A Supplement to the Second Edition of the Methods of EthicsMacmillan, 1884 - 184 sayfa |
Diğer baskılar - Tümünü görüntüle
Sık kullanılan terimler ve kelime öbekleri
action actually admit adoption æsthetic affirm agent appears applied ascer attainment aversion Benevolence Book causes Chap chapter Common Sense commonly conceive consciousness consequences consider definite degree desire determining discussion distinction distinguished doctrine doubt duty effects Egoistic Hedonism element emotional empirical method Ethics existence experience feeling fundamental Grant Allen happiness hedonistic human ideal imply important impulses individual internal sanction Intuitional Intuitionism Intuitionist involved J. S. Mill judge Justice Kant kind latter less Libertarians means merely method moral judgments moral rules moralists motives natural rights nature nexion notion object observed obviously onus probandi ordinary organism particular Perfection persons pleasure and pain possible practical present principle prompted proposition psychological Hedonism question rational realization reason recognized regard relation result right conduct seems shew social Social Statics society Spencer strictly tendency tends term thought tion treatise true ultimate end uncon Utilitarian virtue virtuous volition
Popüler pasajlar
Sayfa 93 - pains are the correlatives of actions injurious to the organism, while pleasures are the correlatives of acts conducive to its welfare.
Sayfa 107 - If now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any transgression of duty, we shall find that we in fact do not will that our maxim should be a universal law, for that is impossible for us...
Sayfa 107 - Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
Sayfa 11 - ... and though we do not conceive that it is by reason alone that men are influenced to act rightly, we still hold that appeals to the reason are an essential part of all moral persuasion, and that part which concerns the moralist or moral philosopher as distinct from the preacher or moral rhetorician. On the other hand it is widely maintained that, as Hume says, " Reason, meaning the judgment of truth and falsehood, can never of itself be any motive to the Will" — the motive to action being in...
Sayfa 94 - ... to expel are the correlatives of beneficial actions, it must quickly disappear through persistence in the injurious and avoidance of the beneficial. In other words, those races of beings only can have survived in which, on the average, agreeable or desired feelings went along with activities conducive to the maintenance of life, while disagreeable and habitually-avoided feelings went along with activities directly or indirectly destructive of life ; and there must ever have been, other things...
Sayfa 82 - It should seem, that a due concern about our own interest or happiness, and a reasonable endeavour to secure and promote it, which is, I think, very much the meaning of the word, prudence, in our language; it should seem, that this is virtue, and the contrary behaviour faulty and blamable ; since, in the calmest way of reflection, we approve of the first and condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves and others.
Sayfa 107 - We have also, which is of great importance, exhibited clearly and definitely for every practical application the content of the categorical imperative, which must contain the principle of all duty if there is such a thing at all.
Sayfa 151 - Mill: hence, in giving as a statement of this principle that "the general happiness is desirable," he must be understood to mean (and his whole treatise shews that he does mean) that it is what each individual ought to desire, or at least — in the stricter sense of 'ought...
Sayfa 150 - ... humanity" is, as Kant says, "a self-subsistent end:" moreover, there seems to be a sort of paralogism in the deduction of the principle of Benevolence by means of this conception. For the humanity which Kant maintains to be an end in itself is Man (or the aggregate of men) in so far as rational. But the subjective ends of other men, which Benevolence directs us to take as our own ends, would seem, according to Kant's own view, to depend upon and correspond to their non-rational impulses — their...
Sayfa 161 - Utilitarian formula seems to supply no answer to this question: at least we have to supplement the principle of seeking the greatest happiness on the whole by some principle of Just or Right distribution of this happiness. The principle which most Utilitarians have either tacitly or expressly adopted is that of pure equality— as given in Bentham's formula, "everybody to count for one, and nobody for more than one.