, the choice by electors is abandoned, and a direct popular choice substituted, in what form shall it be cast? There have always been suggestions of a direct vote of the whole people of the country, irrespective of States, counted in the aggregate. But we cannot think such a proposition will receive even serious consideration by Congress or by any convention. It is sufficient that it sets aside State rights in the election, and what we are accustomed to call the Federal numbers, provided for the security of those rights. The requisite three fourths of the States are not likely to surrender their privileges and leave everything to the force of mere numbers, counted by the head. Besides this, such a vote would be an ordeal to which we ought not to subject anything in itself so full of dangers as the popular election of a single executive head, in plain words, the maintenance of an elective limited monarchy.

We have been objecting that, by the general-ticket system in the choice of electors, the area of the operation of a fraud is extended from a district to an entire State, from the choice of one

elector to the choice of thirty or forty. But under the plan of simple direct voting, counted in the aggregate, the area for the operation of every fraud or mistake would be the whole Republic. The result of every such illegal act would go directly into the aggregate vote of the whole country. The temptation to procure or commit any form of illegal act now known or hereafter to be invented will be increased to the highest power known to political algebra, and no redress will be adequate. Without saying that we do not believe that our system would stand the shock, it is enough to say that there is no excuse for subjecting it to such a test. The only course that remains seems to be that of the people voting directly for President, but counting the votes in accordance with Federal numbers, that is, by States and single districts.

To be more explicit, the plan is that each citizen of a State vote directly for the candidate for President whom he prefers. The candidate having the plurality of votes in the whole State will be credited with two electoral votes, and the candidate having the plurality of votes in any district will be credited with one electoral vote for each district which he carries. The result is, that the plurality in each State counts two electoral votes, and the plurality in each district counts one vote. In the last election, for instance, Mr. Tilden would have had two votes from the State of New York at large, and Mr. Hayes would have divided with him the thirty-three Congressional districts, according as one or the other had the plurality of votes in each; while in Ohio, Mr. Hayes would have had the two electoral votes at large, and the votes of the districts would have been divided upon the same principle. In short, this process gives to each State two electoral votes corresponding to its two Senators, and as many district votes as it has members of the House of Representatives, and will require the latter vote to be counted by single districts. This method, hinted at by Story, in his "Commentaries," but receiving little attention, is revived by Senator Morton, in his proposal to amend the Constitution, and we believe that to this part of his proposal no serious objection has been offered. We believe it to be the very best security that can be proposed to the country in the exercise of its right to the periodical choice of its chief magistrate.

Term of Office and Re-eligibility.

We are strongly of opinion that the term should be extended, not to a great length, not beyond six or seven years. The truth is, the process of king-making is a very exciting process in this Republic. What is popularly called the campaign lasts six months, and, including the preparations for the national conventions for nominating candidates, absorbs public attention one year out of four, and destroys every fourth term of Congress, and that always the long term, for useful legislation. It is not for the interests of the people at large that the air should always be surcharged with electioneering, and that the work of preparing themselves for elections and attending the polls, as well as the inevitable primary meetings and ante-primary meetings and conventions, should take up a large portion of the time of working and business men, whether in professions or in trades, mechanics or laborers, who have families to support and private duties to themselves and others and public duties not political, in abundance, to discharge. The more frequent and complex the elections become, the more the private citizen is disfranchised, and the whole passes into the hands of electioneering experts, the chief of the dangerous classes in this country. A citizen needs a breathing time in which he can think of other things, a period of repose. The choice of a member of Congress every other year, of a Senator through his legislature, on the average about as often, and the choice of some or all State and municipal officers annually or biennially, will be quite enough for him to do, quite enough to keep alive his political faculties and supply him with political information.

It must be expected that all attempts to make elections less frequent and more simple will meet the opposition of electioneering experts and men whose daily life lies in and whose daily bread depends upon what they are pleased to call politics. Such men depend upon frequent elections, as pickpockets depend upon frequent crowds. If the people themselves can once make a successful revolt against the tyranny of these low-toned and low-bred oligarchs, the country may have peace and repose, the vote of a private citizen will have responsibility and power, and the trade of the electioneering brokers and middlemen will suffer a diminution of power and profits.

We cannot but think that the effect of an enlarged term would be

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